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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Europe of the 1990s is mazked by two economic, social and political reforms of
unprecedented scale and scope. In the European Union (EU) the process ofeconomic integration
that was embarked upon already in the 1960s, will take a big step forwazd in 1999 with the
completing of the Economic and Monetazy Union (EMU). In Eastern Europe the transition
from plan to market economies that was stazted in 1989 and 1990, implies a drastic restructuring
of basically all economic, social and political institutions and structures. This introduction
starts with a broad overview about the issues that are important in the debate on EMU. Next,
attention is shifted to reform in Eastern Europe. In Section 3 the structure of this thesis is
discussed.
i.l Towards the EMU
The principles of the EMU were laid down in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. EMU in the
first place entails the replacement of national currencies by a common currency, the Euro.
EMU also implies the replacement of national monetary policies by a common monetary
policy that is implemented by the common central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB),
in whose decision making all participating countries will have a(weighted) vote. By the end
of 1996, the EU Commission has to decide with which countries EMU will start and how
the countries that do not enter in the first round can be made to enter at a later stage. Alongside
the process of monetary unification in the EMU, political integration is highly important
in the EU. Indeed, economic and monetary integration not accompanied by progress in European
Political Union (EPU) is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run. According to many, the
current institutional structure of the EU in which the Council ofMinisters dominates decision
making and the European Commission dominates policy design and implementation, is
inadequate to cope with some major problems the Community experiences, in particulaz with
respect to the legitimacy of its decisions and a perceived 'democratic deficit'. As a consequence,
a number of institutional reforms have been initiated in the EU institutions. The Single European
Act of 1986 achieved that the role ofqualified majority voting was increased. Before, unanimity
voting would endlessly delay decision making. As a consequence, coalition formation has
become much more important. The power of the European Pazliament was increased by a
(limited) right to amendment. It is conceivable that the institutions of the EU will gradually
evolve into a real federal government in which the Commission is the executive that initiates
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communal policies and in which the European Pazliament has the legislative powers.
The design and implementation ofmonetary policiesof the ECB has azoused considerable
interest ofmacro-economists and their analyses have increased our understanding of the probable
functioning and implications of the ECB both in theory and in practice. Considerable attention
has been devoted to the objectives of the ECB and the decision making process inside the
ECB. The actual monetary policies that the ECB will follow aze the result of an intricate
bazgaining process between the representatives of the countries that join the EMU, entailing
compromises between coalitions of countries. Alesina and Grilli (1993) and von Hagen and
Suppel (1994) analyse the stabilisation motive underlying ECB monetary policies and the
internal decision making process on ECB monetazy policies. von Hagen and Fratianni (1993)
study the implementation and operation of its monetary policies. Martin (1996) analyses a
two-speed monetary union in which 'high-inflation' countries that initially do not enter the
monetary union, converge to the EMU that is dominated by 'low-inflation' countries. The
stabilization dimension of ECB policies also features in the model of Chapter 5 that is
chazacterised by (short-run) Keynesian rigidities in the goods market.
Seigniorage revenues will result from ECB monetary policies and will be redistributed
to the individual countries. The implications of this 'revenue' dimension of the ECB are studied
in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. It is shown how the transfer of monetary policies from
a national level to the ECB will establish links between the public finances of the participating
countries. The link is provided by the monetary policies of the ECB: the seigniorage revenues
that the ECB collects will be redistributed to the participating countries~. The potential scope
for ECB seigniorage is not to be underestimated, especially ifone is willing to accept a more
extensive concept. The ECB will control a large stock of European base money of, say, 500
billion ECUz. The use of the common currency by the rest of the world as foreign exchange
reserves or in trade, is likely to be non-negligible'. The ECB will carry a voluminous portfolio
ofgovernment bonds to carry out open market transactions. It will have to take its responsibility
as a'lender of last resort' in times of financial instability to prevent a financial collapse in
the EMU. Unanticipated inflation can reduce the real value ofoutstanding nominal obligations
ofnational governments considerably. Finally, a system of reserve requirements enables the
' The seigniorage redistribution rule proposed by the EU Commission weights the GDP shaze and the population
share of each country.
2 The GDP of the EU 15 amounts to 5920 bin ECU in 1994. Assuming an average base money to GDP
ratio of 80~o an amount of 474 bin ECU results.
' The demand for ECU base money by the rest of the world for transaction purposes and as foreign exchange
reserves could amount to 50 bin ~ according to estimates in European Commission (1990).
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ECB to control (excess) banking reserves in the EU. Clearly, ECB monetary policies are
important in the functioning of the EU economy and public finance in particulaz. Considering
that seigniorage revenues aze part of a lazger tax system, it follows that EMU will affect
fiscal policies of the participating countries in this manner. The redistribution of seigniorage
by the ECB is a special instrument in the broad set of fiscal transfers that can be used in
the EU.
In its seminal study 'One Market, One Money', the European Commission (1990)
studied the possible costs and benefits from a common currency and a common monetary
policy. In the context of EMU, the 'optimal currency azea' azgument has often been stressed
by critics of the EMU. According to this argument, EMU will be inefficient if the countries
that participate do not constitute an optimal currency area. Countries are less likely to constitute
an optimal currency area if Keynesian rigidities prevail in the goods and labour markets and
macroeconomic shocks tend to be asymmetric rather than symmetric, if there is low labour
mobility among the countries that share a common currency and if there is little or no automatic
stabilisation from federal fiscal taxation and government spending. Exchange rate flexibility
on the other hand can, in principle, can stabilise very well the impact of asymmetric shocks
and, therefore, is likely to be more efficient ifcountries do not constitute an'optimal currency
area'. Given the empirical evidence that macroeconomic shocks in the EU are to a certain
extent asymmetric, that labour mobility is low, wage rigidities prevail and that automatic
stabilisation from federal taxes and government spending is very small", critics of EMU have
often (ab)used this 'optimal currency azea' argument to proclaim their scepticism against
EMU.
While the introduction ofa common cunency and the establishment of the ECB provide
new institutional structures for the conduct of monetary policy in the EU, a lot of uncertainty
remains on the appropriate institutional structure of fiscal policy in the EMU. Clearly, EMU
entails important consequences for the conduct of fiscal policies. The European Commission
(1993) made an extensive study on the impact of a monetary union on the conduct of fiscal
policies of the participating countries. In the first place, EMU proclaims fiscal stringency
to reduce the possibility of a'bail-out' by the ECB of undisciplined fiscal authorities that
accumulate unsustainable amounts ofgovemment debt. Considerable concern has azisen about
the possibility that lack of fiscal discipline in the EMU will weaken the credibility of the
" See e.g. Christodoulakis, Dimelis and Kollintzas (1995) on the degree of asymmetry of macroeconomic
shocks in the EU, Decressin and Fatás (1995) for empirical evidence on labour mobility in the EU, Heylen
and van Poeck (1995) on wage rigidities in the EU and Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) on the automatic stabilisation
from federal taxes and expenditures in the U.S. and the E.U.
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ECB commitment towards price-stability: undisciplined countries could use their voting power
in the ECB decision making process to enforce more inflationary policies such as to generate
more seigniorage revenues, erode the real value ofoutstanding government debt and increase
output by ( unanticipated) inflation.
In addition, lack of fiscal discipline of some EMU members might put pressure on
the European Commission to increase redistribution ofreal resources towards the tmdisciplined
governments. The possibility of such monetary andlor fiscal 'bail-outs' ofundisciplined countries
could induce a'fiscal deficit bias' in the EU in addition to already existing political distortions
that contribute to a'fiscal deficit bias'S. The Delors Committee ( 1989), therefore, proposed
ceilings on the fiscal deficit (30~0 of GDP) and the level of government debt (600~0 of GDP)
to enhance fiscal discipline in the EMU. These fiscal criteria are important elements in the
Maastricht Treaty on EMU. Moreover, a high degree of independence of the ECB should
further reduce the possibility of 'bail-outs' of undisciplined fiscal authorities by the ECB.
The 1980s have, indeed, witnessed a considerable increase in government indebtedness
in the EU countries. For some cotuttries concerns about the sustainability of the current fiscal
stance appear justifiedb. Some countries have made a start with fiscal consolidation as witness
lower primary fiscal deficits. Due to a considerable interest burden the process of fiscal
consolidation is undoubtedly a long and painful process in many cases. The OECD (1989)
and (1994a) studies analyse this process of government debt accumulation and fiscal reform
in OECD countries in more detail. The main elements in fiscal reforms in the OECD area
are a reduction in govemment spending, the design of a less distortionary tax system and
bringing under control again of government indebtedness. Table 1 summarises the fiscal stance
of the EU countries by the following key-indicators: the (gross) debt to GDP ratio (column
2), D~Y, the interest payments to GDP ratio, iD~Y, (column 3), the primary deficit to GDP
ratio, FIY, (columns 4 and 5), the seigniorage to GDP ratio,~LUY, (columns 6 and 7), government
revenues to GDP ratio, T~Y, ( columns 8 and 9) inflation, n, (columns 10 and 11) and
unemployment, UN, (columns 12 and 13). The final column gives the weight of the country
weights in aggregate EU GDP in 1995, w.
5 See Roubini and Sachs (1989) on political distortions that contribute to a'fiscal deficit' bias in the economy.
6 Corsetti and Roubini (1993) test the sustainability of the process of government debt accumulation in
the EU. Debt accumulation is sustainable if the (interest-inclusive) fiscal deficit (measured as a fraction of
GDP) is a stationary variable. The empirical results indicate that the data-generating process has not been stationary
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Considerable differences in government indebtedness and the burden of interest payments
exist at the end of 1995. 1990-1995 averages ofprimary fiscal deficits, seigniorage and inflation
also display considerable variation. The EU average found in the last row can be used to
divide the EU into an above EU average and a below EU average indebted part. The first
part encompasses Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden while the
other countries have below average government debt. As concerning inflation, Belgium and
the Netherlands move to the below EU average group, whereas Portugal, Spain, the UK and
Finland move to the above EU average group.
Figure 1 displays government indebtedness (as o~o of GDP) of the EU countries for
the period 1978-1995. The first graph shows debt dynamics of the three most heavily indebted
countries, Belgium, Greece and Italy that have debtlGDP ratios over 1000~0. Stabilisation
ofgovernment indebtedness has not yet been achieved. The second graph shows government
debt dynamics ofIreland, the Netherlands and Sweden that have also accumulated considerable
government debt. Ireland succeeded in stabilising its debdGDP ratio and to reverse the trend
of rising government debt of the eazly 1980's. Sweden has experienced a rapid increase of
government debt during the last years. Govemment debt dynamics of four countries that currently
have a debdGDP ratio of around 650~0, namely Denmazk, Finland, Portugal and Spain aze
shown in the third graph. The public finances of these countries could currently be considered
as sustainable. The fast rate of government debt accumulation that Finland, however, recently
experienced, is clearly not sustainable in the medium and long term. Government indebtedness
in Austria, France, Germany and the United Kingdom is displayed in the final graph. These
countries would satisfy the Maastricht criterion of less than 600~o government indebtedness,
although France, Germany and the UK show a fairly strong increase in government debt
accumulation during the last three yeazs.
Introduciion
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Figlue 1
Government Debt Dynamics in the EU. Source: OECD
Government debt will only stabilise if fiscal deficits are stabilised. Italy and Belgium
show a downward trend in their fiscal deficit, although their current fiscal deficits of around
So~o currently are well above the 30~o criterium advanced in the Maastricht treaty. Greece still
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runs exceptionally high ftscal deficits. Ireland and the Netherlands run fairly modest fiscal
deficits of 30~0. Sweden has experienced a strong increase in fiscal deficits after a period of
low and even negative fiscal deficits in the eazly 1980's. Fiscal deficits appear to converge
to around 40~o in Denmazk, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Austria and Germany. France and the
UK experienced an increase in fiscal deficits to a level of óo~o recently.
The fiscal deficit consists of the primary fiscal deficit and interest payments on
outstanding government debt. The primary fiscal deficit is equal to government expenditures,
excluding interest payments on govemment debt, minus revenues. An important cause for
the relatively high fiscal deficits is the huge interest burden that a number of countries face.
Huge interest burdens of azound l00~0 of GDP are facing the three most indebted countries:
Belgium, Greece and Italy. The interest burden of most other countries is cutrently around
3-Soro of GDP.
The fiscal criteria in the Maastricht Treaty for entering the EMU have evoked many
discussions by economists, politicians and popular press. While the numerical values that
have been fixed aze highly azbitrary, there is a general consensus that the fiscal stringency
criteria are useful in promoting fiscal sustainability. The main potential danger in the fiscal
criteria is that they could contribute to a deflationary bias, especially in countries which face
a lazge adjustment burden from compliance with the fiscal criteriaa. Joining the EMU implies
that the burden of country-specific shocks will falls lazgely on national fiscal policy whose
autonomy and flexibility is, however, already reduced due to the fiscal stringency criteria
and the high degree of fmancial and goods mazket integration. The Delors Committee, therefore,
advocated a further increase in the EU structural adjustment funds in order to alleviate the
adjustment burden of the part of the EU in unfavourable conditions as compazed to the EU
average. As a consequence, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the Cohesion Fund that aims
at supporting the countries that have the highest burden from complying with the Maastricht
criteria.
As concerning the implementation of fiscal policy in the EU, the principle of
"subsidiarity" is often stressed. According to this principle decisions on fiscal policies should
be made as decentralised as possible and involvement of the EU Commission be limited to
policies in case of important externalities, mazket failure andlor economies of scale. Given
the considerable degree of interdependencies between the EU countries and the emergence
of considerable economies of scale in raising taxes and production of pure public goods,
more centralisation in taxation and the production of public goods in the EU and an increase
' See Jensen and Jensen (1995) for a theoretical analysis of the costs of compliance with the fiscal EMiJ
criteria from the perspective of a small country.
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in the activities of the EU Commission and the EU budget, which is currently rather limited
(around 1,30~0 ofEU GDP) and lazgely devoted to agricultural policies, aze likely to be welfare
improving.
Unavoidably with the completing ofEMU andproceeding with the EPU, fiscal federalism
issues in the EU become more important. Fiscal federalism concerns the optimal allocation
of the powers to raise taxes and to provide government spending over the different layers
ofgovernment: local govetnment, regional government, national government and, in the context
of EU, also the communal EU level. The theory of fiscal federalism explains that taxation
and government spending should be more centralised if there are important externalities that
cannot be internalised at lower levels of government. At present the EU can be considered
as a very decentralised fiscal federation and a higher degree of centralisation at the EU level
of taxation and government spending is likely to be more efficient in many cases.
Important element in the discussion on fiscal federalism is the issue of fiscal redistribution
in the ELJ9. Standard 'fiscal federalism' arguments for intra-Community transfers are based
on equity, efficiency, and stabilisation considerations. The welfare effects ofa single market,
tax harmonisation and constraints on fiscal instruments implied by the EMU are additional
arguments for fiscal redistribution in the EU. The equity azgument addresses the notion of
solidazity and the desire for cohesion between EU countries. Efficiency azguments for fiscal
redistribution are related to the existence ofexternalities between EU countries and the economies
of scale and scope that are possible when centralising fiscal policies and instruments.
In addition, fiscal redistribution in the EU can be used to actively stabilise country-specific
shocks. Currently, the stabilizing effects from transfers through the EU budget is extremely
small because of the small size of the EU budget'o, much smaller than in more mature fiscal
federations, like the U.S". Transferring stabilisation policy to the federal EU level, in that
9 The European Commission ( 1993) discusses in detail the many issues in the debate on fiscal federalism
and fiscal redistribution in the EU.
'o The Structural Funds are explicitly designed to redistribute resources in the EU. The structural funds
of the EU comprise the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and
the Guidance component of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGF). By 1994, total
disbursements of the structural funds amount to one fourth of the EU budget and 0.3"~0 of the EU GDP. Explicit
objectives of the structural funds aze (1) promotion of development and structural adjustment in less developed
regions, (2) rehabilitation of areas affected by industrial decline, (3) reduction of long-tenn unemployment,
(4) occupational integration of the young, (Sa) speeding-up of agricultural adjustment and (Sb) promotion of
rural development.
" Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) and von Hagen (1991) study the stabilising effects of the fiscal transfers
from the federal to the state level in the US.
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case will provide more insurance to the adverse consequences of country-specific shocks.
In particular, in a monetary union where national monetary policy is no longer existing, with
Keynesian rigidities in goods and labour markets, and in which low labour mobility prevails,
a European Federal Transfer Scheme (EFTS) to counteract country-specific shocks is likely
to be welfare improving for the EU as a whole. Chapter 5 studies the design and effects of
such an EFTS in more detail and is motivated by concern about the European unemployment
problem that currently exists. Figure 2 gives the unemployment performance in the recent
past.
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Figure 2
Unemployment Dynamics in the EU. Source: OECD
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The graphs indicate that the rate of unemployment in most EU countries has tended
to increase over the successive economic cycles since the 1970s. The job creation generated
during the expansionary phases has not been able to compensate the employment losses
experienced during the recessions, thus increasing structural unemployment with each business
cycle. Between 1984 and 1989 unemployment decreased gradually in most EU countries.
In the period 1990-1993, unemployment started to rise again after which it levelled of at
rates between óo~o (Portugal) and 200~0 (Spain). Together, cyclical and structural driving forces
determine the actual unemployment performance'Z. In its extensive 'Jobs Study', the OECD
(1994b) studied the unemployment problem in the OECD azea. According to its estimates,
of the current unemployment rate in the EU of more than l00~0, about 6,So~o is structural
unemployment while the remainder can be classified as cyclical unemployment.
1.2 Towards a Market Economy in Eastern Europe
In Eastern Europe, the collapse ofcommunism necessitates a complete rebuilding ofthe political,
social and economic institutions. Important elements in the reform process of these 'economies
in transition' are the establishment of a democratic, pluriform society, the privatisation of
a large part of the government sector, and the liberalisation of goods, labour and financial
markets, foreign trade and capital flows. The economic transition in Eastern Europe contains
three main elements: macroeconomic stabilisation, liberalisation of prices and markets and
institutional change. Stabilisation requires fiscal and monetary restraint, exchange rate
management and wage and incomes policies. Liberalisation implies policies that eliminate
legal and bureaucratic restrictions on economic activity such as price controls, restrictions
on foreign trade and exchange rate convertibility and barriers to set up and develop private
enterprise. Liberalisation policies support a rapid shift towazds a market economy and promote
the growth of the private sector. Institutional reform creates the change in economic, political
and social institutions necessary to establish a stable democratic market economy. It involves,
amongst other, privatisation ofstate fitrns, reform of legal codes and the tax system and reform
of the political system towards a pluriform, democratic society.
The transformation process has proceeded at different speeds across the different
countries, reflecting differences in opinion whether reforms should be introduced in a'big
bang' or'shock therapy' fashion or should be introduced in a gradual manner. Macroeconomic
stabilisation and liberalisation can be implemented much faster than institutional reform.
12 Cyclical and structural components may interact with eachother as leager and Parkinson (1995) show
in their model of unemploment 'hysteresis'.
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Obviously, political developments aze of pazamount importance to the progress in the transition
process". Frequent tumover ofgovemments and ministers is likely to delay the implementation
of structural reform. The political framework for transition has been less favourable in Bulgaria,
Romania and to Poland than in Hungary and the Czech Republic, in this respect. Structural
reform has progressed most in Hungazy, the Czech Republic and Poland that, however, also
possessed the most advantageous initial conditions of the former planned economies.
The most successful reformer in Eastern Europe, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus of
the Czech Republic and the former Czechoslovakia, expressed perhaps most cleazly the objectives
of the reform process, back in 1990:
"We want to achieve the transition from a state-dominated economy to an economy
based on private property, private initiative and private entrepreneurship. We do not intend
to orchestrate the economy from above and we do not want to start another vicious circle
of pseudo-rationalistic engineering based on ambitions of irresponsible intellectuals and
technocrats. We are increasingly convinced that our country, or any other, is less unique
than it is often claimed. There are some specifics, some differences, but there are more
similarities, including the basic economic laws that are valid across continents, economic
systems, and ideological beliefs. Let me stress the following points: (i) a partial reform is
much worse than a nonreform. This is a message which was explicitly clear from the partial
reform in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. A partial reform in a distorted economy is a tremendous
and dangerous mistake, (ii) in favouring a nonpartial and comprehensive reform, I do not
intend to wait for an all-embracing reform blueprint. To wait is one way offalling into 'the
reform trap', (iii) a reform project means aplan for several crucial reform steps in a proper
sequence. A reform project does not mean that we understand all the details; that we know
in advance all the steps; (iv) even if the major challenges for the transformation process
are microeconomic in nature, sound macroeconomic policy is essential ifthe reform process
is to succeed. Restrictive monetary and fiscal policy is the precondition for any successful
economic reform. Without it, we are in the reform trap again, (v) another major obstacle
to a successful economic transformation is the lack oftransparency ofbasic economic relations
in apost-centrally planned economy. All economic agents at the microlevel, the government,
as well as the architects ofthe reform, are in reality blind because ofthe lack oftransparency
in two areas: in the field ofproperty rights and in the field ofprices. We have understood
that the early rapid transformation of property rights is absolutely crucial for the rejorm
" Hillman (1994) provides a detailed account of the political economy of transition.
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to succeed. Relative prices must be changed at the early stage of the reform process, too. "
V. Klaus, Lecture held at the conference ofthe Egon Sohmen Foundation, Laxenburg, Austria,
May 1990
Depending on the initial conditions, the starting date of the reform programs and the
implementation speed, the economies in transition experienced marked differences in the
severity of internal and external macroeconomic imbalances. While differing in degree, all
economies in transition experienced a substantial decline in (recorded) output, an inflationary
surge, fiscal imbalances, current account imbalances and increasing inequality in the distribution
of income and wealth during the first stage of the reform process. A drop in standards of
living for a considerable part of the population and an increase of unemployment manifested
themselves and have threatened the further proceeding of the reform processes in many cases,
as support for the reform process declined. Unemployment increased due to the closing down
of a large number of loss making former state managed enterprises that were uncompetitive
compazed to international standards and the collapse of intra-Comecon trade in 1991. Inflation
was fuelled by the liberalisation ofprices, the lazge initial monetary overhang and monetising
of large fiscal deficits. High fiscal deficits were the result of shrinking tax bases without
a concurrent reduction in government spending. Large current account deficits reflect strong
import demand for Western products and the low competitiveness of domestic producers
at world market conditions.
Table 2 provides more information about the economic perfonnance that the economies
in transition experienced during the period 1990-1995 that we may consider as the ' first stage'
of transition. A necessary caveat applies: in most cases output, inflation, public finance and
external trade data are measured only with limited accuracy due to deFicient statistical reporting
procedures, differences in accounting procedures, etc. The numbers below, therefore, should
be used to derive global trends, rather than to claim an exact account of the factual
macroeconomic performance of these countries.
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Table 2
Macroeconomic Indicators Transition Economies 1990-1995
Real GDP Growth
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Infla tion rate
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Albania -10.0"Io -27.7oro -7.2"~0 9.6"ro 9.4"ro 8.6"ro
Bulgaria -9.loro -11.7"ro -7.3oro -2.4"ro 1.4"ro 2.Soro
Croatia -3.70~0 0.80~0 5.0"~0
Czech Rp. -3.Ooro -15.9"ro -6.4"ro -0.9"Io 2.6oIo 5.0"ro
Estonia -3.6oIo -7.9"ro -21.6"ro -8.4"ro 3.Ooro 4.0"ro
Hungary -3.Soro -11.9"ro -3.0"ro -O.8oIo 2.90~0 1.9"ro
Latvia -3.Soro -il.]"ro -35.2"ro -16.1"ro 2.2"Io 0.4"ro
Lithuania -S.Ooro -13.1"ro -56.6"ro -24.2oro 1.7"ro 5.3"ro
Poland -11.6oro -7.óoro 2.6"~0 3.Soro 6.0"~0 6.5"ro
Romania -5.6"ro -12.9oro - 8.8"ro 1.3"ro 3.9"ro 6.9oro
Russia -2.0"ro -13.0"ro -19.Ooro -12.0"ro -15.0"ro -4.Ooro
Slovakia -3.0"ro -15.9"ro -6.4"ro -3.7oro 4.9"ro 7.4oro
Slovenia 1.3"Io 5.3"Io 4.8"~0
Ukraine -3.2oro -11.9oro -17.0"ro -16.8oro -23.7"ro -11.4"Io
Gvt. budget deficit o~o of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Albania -15.4"ro -30.7oro -21.5"ro -16.0"ro -13.0"ro -13.1"ro
Bulgaria -12.8"ro -14.7"Io -15.Ooro -15.7"ro -7.Ooro -6.0"ro
Croatia -S.Ooro -3.8"~0 -0.7"~0 1.7"Io -I.5"ro
Czech Rp. -7.Ooro -1.9oro -1.7"ro 0.óoro -1.3"ro -1.6"ro
Estonia 5.2oro -0.3oro -0.7oIo 1.3"ro 0.3"ro
Hungary 0.9oro -3.Ooro -6.8"ro -6.7oro -8.óoro -6.7"ro
Latvia 6.3"ro -0.8"ro 0.6"ro -4.0"ro -3.4oro
Lithuania -0.1"~0 -2.0"~0 -1.3"~0
Poland 3.3"~0 -6.7"ro - 8.0"ro -4.0"ro -2.0"Io -2.7oro
Romania l.loro -1.7oro -4.6"Io -O.loro -1.0"ro -2.Soro
Russia - 18.9"ro -7.6"ro -10.1"ro -12.0"ro
Slovakia -7.0"ro -1.9"ro -1.7"ro -7.1"ro -1.3"ro -0.4"ro
Slovenia 2.boro 0.20~0 0.3"ro -0.2oIo -0.5"ro
Ukraine -29.3"~0 -10.3"~0 - 8.8"~0 -3.5"~0
36"ro 226oro 85"ro 23oro 8"ro
24"ro 334"ro 82"ro 730~0 96"ro ó2oro
1516"Io 98"ro 2"ro
10"ro 58"Io 1 loro 21oro l0oro 9oro
17"ro 211 "ro ] 069"ro 89oro 48"ro 29oro
29oro 34"Io 23"ro 22oIo 19oro 28oro
11"ro 124"ro 951oro 109oIo 35"ro 25oro
376oro 225"~0 ]020"ro 4100~0 72"ro 37oro
586"ro 70"ro 43oro 35oro 32"ro 28"ro
Soro 161 oro 210"ro 256"ro 137oro 32oro
5"ro 93"ro 1353oro 896oro 302oIo 190"ro
10"ro 58"ro ] loro 23oro 13oro l0oro
I15"ro 207"ro 32"ro 20"ro 12"ro
Soro 91 "ro 1910"ro 4735"ro 891 oro 376"ro
Curr. Accnt. min US ~
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
-118 -168 -51 15 -157
-1710 -77 -360 -1098 -25 334
-593 -589 823 104 103 -1712
-1100 357 226 115 -50 -1892
36 23 -170
127 267 324 -3455 -3911 -2180
-49 ]03 -158
160 -69 -219
716 -1359 -269 -2329 -944
-1656 -1187 -1564 -1170 -271
-4300 7100 -5723 -773 -2309
-I100 357 -226 -605 648
479 129 929 196 516 -36
-401 -970 -1800
ource: , nternationa manc~a tat~stics an or conomic ut oo . um ers or t e zec
Republic and Slovakia refer to the fotmer Czechoslovakia during 1990-1992.
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To reduce the internal and external macroeconomic imbalances, stabilisation programs
were launched. Sahay and Végh (1995) document extensively the output and inflation
stabilisation programs in the economies in transformation. Table 3, taken from Sahay and
Végh (1995), summarises the initial conditions of the transition economies, the stabilisation
programs that were launched in 1990 and 1991 and the outcomes that resulted. Except to
some extent in the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, the stabilisation programs
were introduced in an initial situation ofhigh inflation and severely stagnating output growth.
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Russia had to undertake the largest
industrial restructuring because of the prevalence of a large and largely inefficient industrial
sector. External trade was disproportionately directed to the rest of the Comecon in case of
Bulgaria and Romania. External debt problems were most severe in case ofBulgaria, Croatia,
Hungary and Poland. The labour force was well organised in Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Romania
and Russia and Slovenia. In the financial sector, bad loans and arreazs were a major problem
in most countries.
The stabilisation programs in all cases had a heterodox chazacter, implying that besides
orthodox monetary policy measures, also fiscal and income policies were used as stabilisation
tools. As concerning monetary policy, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Russia
implemented money based inflation stabilisation. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary
and Poland implemented exchange rate based stabilisation programs. In general, the exchange
rate based programs were more successful than the money based programs. Structural reform
has progressed most in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia and Poland. Hungary started
its reform earlier and implemented it in very gradual manner. Progress is slow in case of
Bulgaria, Romania and Russia.
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Table 3
Transition Economies, Initial Conditions in 1990
Countries Macroeconomic Growth in late Industry, extemal En[erprise sector Key financia!
conditions 1980s trade, extemal debt sector problems
Bulgaria imbalanced: large low posi[ive-stag- large heavy indus- central control, bad loans (25"~ of
price jump nant, varied (0-5~) try, CMEA (60- strong labour GDP in 1992) and
70~o), debt high arrears íncreasing
Croatia imbalanced: three negative (-4-OI) balanced industry, self-managed, moral hazard due to
digit inflation west (50-70"~), debt strong labour enterprise ownership
high
Czech Republic balanced: small low but positive (I- heavy industry, central control, bad loans and
and price jump 3~) increasing west weak labour arrears
Slovak Republic orientation (45~ by
end 80s), debt low
Estonia imbalanced: large stagnant mainly ligh[ and central control, bad loans and
price jump food, mainly with weak (?) labour arrears
Russia, debt low
Hungary balanced: low infla- low bu[ positive balanced industry, self-managed, weak no major problems




Latvia imbalanced: large low or stagnant mainly manufac- central control, arrears
price jump turing, mainly with weak (?) labour
Russia, debt low
Poland imbalanced: high low but positive ( 2- light industry, self-managed, slowly progressing
inflation after large 4~0) CMEA and west strong labour refonns
price jump balanced, latter
increasing, debt
high
Romania imbalanced: several steadily declining industry (SOI), central control, major atrears prob-
large jumps (0-6~) CMEA (60-80"~), strong labour lem
debt low
Russia imbalanced: largest low or stagnant heavy industry, central control, arrears and bad
price jump CMEA and west strong labour loans
balanced, debt low
but rising
Slovenia imbalanced: three stagnant (-3 to 3"Io, balanced, mostly self-managed, moral hazard due to




Transition Economies, Stabilisation Programs, Policies and Outcomes, 1990-93
Country: Nominal anchors Wage-setting: ceil- Inflation cutcome Output outcome Structural refortns
stabilisa[ion pro- ings on Wage-Bill outcome
grarn (WB) or Average
Wages (AW)
Bulgaria: started ín credi[ ceilings, wage ceiling on WB, tax- at 60-80 percent still negative though slow on all fronts
early 1991 policy based, projected annual, inertia exist at declining rate
inflation
Croatia: started in base money, wage ceiling on WB,
early 1991 policy penalty tax
Czech Republic and pegged exchange
Slovak Republic: rate, wage policy
started in early 1991
Estonia: started in currency board,
mid-1992 wage policy
Hungary: started in pegged echange
1991 rate, wage policy
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three-digit levels very large and nega- initially good, start
(annual) and rising tive slowed due to war
until October 1993
ceiling on AW fairly low (20-30 grow[h resumed rapid progress in
based on projected percent annual) from large drops in privatisation and
inflation, penalty 1991 financial sector
tax
ceiling on AW, rapidly declining, appears to have slow progress
penalry tax reached 35 percent bottomed out in
annual at end 1993 mid-1993
ceiling un[il 1991 low and slowly growth resuming gradual pace of
on WB, penalty tax, declining, between slowly reforms continues
now tripartite dis- 20-30 percent
cussions annual
Latvia: started in credit ceilings, wage ceilings on WB,
mid-1992 policy penalty tax
Poland: started in
early 1990
rapidly declining, appears to have rapid privatisation
reached 35 percent bottomed out in of small scale busi-
annual at end 1993 mid-1993 nesses
credit ceilings being ceiling on boih, declining slowly relatively impressive progress on all
replaced by indirect partial backward since 199Q, reaching growth resumed in fronts
control, wage policy indexation, penalty 35 ~o in 1993 1992
tax
Romania: started in central bank credit,
early 1991 wage policy
Russia: started in central bank credit,
early 1992 wage policy
ceiling on AW, very volatile, still negative though agriculture
partial backward remains very high decelerating privatised, others
indexation, penalry (250 percent annual slow progress
tax in 1993)
ceiling on WB, very volatile, large and very nega- privatisation of
bazed on multiple of remains very high tive for the past small scale busi-
minimum wages, (nearly 900 percen[) three years (10-20 nesses, rest very
low penalry tax for the second year percent) slow
in 1993
Slovenia: started in base money, wage collec[ive bargain- rapidly declining, growth marginally progressing,
early 1991 policy ing, "Intevention reached about 23 resumed in 1993 especially in finan-
Law" percent in 1993 cial sector
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As a general picture, a gradual recovering is seen in most countries since 1993: inflation
soared, output growth starts to resume and fiscal and current account balances tended to improve
in most cases. The privatisation of the former State enterprises and the establishment of new
private firms has led to a substantial growth of the private sector in many countries. Mid-1995
estimates by the ERBD indicate at private sector shazes of GDP ranging from 70"~o in case
of the Czech Republic, 600~o in case of Albania, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia, SOo~o
in case of Russia, Lithuania and Croatia, 450~o in case ofBulgaria to 350~o in case of the Ukraine.
Murrell (1996) documents the progress that has been made in political and economic reform.
Two indices are compared for 1989 and 1994: the Democratic Rights index to measure the
degree of political liberalisation and the Economic Freedom index to measure the degree
of economic liberalisation. It is seen that some countries in Eastern Europe have moved from
low levels ofboth indices to scores comparable to those of their Westem European neighbours.
A strong correlation between political and economic liberalisation is seen: countries that
proceeded more with political liberalisation also tend to have made more progress with economic
liberalisation and vice versa.
1.3 The Structure of this Thesis
The chapters of this Ph.D. thesis, while differing largely in their subjects and methods, have
the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in the context of EMU and economic transition
in Eastern Europe as a common theme. The large differences between the chapters is an
indication of the complexity of this interaction and the many different issues and perspectives
that can be studied. This thesis covers only a small fraction of them. The concepts of interaction
between monetary and fiscal policy that aze covered in a more detailed manner are (i) the
dynamic linkage of monetary and fiscal policy via the dynamic government budget constraint
and the strategic interaction between the monetary and fiscal policymakers that this linkage
creates, (ii) the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy and the problem ofoutput stabilisation
and (iii) monetazy and fiscal policy in the 'public finance view ofinflation' and in the problem
of 'dynamíc optimal taxation'.
The Interaction between Monetary and Fiscal Policy and the Dynamic Government
Budget Constraint
The dynamic interdependence ofmonetary and fiscal policy through the dynamic govern-
ment budget constraint, as put forward most strikingly in the 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic'
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argument of Sargent and Wallace (1981), has fascinated many economists". The dynamic
interdependence of monetary and fiscal policy by the dynamic government budget constraint
is studied in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 that extend the Tabellini (1986) differential game between
the monetary and fiscal authority on government debt stabilisation. Tabellini adds the strategic
interaction dimension to the dynamic interdependence ofmonetary and fiscal policy because
of the dynamic government budget constraint. After the introductory Chapter 2, Chapter 3
and 4 extend the Tabellini (1986) model to a monetary union with a common central bank.
In the context ofa closed economy, Chapter 2 models the strategic interaction between
monetary authorities, who control monetisation, and fiscal authorities, who control primary
fiscal deficits, as a differential game on government debt stabilisation. The cooperative and
noncooperative Nash open-loop equilibria are computed analytically and interpreted. Furthermore,
we reinterpret the 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic' in the context of the differential game
between the monetary and fiscal authorities on government debt stabilisation and analyse
the impact of a more conservative central bank. To explore the consequences of a more
independent central bank, we analyse Stackelberg open-loop equilibria with the monetary
authority being Stackelberg leader. The strategic advantage that the Stackelberg leader possesses,
enables it to shift a large part of the adjustment burden from debt stabilisation to the Stackelberg
follower, i.e. the fiscal authority. A numerical example is developed to illustrate the results
from the theoretical sections.
Chapters 3 and 4 extend the closed economy analysis of Chapter 2 to a monetary
union with a common central bank. This extension of the model is used to study the effects
of EMLJ and the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1999. The replacement
of national currencies by a common currency in the EMiJ causes a monetary externality if
the European Central Bank is inclined to monetise part of outstanding government debt in
the community. High government debt in one part of the EU then leads to a high communal
rate of inflation. Extending the closed-economy analysis of Tabellini (1986) and Chapter
2 to a two-country monetary union, government debt stabilisation in the EU is modelled as
a differential game between fiscal authorities and the ECB. A conflict between fiscal authorities
of the individual countries in the EU and the ECB arises on whether fiscal or monetary
instruments should be adjusted to stabilise government debt in the EMiJ. Dynamics of the
fiscal deficits, inflation and government debt in a monetary union are derived and compared
with an EU with national monetary policies.
Chapter 3 first analyses the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities in
the closed-economy setting. Outcomes in the Nash open-loop equilibrium, the Stackelberg
" Drazen and Helpman (1990) contains an insightful analysis of the argument.
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open-loop equilibrium with the monetary authority leading and the Stackelberg open-loop
equilibrium with the fiscal authority leading, aze compared to see the implications ofhaving
an independent or a dependent Central Bank. Next, outcomes aze studied in a two-country
EMU. Finally, a comparison is made between outcomes under national monetary policies
and EMU. It is found that with a dependent ECB, EMU implies even higher inflation and
less fiscal adjustment than with national monetary policy. The rather unfavourable performance
of a monetary union with a dependent ECB is caused by the fact that a dependent ECB
accommodates even more than dependent national Central Bazilcs since it faces two Stackelberg
leading fiscal authorities rather than one, like a dependent national Central Bank. Finally,
a numerical example is carried out to illustrate the main results from the theoretical part.
Chapter 4 extends further the differential game on government debt stabilisation in
the EMU between the ECB and national fiscal authorities: it focuses on difference in outcomes
with Nash open-loop strategies, in which case players aze able to commit their policies, and
Nash feedback strategies, in which case players cannot commit their policies. As in Chapter
3, the compazison of outcomes in the EMU with outcomes under national monetary policies
has been given a prominent place. Ii is shown that with open-loop strategies, moving from
national monetary policies to EMU does not alter fundamentally the strategic interaction between
monetary and fiscal authorities in the differential game on government debt stabilisation.
With feedback strategies, the strategic interaction between monetazy and fiscal authorities
changes fundamentally, however, when moving from asetting with national monetary policies
to a monetary union with a common central bank. With feedback strategies, players tend
to reduce their own effort to achieve a common objective ifother players increase their effort.
This implies an adverse incentive problem that is not present with open-loop strategies and
makes outcomes with feedback Nash strategies, in general, even less efficient than in the
noncooperative Nash equilibrium with open-loop strategies.
Tabellini (1986) showed that such an adverse incentive problem under feedback strategies
leads to inferior outcomes in the form of high inflation, fiscal deficits and government debt,
in a setting with national monetary policy. We find that with feedback strategies this incentive
problem is alleviated in a monetary union, however, as the individual fiscal players perceive
less response from the ECB as compazed to their former national Central Bank. This increases
their effort to contribute to the common objective ofgovemment debt stabilisation: with feedback
strategies, EMU leads to lower fiscal deficits, money growth and government debt than with
national monetary policies.
Also the possibility that the fiscal authorities cooperate against the ECB in the debt
stabilisation game is analysed. Fiscal cooperation does not affect outcomes with open-loop
strategies. It is shown that with feedback strategies, fiscal cooperation enables the fiscal
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authorities in the monetary union to regain the strategic position that they possessed when
playing individually against their national monetary authority. Therefore, with feedback strategies
and fiscal cooperation in the monetary union, outcomes coincide with a setting where fiscal
authorities interact with their national monetary authority. Using numerical simulation techniques,
it is then analysed how asymmetries between the countries that participate in the EMU affect
the outcomes w.r.t. government debt, fiscal deficits and inflation. In particulaz, differences
in the initial level of government debt and differences in fiscal preferences are considered.
Since the current size of government debt reflects past rather than current, let alone future,
fiscal and monetary discipline, we consider current non-interest fiscal deficits a better indicator
of fiscal sustainability and fiscal discipline in the countries that want to join the EMU than
the actual size of government debt. In our opinion, the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Criteria
that concern current government debt and the interest-inclusive fiscal deficit, therefore, were
not very well chosen and suffer from a certain lack of consistency.
(ii) The Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Output Stabilisation
A second important interaction between monetary and fiscal policy concerns the
stabilisation ofoutput and employment if the economy is characterised by Keynesian rigidities
in the goods and labour markets. Chapter 5 develops a model of output stabilisation in an
EMU that features nominal rigidities in the short run, labour immobility, low automatic stabil-
isation from federal taxation and government spending and that is subject to symmetric -that
is EU wide- and asymmetric -that is country-specific- macro-economic shocks. It is shown
that national fiscal policies and monetary policy of the ECB can be helpful in stabilising
the EU economy if it is hit by a symmetric shock. Asymmetric shocks can be stabilised by
national fiscal policies andlor a European Federal Transfer System (EFTS) that transfers
resources towards the EU countries that aze hit by negative asymmetric shocks. Such a EFTS
would function as an EU equivalent of the fiscal transfer systems that operate in other mature
federations, like the German system of "Finanzausgleich" or the U.S. system of federal taxes
and government spending.
Alesina and Tabellini (1987) study fiscal and monetary policy interaction in a model
where output is determined by the supply-side of the economy. In this model the private
sector is represented by a trade union that sets wages based on its inflationary expectations.
Distortionary taxes drive output below its natural rate, unanctipated inflation, on the other
hand, boosts output. Monetary policy affects fiscal decision making as the seigniorage revenues
that result from monetary policy can be used to cut taxes andlor to increase government
spending. The analysis compazes outcomes in case the monetary authority can credibly commit
22 Chapter 1
its policies vis-á-vis the private sector, with outcomes in case the monetary policy typically
cannot do so. An independent central bank is usually believed to be able to commit its monetary
policies14. It is shown that the equilibrium with commitment reduces inflation which reduces
social welfare losses. Due to lower seigniorage revenues, however, distortionary taxes have
to be increased and government spending has to be cut. The resulting decrease in output and
lower government spending increase social welfaze losses. The Alesina and Tabellini model
has been further extended by van Hoose (1992) who introduces a two-country variant to
study the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in a two-country EMS, Jensen (1992)
who considers the possibility that also the fiscal authority faces a commitment problem and
Jensen (1994) who introduces government debt dynamics into the analysis. In van Aarle and
Huart (1996), we extend the Alesina and Tabellini model to a two-country EMU to study
the effects of an independent ECB, a two-speed EMU and fiscal federalisation in the EU.
(iii) The Public Finance View of Inflation
Central Banks and governmental financial institutions in many developing countries
and economies in transition often implement economic policies that have important fiscal
effects. Such quasi-fiscal operations undertaken by Central Banks and governmental financial
institutions are usually undertaken to circumvent legislative and political constraints on fiscal
policy, and have often important fiscal consequences. In general, such quasi-fiscal operations,
are likely to reduce efficiency because they distort relative prices in the economy and in this
manner may hamper economic growth and development.
Central Bank lending to the public sector at below-market interest rates and subsidised
loans and loan guarantees to specific sectors and groups of borrowers, are common practice
in many developing countries and affect the public sector's net financial position. If loans
are provided at below-market interest rates, public expenditures will not be evaluated at their
true opportunity costs, inducing excessive government spending and financing projects whose
true economic costs exceed the benefits. Overdraft facilities and the purchase of government
securities also imply the allocation of credit by the Central Bank to the Government. With
systems ofreserve and liquidity requirements, the Central Bank can force the banking sector
to hold government securities at below-mazket interest rates. Multiple exchange rate systems
are an other common practice that imply fiscal effects. Typically, the official rate is set at
a lower (overvalued) exchange rate than the market rate. The government may require the
repatriation and sunender of all export proceeds at the official, overvalued exchange rate.
" See e.g. Eijffinger and the Haan (1996) for a recent survey of the literature on central banking.
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This implies an implicit tax on international trade~s. Common practice is also the imposition
of prior import deposits that require domestic agents that want to import goods and physical
capital for shorter or longer periods to deposit amounts at the Central Bank at zero or below-
market interest rates. Prior import deposits form a tax on imports and are similar to tariffs.
In essence, such forms of 'financial repression' of the banking and financial sector
by the monetary authorities, represent implicit taxation of the banking and financial sector
which are likely to distort financial intermediation, increase the spread between borrowing
and lending rates, reduce saving and investment in the economy and ín this manner, may
reduce economic growth1ó. On the other hand, financial repression, in many cases yield
substantial revenues to the government.
Interdependence ofmonetary and fiscal policies, therefore, arises from these quasi-fiscal
revenues or seigniorage that such monetary policy instruments generate. The 'public finance
view of inflation' studies this fiscal dimension of monetary policies and the use of the inflation
tax as part of the design of an efficient system of taxation in a world where ordinary taxes
are distortionary. Disregarding the rather theoretical case ofa completely autonomous central
bank, a government will consider and exploit these fiscal revenues from monetary policy
to finance government spending. In the Chapters 6, 7 and 8 the fiscal revenues from monetary
policy play a central role and a number of different sources of seigniorage are considered.
Chapters 6 and 7 concentrate on the relationships between currency substitution, fmancial
repression, inflation and seigniorage and develop applications to the transforming economies
in Central and Eastern Europe. Currency substitution enables domestic agents to partially
evade the inflation tax that governments try to impose by generating high inflation rates.
Chapter 6, which is mainly an empirical chapter, investigates currency substitution, inflation
and seigniorage for the case ofHungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. The economic and
political uncertainty, high inflation and liberalisation of foreign exchange restrictions have
encouraged substantial currency substitution in these economies in transition. It is shown
how currency substitution affects money demand andby that seigniorage revenues. The empirical
estimations of the money demand functions are used to calculate the seigniorage maximising
rates of inflation in the economies in transition.
Chapter 7 analyses the consequences of cttrrency substitution and financial repression
on public finance and investigates the case ofPoland. Two theoretical models, one on currency
15 See Huizinga (1996) for an analytical model on the implicit taxation oftrade and capital flows by multiple
exchange rate systems and their possible welfaze implications. Empirical evidence is presented in the case of
the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and South-Africa.
16 Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1994) analyse in detail the impact of financial repression on growth.
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substitution, inflation and seigniorage and one on the quasi-fiscal revenues from financial
repression of the domestic financial system by the monetary authorities, are studied. An increase
in currency substitution lowers the scope for the inflation tax and affects the shape of the
seigniorage Laffer curve. The monetary authorities could impose currency controls to counteract
currency substitution. The consequences of such currency controls are also considered in
this chapter. An empirical application of the analytical results is considered with respect to
currency substitution in Poland. In January 1990, Polish authorities decided to remove the
strict foreign exchange controls. A strong increase in currency substitution took place.
Reserve requirements can be used by the monetary authorities to force the financial
sector to hold excess reserves. This increases base money and by that seigniorage revenues.
A theoretical model, inspired by the analysis of Brock (1989), shows the relation between
inflation, seigniorage and financial repression. Seigniorage is maximised by choosing the
combination of inflation and financial repression that maximises seigniorage revenues. An
empirical application is made to the case of Poland that liberalised substantially its financial
sector from 1990 onwazds.
Chapter 8 considers the 'dynaznic optimal taxation' framework and derives its main
principles for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy. The theory of 'dynamic optimal
taxation' was formulated in contributions of Phelps (1973), Barro (1979) and Mankiw (1987).
Two different tax instruments aze considered: an output tax that is controlled by the fiscal
authorities and which summarises the total system of ordinary taxes and the inflation tax
levied on the holders of money (and any other non-indexed government liability) and which
is controlled by the monetazy authority. Starting point of the theory is that all taxes create
distortions: taxes create distortionazy wedges and the provision of public goods or financial
transfers may affect incentives adversely. The 'dynamic optimal taxation' framework determines
the optimal mix of tax rates and their optimal adjustment over time by considering the excess
burdens associated with the different taxes and the elasticities of the different tax bases with
respect to their tax rates. Static efficiency of the tax system requires that the mazginal excess
burden that is associated with every tax instrument, is equalised for every tax instnunent.
Dynamic efficiency that mazginal excess burdens aze, moreover, equalised over time, implying
the generally accepted notion of optimal 'tax smoothing' over time.
This leads to the 'tax-smoothing' result according to which the marginal costs of taxation
should be equalized, both across different instruments of taxation and over time. The 'dynamic
optimal taxation' framework, therefore, determines optimal combinations ofordinary taxation,
which is controlled by the fiscal authority, and the inflation tax on the holders of domestic
base money, which is controlled by the monetary authority and their dynamic adjustment
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over time". These static and dynamic efficiency conditions imply readily empirically testable
implications: static efficiency requires that the rate of output taxation and inflation aze
cointegrated; dynamic efficiency requires that the rate ofoutput taxation and the rate of inflation
aze set such that they behave like a random walk and their future values cannot be predicted
from their past values. These testable implications of the 'dynamic optimal taxation' theory
are tested for a broad set of developing and developed countries during the period 1964-1994.
As noted by Poterba and Rotemberg (1990), monetary policy, if set according to the
principles of 'dynamic optimal taxation', suffers from a time-inconsistency problem in the
presence of a large stock of nonindexed, long term government debt: the government will
be tempted to reduce the real value of its government debt obligations by unanticipated inflation.
In the time-consistent case the public will realise this incentive problem that optimal monetary
policy is subject to and determine its inflationary expectations accordingly. The inflation
rate in the time-consistent or no-commitment case, therefore, is higher than inflation in the
optimal but time-inconsistent or commitment case. Commitment technologies such as indexation
of government debt, shortening of maturities or government debt issued in foreign currency,
may alleviate the time-inconsistency problem and make the commitment equilibrium of the
dynamic optimal taxation solution more viable. It is found that many developed countries
seem to have obeyed the 'dynamic optimal taxation' principles but that a considerable number
of developing countries appear to have experienced time-inconsistency problems.
" Recently, van der Ploeg ( 1995) integrated into one framework the dynamic optimal taxation theory and
the stabilisation dimension of monetary and fiscal policy.
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Chapter 2
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt
Stabilisation'
Introduction
During the 1980s, many countries experienced substantial increases in government
indebtedness. Therefore, government debt stabilisation has become a prominent policy
issue. Recently, the OECD (1994a) surveyed the fiscal stance in its member countries
and expressed concern about the development of public debt in many of its member
states. Projections of current fiscal policies show that in several countries debt stabilises
only faz beyond the yeaz 2000 at levels that are some 30 percentage points of GDP
higher than current levels, which are already fairly high as showed Table 1 in the first
chapter. Recent interest in the stabilisation of government debt is related also to the
fiscal entrance criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the European
Union (EU). According to the EMU provisions of the Maastricht treaty, a country can
enter the EMU only if its government debt is below 600~0 of GDP or if the government
debt-GDP ratio is approaching this target value with sufficient speed.
Because of the dynamic government budget constraint, fiscal and monetary
policy authorities typically face a conflict about whether fiscal or monetary instruments
should be adjusted to stabilise government debt. Several papers have explored the
interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in a game-theoretic framework. In a
static context, Alesina and Tabellini (1987) include the private sector as a third player in
the monetary-fiscal policy game. In a dynamic framework, Petit (1989) and Hughes
Hallett and Petit (1990) consider open-loop equilibria in which the private sector plays a
passive, non-strategic role. Levine and Peazlman (1992) and Levine and Brociner (1994)
consider the interaction between fiscal authorities in two countries and a single monetary
authority in a monetary union. They adopt a model for private-sector behaviour based on
rigorous micro-foundations. Following almost the entire literature on the strategic
interaction between fiscal and monetary policies in a dynamic game-theoretic frame-
work, they have to rely on numerical simulation.
' This chapter is the result of a joint research project with Lans Bovenberg and Matthias Raith. A first
version appeared as CentER Discussion Paper 9501, a shortened version of this chapter has been
published in the Journa! of Economres.
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This chapter derives analytical solutions by building on the differential game
framework developed by Tabellini (1986) to formalise the conflict between monetary
and fiscal authorities implied by the government budget constraint. In pazticular, we
extend Tabellini's analysis in several directions. First, as the authority that is most
closely tied to the political process, the fiscal authority cazes about not only fiscal but
also monetary objectives. This alleviates the conflict between the two authorities by
reducing the externalities that monetary policy imposes on the fiscal player. Second, in
accordance with the entrance requirements for the EMU, non-zero debt tazgets aze
allowed for.
Third, and most importantly, we elaborate on the solutions derived by Tabellini
(1986) in several ways. In particulaz, we calculate analytical solutions not only for the
steady state but also for the entire transition. Moreover, we provide new interpretations
of the closed-fonn solutions by distinguishing between the inter- and intratemporal
distribution of the burden associated with government debt stabilisation. We also
determine and interpret the vazious externalities the two policy authorities impose on
each other in the noncooperative game. Furthermore, the effects of various changes in
the objective functions of monetazy and fiscal authorities aze derived. In pazticulaz, we
consider the effects of a more conservative central bank and reinterpret unpleasant
monetazist arithmetic, which was first emphasized by Sargent and Wallace (1981), as a
possible outcome of a differential debt stabilisation game between monetary and fiscal
authorities. Whereas Sazgent and Wallace (1981) assume that fiscal policy is exogenous-
ly given, we determine both fiscal and monetary policy endogenously as the outcome of
strategic interaction between monetary and fiscal policymakers. Z Finally, we address the
issue of central bank independence by investigating Stackelberg equilibria.
The main contribution of this paper thus involves the interpretation of analytical
solutions, thereby providing insight into the contrasts between noncooperative and
cooperative games. To arrive at closed-form analytical solutions for the noncooperative
games and their associated inefficiencies due to externalities, we assume an open-loop
infotmation structure.' This implies that monetary and fiscal policies can precommit to a
future course of action as departures of announced strategies would give rise to serious
' The empirical analysis of Burdekin and Laney (1988) suggests that this two-way causality between
monetary and fiscal policy is indeed important.
' For a similar open-loop approach, see Petit (1989) and Hughes Hallett and Petit (1990). Using
differential games, Blake and Westaway (1992) and Blake (1992) investigate how different assumptions
about information structure and commitment affect the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies.
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future course of action as departures of announced strategies would give rise to serious
loss of reputation.' Closed-loop equilibria, which cannot be solved analytically, intensify
the contrast between cooperative and noncooperative games further by exacerbating the
inefficiencies in the noncooperative solution (see Tabellini (1986)). Accordingly, to
analytically identify the major differences between cooperative and noncooperative
solutions, we can limit ourselves to open-loop equilibria.
Section 2 introduces the differential game between fiscal and monetary author-
ities. Section 3 provides the analytical solutions for both the cooperative and the
noncooperative Nash open-loop equilibria, which are compared in section 4. By
exploring changes in preference functions, section 5 investigates the consequences of a
more conservative monetary authority. It also interprets the possibility of 'unpleasant
monetazist azithmetic' in an explicit dynamic game-theoretic framework. To explore how
a more independent central bank affects the strategic interactions between policymakers,
section 6 explores Stackelberg equilibria.
2.2 A Differential Game on Government Debt Stabilisation
Fiscal deficits have to be financed by either base-money creation or the accumulation of
government debt. In many cases, decisions on primary fiscal deficits are made by the
Treasury, while management of monetary policy is the responsibility of the central bank.
While monetary and fiscal policies aze thus delegated to different institutions, the
government budget constraint renders these policies interdependent. In particular, the
dynamic government budget constraint links primazy fiscal deficits, f(t), seigniorage (or
the issue of base money), m(t), interest payments on government debt, rd(t), and
government debt accumulation d(where a dot above a variable refers to a time deriva-
tive):
d - rd(t) t,~t) - m(t) (1)
d(t), j~t) and m(t) are expressed as fractions of GDP. r represents the rate of interest on
outstanding government debt minus the growth rate of output and is assumed to be
exogenous and therefore independent of the level of government indebtedness.
If the fiscal deficit, ~(t)-~rd(t), exceeds seigniorage revenues from base money
creation, m(t), government debt accumulation allows policymakers to shift to the future
' Such binding commitments are facilitated by the surveillance of national policies by the European
Commission or other intemational organisations.
32 Chapter 2
the adjustment burden associated with the (non-monetised) fiscal deficit. The dynamic
government budget constraint thus reveals that the interaction between the monetary and
fiscal authorities exhibits both an intratemporal and an intertemporal dimension. The
latter implies a link between monetary and fiscal policies and the accumulation of
government debt. The initial stock of outstanding government debt, d(0), and the interest
rate (net of output growth) play a major role in the process of fiscal consolidation. In
the presence of a large initial stock of debt and a high real interest rate, government debt
stabilisation requires greater efforts than called for in a situation with a low initial stock
of debt and low interest rates.
Government solvency is ensured if we assume that the following transversality
condition, generally referred to as the no-Ponzi game condition, is met:
lim d(t) e -' ` - 0
~-m (2)
Stabilisation of government debt can be achieved in two alternative ways: by reducing
primary fiscal deficits or by raising the creation of base money. Policy conflicts azise if
fiscal and monetary policies are controlled by different institutions that assign different
weights to vazious objectives, including inflation, govemment debt stabilisation, and
public spending. Following Tabellini (1986), we formalise the strategic interaction
between monetary and fiscal authorities by specifying instruments and objectives of the
policymakers within a differential game.s
The fiscal authority (or Treasury) features the following intertemporal loss
function, which depends on the time profiles of the primary fiscal deficit, base money
growth and government debt:
LF(t~- 2 f {~t) f)Z}rl(m(t)-m)Z}~l(d(t)-d)Z1e-bt`-`o~dt (3)
~o
Fiscal authorities manage primary fiscal deficits to minimise this intertemporal loss func-
tion, subject to the dynamic government budget constraint (1), the transversality con-
dition (2), and the initial stock of government debt, d(0). f, in and d represent exoge-
nous policy tazgets for base money growth, the primary fiscal deficit and public debt.
These "blisspoints" reflect the institutional and political structures in which decision ma-
king on macroeconomic policies takes place. The subjective rate of time preference, S,
5 See Basar and Olsder (1982) for details on differential game theory.
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determines the extent to which policymakers discount future losses.b
The primary deficit reflects the objectives of the fiscal authority with respect to
noninterest public spending and taxation. The policy tazget for the primary deficit, f, can
be interpreted as the blisspoint of noninterest public spending given an exogenous path
for taxes. Alternatively, it can be viewed as the preferred tax-GDP ratio given an
exogenous path for noninterest public spending.
As in Tabellini (1986), government debt features in the loss function because
higher levels of debt require lazger tax distortions to service the additional interest pay-
ments. Moreover, the larger the stock of public debt becomes, the more substantial the
required adjustments in taxes associated with fluctuations in the real rate of interest and
real output need to be. If Ricardian equivalence fails, high levels of public debt are
likely to also crowd out private investment and induce undesirable intergenerational
redistributions of wealth. In view of these arguments, Tabellini (1986) assumes a zero
policy target for public debt. The entrance requirement for the EMU, however, involves
a debt-GDP ratio of 60 percent. Moreover, several countries have implemented positive
debt tazgets to guide the process of fiscal consolidation (see OECD (1994b)). According-
ly, we allow for a positive debt target to model the desire to comply with such debt
targets. The parameter ~, reflects the priority that the fiscal authorities attach to debt
stabilisation. A large weight can be interpreted as the fiscal authorities wanting to
exercise substantial fiscal discipline.
As another extension of Tabellini (1986), growth of base money enters the
objective function of the fiscal authorities. Money growth is included in the objective
function because the fiscal authority, which is closely linked to the political process and
thus represents the interests of the electorate, cazes about inflation.'
Monetazy authorities set the growth of base money so as to minimise the follow-
6 A high rate of time preference is sometimes associated with a high degree of political instability
when policymakers discount heavily future costs and benefits of their policies and focus on the short term
pains and gains that can be achieved by their policies.
' We assume that the economy is on the upward-slooping part of the seigniorage Laffer curve so that
a higher rate of inflation increases seigniorage revenues, m(t). Empirical studies on money demand
indicate that inflation in industrial countries is well below the seigniorage maximising rate (see, e.g.,
Boughton (1991)). Accordingly, industrial countries are indeed on the upward-sloping part of the
seigniorage Laffer curve. If money demand is of the constant velocity type, i.e. M(t)-k.P(t)y(t) (where P(t)
denotes the price level, y(t) real output and k velocity) and price expectations are rational (so that the
inflation tax on government debt is zero), inflation n is given by n-M~M(t)-gY-m(t)Ik-gy, where g,,






The relative weight attached to money growth (i.e. llx) measures how conservative the
central bank is. In particulaz, if x-0 (so that llx--~~), the central bank cazes only about
price stability, and thus is ultra conservative.
The instrument controlled by the fiscal player (i.e. the primary fiscal deficit) does
not enter the objective function of the monetary player. The fiscal player, however, cares
about the instrument controlled by the monetary player (i.e. base money growth). This
asymmetry originates in the different positions of the monetary and fiscal authorities vis-
à-vis the political process. The monetary authorities aze relatively independent from the
political process. The fiscal authorities, in contrast, aze closely linked to the government,
which is responsible to parliament. As such, the fiscal player represents more closely the
political objectives of the electorate, which cares not only about public spending and
taxes but also about inflation.
Including money growth in the objective function of the fiscal authorities does
not affect the noncooperative Nash open-loop equilibrium. The reason is that the fiscal
player takes the strategy of the monetary player as given. Accordingly, it does not
perceive any effect of its instrument (i.e. the primary fiscal deficit) on money growth.8
The cooperative equilibrium and thus the externalities in the noncooperative game,
however, are affected by the inclusion of money growth in the objective function of the
fiscal authorities. In particulaz, the policy conflicts between the two authorities about
money growth are alleviated. If money creation does not enter the fiscal objective
function, a reduction in money growth by the central bank imposes an adverse externa-
lity on the fiscal authorities by boosting the accumulation of public debt. With money
growth entering the loss function of the fiscal authorities, this adverse externality is
partially offset by a positive externality implied by lower money growth and thus lower
inflation.
' If the fiscal player is Stackelberg leader, however, it takes into account how the central bank
responds to changes in fiscal policy. Accordingly, it perceives an indirect effect of fiscal policy on money
growth ( see section 6).
Macroeconomic Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilisation 35
The gap between ffrd and m,9 which is assumed to be positive, is an important
determinant of government debt accumulation: it measures the tension between the de-
sired financing, f}rd, and desired monetary accommodation, m. Accordingly, a larger
gap intensifies the conflict between the target values for the various objectives. Also a
large initial stock of government debt, d(0), or a low debt tazget increase the tension
between the policy objectives. In the remainder of the analysis, we assume that the
initial stock of debt exceeds the target, i.e. d(0)~d. Another important factor behind the
accumulation of public debt is the difference between the rate of time preference, S, and
the net interest rate, r. If S~r and public debt does not directly feature in the objective
functions (i.e. ~,-x-0), the subjective benefits of additional government debt exceed its
objective costs so that government debt would accumulate without bound and the no-
Ponzi game is violated.
The weights that the fiscal and monetary authorities attach to debt stabilisation
(i.e. ~, and x, respectively) are important determinants of how the burden of stabilising
government debt is distributed over the fiscal and monetary policymakers in the
noncooperative Nash game. If x is high and ~, low, substantial money creation rather
than small primary fiscal deficits resolve the tension between the Treasury and the
central bank on government debt stabilisation. Hence, this situation implies a strong
fiscal player and a weak central bank. If both x and ~, aze small, neither player is willing
to substantially adjust its policy to stabilise government debt. Hence, if the policy
authorities are relatively impatient ( i.e. S~r), the adjustment burden is shifted mainly
towazds the future by accumulating more public debt.
2.3 Solving the Differential Game
Two elements are crucial in the dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal
authorities: first, whether policies are coordinated and, second, the information structure.
Coordination of macroeconomic policies internalises the positive externalities on the
other player from efforts to stabilise government debt. The cooperative equilibrium is
thus Pareto efficient and can therefore serve as a benchmazk to determine the inefficien-
cies associated with noncooperative equilibria. In terms of institutional settings, the
cooperative equilibrium can be interpreted as involving a central coordinating institution,
such as pazliament, determining guidelines for the time paths of fiscal deficits and base-
9 We assume that both players feature the same blisspoints. Allowing both players to differ with
respect to their targets would not qualitatively affect the analysis.
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money creation (see Tabellini (1986)). In the case of cooperation, a~ represents the
relative weight attached to the objectives of the fiscal authorities in the aggregate loss
function of the coalition, L` (to)-wLF(to)fLM(to). co can be interpreted as the bargaining
strength of the fiscal authorities in a cooperative game with the monetary authorities or,
alternatively, as the political strength of the Treasury in convincing parliament about the
desirability of its preferred policies. We assume w to be exogenous. Alternatively, it
could be determined endogenously as the outcome of a bazgaining problem between
both authorities, for example as the Nash-bargaining solution.
The cooperative equilibrium is found by minimising the following present-value
Hamiltonian,
hi~(t) - 2 (f(t) -flz t (W2}I) (m(t) -m)z t (`~ 2}K) (d(t) -d)z
t pe(t) (rd(t) t}(t) - m(t))
(5)
with respect to the available instruments {f(t),m(t)}. As the co-state variable associated
with the dynamic government budget constraint, p~(t), represents the mazginal costs of
public funds as perceived by the coalition of policymakers. The first-order conditions of
this dynarnic optimisation problem amount to:
.f(t) -f - ~~(t)w
m(t) - m t gc(t) (6)
c.i rl t 1
~i e - ( S -r) ~c(t) - (w ~, tx) (d(t) -d)
In noncooperative setting, the debt stabilisation game suffers from inefficiencies.
To analytically explore the inefficiencies in noncooperative equilibria, we focus on
open-loop equilibria. As noted in the introduction, closed-loop equilibria, which cannot
be solved analytically, would only further intensify the contrast between cooperative and
noncooperative games. In this section, we solve for the Nash game before turning (in
section 6) to Stackelberg games. In the Nash open-loop game, players simultaneously
commit to a strategy, taking as given not only the current decision of the opponent but
also the future course of action of the other player. In terms of institutional arrange-
ments, the Nash open-loop equilibrium can be interpreted as the two policymakers
simultaneously submitting their strategies to a third authority enforcing these plans as
binding commitments. This third authority can be the European Commission or another
international organisation conducting surveillance of national policies.
The Nash open-loop equilibrium is found by separately minimising the present-
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value Hamiltonians of the fiscal and monetary authorities. The Hamiltonian of the fiscal
authoritíes is given by:
H F(t) - 2(fCt) - fl2 } ~(m(t) -m)z } ~ (d(t) -d)Z } N~F(t) (rd(t) t.~t) - m(t)) (7)
This gives rise to the following ftrst-order conditions:
f(t) -.f - wF(t)
~,F(t) - (S -r) WF(t) - í~ (d(t)-d)
(g)
Optimisation of the present-value Hamiltonian of the monetary authorities,
HM(t) - 2(m(t)-m)Z t ~ (d(t)-d)2 } 4~M(t) (rd(t) }J(t) -m(t)) (9)
yields the following optimality conditions:
m (t) - m } pM(t)
~lM - (S -T) ~.tM(t) - K (d(t) -d)
(10)
The optimisation of quadratic objective functions produces lineaz dynamic sys-
tems of government debt and the co-state vaziables associated with government debt,
It'(t). These dynamic systems, which are replicated in appendix A, aze assumed to
display saddlepoint stability to rule out explosive government indebtedness and thus
violation of the transversality constraint (2). This requires that the weights policy
authorities attach to debt stabilisation (i.e. ~, and x) aze lazge relative to the gap between
the subjective rate of time preference and the net interest rates (for more details, see
section 4 below).
In the saddlepoint stable systems, adjustments in the forward-looking co-state
vaziables place the system on the unique converging trajectory to its new steady-state
equilibrium {d(oo),p'(w)}. The stable root of the dynamic system in {d(t),lt'(t)} deter-
mines the transient dynamics of the saddlepoint stable system: with a negative sign it
measures the adjustment speed towards the steady-state. The adjustment speed is
denoted by h.'o The system dynamics of both the cooperative and noncooperative game
can be written in the following form:
'o The reciprocal of the adjustment speed, llh, equals the mean time lag, which is defined as the time
that is required to eliminate about 630~0 of the discrepancy between the initial and steady-state value of a
particular variable.
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d(t) - (d(0) -d(~)) e -h` t d(~)
F~ `(t) - (F~`(~) - F~`(~)) e
-hr ~ ~~(,o) (11)
.~ït) - (tr0) :Íï~))e -nr t~~)
m(t) - (m(0) -m(~)) e -nr t m(,~)
where oo refers to the steady-state and 0 to the initial state of a vaziable. Expression (11)
reveals that the dynamics of any variable can be chazacterised by three elements: the
initial state, the adjustment speed, h, and the steady-state. The next section derives these
three elements analytically for both the cooperative and the noncooperative Nash open-
loop equilibria.
2.4 Cooperative Policies and the Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium
The cooperative equilibrium and the noncooperative Nash open-loop equilibrium can be
solved analytically. Appendix A, which contains the analytical solution, shows how the
initial value, the adjustment speed and the steady-state can be expressed in the following
form:
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General Solution
m(0) -m } (1-a)[(1-h(3)(f trá-m)t(h}r)(d(0)-d)]
f(0) -f - a [(1-h(3)(~f rd-m) } (h}r)(d(0) -d)]
f(0) -m(0) - h (3 (f f rd-m) -h(d(0) -d) -rd(0)
m(~) - m } (1-a)(1 trR)(f trd-m)
f(~) -f - a(1 }rP)(f }rd-m)
f(~) - m(~) - -rd - rR(f trd-m)
d(~) - á} R (f }rá-;n)
f(~) -fC0) - -a(htr)[PU}rd-m) -(d(~)-~]
m(~) -m(0) - (1-a)(htr)[j3(f trd-m) -(d(0)-d)]




a - (ó -r) - (S -r)
A h(h}S)
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Table 1 implies that short-run and long-run money growth and primary fiscal deficit and
long-run debt can be expressed in terms of two elements: first, a pazameter indicating
the intratemporal distribution of the adjustment burden associated with government debt
stabilisation, a", and, second, a pazameter indicating the intertemporal distribution of
" a and ( 1 -a) are closely related to the "feedback"-coefficients 0, and n, used by
Tabellini ( 1986). These coefficients measure by how much the monetary and fiscal authorities adjust their
policies to changes in the current stock of debt. Since the game is linear-quadratic, Tabellini ( 1986) pro-
poses the following feedback relations: m(r~Aot6,d(t) and J(r~no-n,d(t). Table 1 and (11) imply the
following: 9óm(0) -(1-axhtrkl(0), 6,--a(htr), nóJ(0}t-a(hfr)d(o) and R,-(1-axhtr).
40 Chapter 2
that burden, (3. This latter parameter is inversely related to the adjustment speed, h
(which, in turn, is positively related to ~, which denotes the negative of the determinant
of the saddlepoint stable system). Both the cooperative and the noncooperative games
yield the same expressions for initial and steady-state money growth, primary fiscal
deficits and steady-state debt in terms of 0(or h or (i) and a. The cooperative and Nash
open-loop equilibrium yield different solutions for 0 and a:
Table 2











The pazameter a indicates how the intratemporal adjustment burden is distrib-
uted over the two authorities: a represents the fiscal authorities' share of the adjustment
burden, while the complementazy share borne by the monetary authorities is given by
1-a. A large a indicates relatively weak fiscal authorities who beaz most of the adjust-
ment burden. In particulaz, the primary fiscal deficit, J(t), is much below its blisspoint, f,
while money growth is relatively close to its tazget value, m. If the fiscal authorities aze
strong and the central bank is weak (i.e. a is small), in contrast, debt stabilisation is
achieved mainly through monetisation of fiscal deficits.
The parameter a reveals how the adjustment burden is shifted intertemporally.
This parameter is zero if authorities are patient (i.e. S-r). This indicates that the conflict
between fiscal and monetary policies is resolved without shifting the adjustment burden
intertemporally. However, adjustment is lazgely shifted to the future if (3 is lazge, which
occurs if policymakers are impatient (i.e. S~r) and attach a low weight to debt stabilis-
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ation. In that case the adjustment speed, h, is low.1z The impact of Q on short-run and
long-rtm policy variables reflects the intertemporal distribution of the adjustment burden.
A higher value of (3 implies higher deficits and lower money growth in the short run,
but lower deficits and higher money growth in the long run.-' With a positive value of
R, the tension between the various objectives, which is indicated by the difference
between ffrd and m, is not fully resolved in the short run. The associated 'underad-
justment' results in the accumulation of government debt. The resulting additional
interest payments on a higher stock of government debt (d(oo)~d) require the authorities
to 'overadjust' in the long run in the sense that they have to depart more from their
blisspoints than is indicated by the gap f~rd -m~0.
Saddlepoint stability requires 0~ and 0" to be positive. The expressions in Table 2
reveal that positive values for 0 require that policymakers attach a sufficiently high
priority to government debt stabilisation (i.e. high values of ~, and x) as long as S
exceeds r.14 Intuitively, to avoid explosive debt dynamics, authorities need to attach a
sufficiently high priority to debt stabilisation to offset their impatience. Adjustment is
slow if the dynamic system is close to being unstable, i.e. the value of 0 is small. In
particular, debt stabilisation is a time-consuming process if authorities are impatient (i.e.
S exceeds r by a large margin) and at the same time care little about debt stabilisation
(i.e. ~, and x are small).
The expressions for a show that the intratemporal share of the adjustment burden
that falls on the fiscal authorities is inversely related to v) in the cooperative case. At the
same time, a higher weight of money growth ( i.e. inflation) in the objective function of
the fiscal authorities raises a. In the Nash open-loop case, a depends only on the
relative weights attached to debt stabilisatíon by the monetary and fiscal authorities. In
particular, if the monetary authoríties value debt stabilisation more than the fiscal
authorities do (i.e. when td~, is large so that the monetary authorities are not conserva-
tive, while the fiscal authoritíes are not disciplined), they bear most of the adjustment
burden associated with the conflict between monetary and fiscal policies. As explained
'Z If the weights attached to debt stabilisation are low, 4 is small (see Table 2). According to
Table 1, this implies that h is small as well. The speed of adjustment is thus of interest not only for its
own sake but also as an indicator of intertemporal shifting. In particular, a small adjustment speed
indicates that intertemporal shifting is important.
" Recall that we assume that ftrd-m~0.
'" These stability conditions are consistent with Tabellini (1986, p. 431), who stresses that the time
path of debt can be stable even if r~0.
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in section 2, rl does not affect the open-loop equilibrium because, in deciding on the
primary fiscal deficit, the fiscal authorities take money growth as given.
A comparison of the cooperative and Nash open-loop equilibria leads to the
following proposition:
Proposition 1
The speed of adjustment is higher and steady-state debt is lower in the cooperative
equilibrium if either (a) fiscal authorities attach less weight to inflation stabilisation
relative to debt stabilisation than the monetary authorities do, i.e. if ~,Irl~x, or (b) fiscal
authorities carry only a small weight, cil, in the cooperative case.
Proof :
According to Table 1, h~--18t 82 '4ocand ho--18{ 8Z}4oo. Therefore, h~~h" if2 2 2 2
0~~~" If we insert the definitions of 0~ and Ao from Table 2, we arrive at the following
inequalities:
(W~tx)(1 t I ~~~tx "(~-T~K~ W t K~Q
W WY)tI Wtjtl W
(12)
The inequality (~,-rlxp0 is a sufficient condition for the second inequality (12) to hold. If
w~0, the second term on the left-hand side of the second inequality (12) dominates the
first term. Hence, the inequality also holds. According to the definition
of (3 in Table 1, (3 and h are negatively related. Moreover, a positive relationship
between (3 and d(oo) exists according to the definition of d(oo) in Table 1. Steady-state
government debt, therefore, is inversely related to the adjustment speed. Hence, h~~ho
implies d`~(ao)~d"(oo). ~
The first term at the left-hand side of the second inequality in (12) reflects the
externality on 'fiscal' welfaze if monetary authorities raise money growth to stabilise
government debt. If the fiscal authorities do not caze about money growth (i.e. r1-0), this
externality is positive as more money growth reduces debt accumulation. The positive
externality is alleviated by a negative externality if the fiscal authority dislikes money
growth ( i.e. r1~0). In the remainder of this paper, we assume that 1~rlx so that the net
effect of both externalities of money growth on fiscal welfaze is positive. The second
term at the left-hand side of the second inequality in (I2) measures the positive spillover
on 'monetary' welfare if the fiscal authorities decrease the primary fiscal deficit to stabi-
lise government debt. The cooperative equilibrium internalises the positive spillover on
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the monetary authority of reductions in the primary ftscal deficit and the positive
spillover on the fiscal authority associated with increases in money growth. Both actions
reduce government debt accumulation, thereby lowering the steady-state stock of debt
and speeding up adjustment.
The information in Tables 1 and 2 reveals that short-term fiscal policies are
typically too loose, while monetary policies are too tight in the noncooperative equilib-
rium. In particular, (f(0)-m(0)) is smaller with cooperation than wíthout cooperation,
since hc(3~ is smaller than h"(3"'S and h`~ is larger than h".16 The intertemporal budget
constraint then implies smaller long-run debt, allowing (f(oo)-m(oo)) to be larger under
cooperation than under non-cooperation (see Table 1 and recall that (3`~ is smaller than
(3~. Regarding steady-state primary fiscal deficits and money creation in both equilibria,
we can show the following:
Proposition 2
Steady-state primary fiscal deficits are lower in the cooperative equilibrium than in the
noncooperative Nash open-loop equilibrium, if
r(ó - r) xx-w(~l-xrl)~ (wrltl)
w~ltx
(13a)
Steady-state money creation is lower in the cooperative equilibrium than in the





From Table 1 it follows that.f`~(oo)~fo(oo) if a~(]tr(3~)~ao(]fr(3o). With the definitions for
a' and 0' from Table 2, this inequality can be rewritten as
1 ( 1 t 1 )(w~ltx)
w ( w wrltl ) ~ .l
~tw 1 1 (~ t w 1 1)(wltx)-r(ó-r)
~}x-r(ó-r)
nt ~t
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator of the left-hand side by w~,fx and at
the right-hand side by ~,, we arrive at
's Recall thatftrd-m~0.





w l( 1 t 1 ) r(b -r) I 1} x- r(8 -r)
W (JT~tl (lJztK) Á, z
w l( 1 t 1 ) r(b -r) 1 ~ 1 t x r(8 -r)
w wr~tl (wztx) z z
Multiplying both sides of this inequality by (wrltl)~, and collecting terms yields (13a).
In a similar vein, m~(oo)~m"(oo) if (1-o!`)(Ifr(3`)~(1-a")(ltr(3`). Substituting the
expressions for a' and 0' from Table 2, we find
w~}1 ( (~' W~}1)(wzfx) )' K
1 1 1 1 z tK -r(b -r)
~tw~}1 (~ t W~}t)(wztx)-r(8-r)
which implies
(wn'1)[(fil}(J7jt1)-(fJzt ) I ` 1}x-,lxr)
Multiplying both sides of this inequality by wx and collecting terms yields (13b). ~
If S-r, the policy conflict is resolved without intertemporal shifting and (3 equals
0. In that case, coordinated policies, compared to uncoordinated policies, are more disci-
plined in the long run (i.e. money growth and primary fiscal deficits are lower with
cooperation), if and only if a~~a". This is the case if the weight c~ of the fiscal objec-
tives in the cooperative solution is small. Intuitively, the coordinated equilibrium is
dominated by the (monetary) player caring more about low inflation and less about large
fiscal deficits.
If the central bank is not conservative (i.e. x large), policies are likely to be more
disciplined in the cooperative case." Intuitively, in that case, the externality of the fiscal
authorities on the monetary authorities (i.e. the 'fiscal extemality') dominates the
externality of the monetary authorities on the fiscal authorities (i.e. the 'monetary'
externality). Accordingly, the fiscal rather than the monetary authority has to conduct
most of the adjustment in the coordinated equilibrium. If the central bank is rather
conservative (small x), policies are more disciplined without cooperation. The reason is
that without cooperation the central bank is free to choose its own restrictive monetary
policy without paying much attention to the consequences for public debt accumulation.
Accordingly, polícy cooperation worsens discipline in this case. In other words, in
" We continue to assume here that intertemporal shifting is absent.
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preserving discipline, a conservative central banks acts as a substitute for policy
cooperation.
If policymakers are impatient (i.e. S~r), the condition for tighter fiscal policy in
the coordinated case becomes stronger than a`~a". The condition for tighter monetary
policies in the case of policy cooperation, in contrast, weakens. The reason is that
coordinated policies result in less accumulation of public debt. The associated lower
long-run adjustment burden allows larger steady-state deficits and lower steady-state
money growth. If the weight of the fiscal authorities is the same in the cooperative and
Nash open-loop equilibria (i.e. a~~-a"), cooperation implies smaller primary fiscal
deficits in the short run and lazger primary fiscal deficits in the long run. Intuitively,
cooperation implies that the adjustment burden is shifted less to the future, as the
authorities value more policies reducing debt acctunulation. Accordingly, money growth
is higher in the short run but lower in the long rtut.
2.5 Comparative Dynamics
The preceding section explored the features of the initial state, adjustment speed and
steady-state in the cooperative and Nash open-loop equilibria. This section examines
how both equilibria aze affected by changes in the preference parameters and the initial
stock of government debt. The effects are found by taking the partial derivatives from
the expressions found in Tables 1 and 2.18 Table 3 provides the effects of pazameter
changes on the initial state and the adjustment speed, h:
1e The partial derivatives evaluated in Table 3 and 4 are found in Appendix B.
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Table 3
Effects of Parameter Changes on the Initial State and the Adjustment Speed
m`(~) .Í~`(0) h ` mo(~) .fo(o) ho
~, t - t ~ - f
K -~ - f -F ~ t
~j - ? - o o ~
w f f t o 0 0
m t f o t f o
f t f o f f p
á - } o - t o
d(0) f - 0 f - 0
The partial derivatives aze evaluated under the assumptions that S~r, d(o)~d, ftrd-m~0,
and ~,-r1x~0. Less conservative monetary authorities (i.e. an increase of x) raise money
growth in the initial state of both equilibria and speed up the adjustment.
More disciplined fiscal authorities (i.e. an increase of ~.) exert similar effects. In
particulaz, the initial primary fiscal deficit is reduced while the adjustment speed
increases. In the Nash open-loop equilibrium, the sign of the effects of an increase of x
on the initial fiscal deficit and of an increase in ~, on initial money creation, is ambigu-
ous. With cooperation, in contrast, an increase in x reduces f`~(o) unaznbiguously and an
increase in ~, unambiguously raises m~(o). Intuitively, by raising the positive extemalities
from debt stabilisation in the cooperative equilibrium, a higher priority to debt stabi-
lisation attached by one player induces also the other player to be more diligent in
stabilising debt. In the noncooperative case, in contrast, the opposite reaction is likely;
more efforts by one player to stabilise government debt induce the other player to re-
duce the efforts aimed at debt stabilisation.
If the fiscal authority attaches a higher weight to monetary stability, initial money
growth is lower and the adjustment speed is reduced in case of cooperation. The impact
on the initial primary fiscal deficit, however, is ambiguous. A higher weight of the fiscal
preferences in the cooperative game raises short-run primary fiscal deficits, money
growth and the adjustment speed. In both equilibria, a higher target for the primazy
fiscal deficit raises the initial primary fiscal deficit, while a lower money growth tazget
reduces initial money growth. A higher debt target allows for lower initial money
growth and a higher initial primary fiscal deficit. A higher initial stock of government
debt imposes a higher initial adjustment burden and thus exerts opposite effects.
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The steady-state effects of changes in the preference pazameters are found in
Table 4:
Table 4
Effects of Parameter Changes on the Steady-State
d~(~) nT~(~) .Í (~) d o(~) mo(~) .fo(~)
~, - (0) - (0) f ( 0) - (0) - ?(-)
K - (O) - (O) t (~) - (~) ?(t) }
7~ f ? - ~ o 0
(il - - f ~ Q ~
m - (o) ? (f) } - (~) ?(f) }
f } (0) f ? (f) f (0) f ?(})
d t t - f t -
If the signs of the partial derivatives in case S-r differ from those in case S~r, we
indicated these signs in Table 4 in parentheses. We first discuss the case of S~r. Not
surprisingly, more priority attached to debt stabilisation (i.e. increases in x and 7,,)
reduces steady-state debt. In the cooperative case, the lower debt service associated with
increases in x and ~. allow for lower steady-state money growth and higher steady-state
primary fiscal deficits. In the Nash open-loop case, in contrast, the effect of an increase
of x on steady-state money growth and the effect of an increase in ~, on steady-state
primary deficits are ambiguous. An explanation for this ambiguity is provided in Prop-
osition 4 (see below). With policy coordination, an increase in the weight attached by
the fiscal authorities to monetary stability reduces steady-state primary fiscal deficits but
exerts an ambiguous impact on steady-state money growth as steady-state debt increases.
More influence of the fiscal authority on cooperative policy design yields lower steady-
state debt, higher steady-state primary fiscal deficits and lower steady-state money
creation.
Furthermore, a higher primary fiscal deficit target, f, or a lower monetazy tazget,
m, increase steady-state government debt by increasing the conflict between the various
objectives. The impact of a change in the money growth target on steady-state money
growth is ambiguous. The same holds true for the effect of a higher primary fiscal
deficit target on steady-state primary fiscal deficits. We explore these ambiguities in
more detail in Proposition 3 below. A higher debt target induces, in both equilibria, a
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higher steady-state level of government debt. The associated additional debt service
requires higher money growth and lower primary fiscal deficits in the long run.
If S-r (see the signs between parentheses in Table 4), the conflict between
monetary and fiscal authorities is resolved without accumulation of government debt. In
that case, steady-state debt is not affected by changes in the preference parameters
(except for the debt target itself). In addition, ambiguities of steady-state effects on the
primary fiscal deficit and money growth disappear. In particular, in the open-loop
equilibrium, an increase in x increases steady-state money growth. Furthermore, an
increase in ~, decreases steady-state primary fiscal deficits. Moreover, in the Nash open-
loop equilibrium an increase in the primary fiscal deficit target and the money growth
target increase, respectively, steady-state primary fiscal deficits and steady-state money
growth in the Nash open-loop equilibrium.
The intertemporal shifting of the adjustment burden of government debt stabilisa-
tion can give rise to unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of the type introduced by Sargent
and Wallace ( I 981).19 Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic occurs when disinflationary
monetary policies have to be reversed because of higher debt accumulation that such
policies induce. If fiscal authorities do not cut primary fiscal deficits to reduce govern-
ment debt accumulation, i.e. if the fiscal player is strong, a large part of the debt adjust-
ment burden is eventually shifted back to the monetary authority, resulting in higher
inflation in the long run. Conversely, fiscal expansions, e.g. in the form of tax cuts, have
to be reversed in the long run if the fiscal player is weak compared to the monetary
player. The adjustment burden from larger government debt that such policies produce is
in the long run for the most part shifted back to the fiscal authorities, if the central bank
does not monetise the additional debt. We can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 3
A lower target value for money growth reduces money growth in the short run. Howev-
er, it raises long-run money growth if (a) ~,~r(S-r)-tc~w in the cooperative equilibrium
and (b) ~,~r(S-r) in the Nash open-loop equilibrium. A higher target value jor primary
fiscal deficits raises short-run deficits. However, it reduces long-run primary fiscal
deficits if (a) x~r(S-r)(wrlfl)-w~, in the cooperative equilibrium and (b) x~r(S-r) in the
Nash open-loop equilibrium.
" Following the Iiterature, we adopt the terminology of 'unpleasant' arithmetic, without necessarily
attaching a normative significance to this phenomenon.
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Proof:
The partial derivatives of m(oo) and f(oo) with respect to m and f aze equal to
8m(~) -1-(1-a)(1 trp) ~~) -1-a(1 trp)
c7m ~
respectively. A decrease of m induces an instantaneous drop in m(0) in both the
cooperative andNash open-loop equilibrium since 1-(1-a~)(1-h~R`) and 1-(1-aoxl -ho(3o)
aze both positive. The partial derivatives of m`~(oo) and mo(oo) with respect to m imply
that a decrease in m induces an increase in m(oo) if (i) 1-(1-a`~x1frR~)~0 in the coopera-
tive equilibrium, and (ii) 1-(1-ao)(ltr(3~~0 in the Nash open-loop equilibrium. With the
t (fJÁ~K)( 1 4 1 )
definitions of a and R in Tables 1 and 2, we can rewrite (i) as t-( 1 w~'i )( éc
wn.t ) ~ o
-.
w w~tt
and (ii) as 1- ~xx ~ó~ 0. Rewriting both inequalities and using the
t,
,l tx -r(8 -r)
definitions of ~~ and ~o from Table 2, we find in case of (i) " ~0 , whe-~c
reas ii can be rewritten as ~ r(ó-r)~0 The first part of the proposition then follows.O o
In a similar vein, we find that an increase in f induces an instantaneous increase
inf(0) in both equilibria, since ( ] -a`)(1-h` (3~) and (1-ao)(1-ho(3o) are positive. According
to the partial derivatives of f` (oo) and f o(oo) w.r.t. f, an increase in j causes a perma-
1 (w~.tx)(1' t )
nent decrease in f(oo) if (i) t-( t w t )( ó~ "`~tt ) ~o in the cooperative equi-
-.
~, wntt
librium and n 1- ~~'x ~ 0 in the Nash o en-loo e uilibrium. i and ii can be(~~) }x Qo P P q ( ) (~ )
w~.tx
rewritten as
(wTltl~Cr(8-r)co and x-Qg~-r)~o respectively, from which the second
part of the proposition follows directly. 0
Unpleasant monetarist azithmetic implies that the initial disinflation is not sustain-
able in the long run and that the new steady-state is instead chazacterised by a higher
rate of inflation. This becomes more likely if the fiscal authorities are strong, i.e. ~. is
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small, impatience is high, i.e. S~ r, and if, in case of cooperation, the weight of the fiscal
objective function is large, i.e. if ca is large. Unpleasant fiscal azithmetic occurs if
monetary authorities aze strong, i.e. x is small, impatience is high, and if, with coopera-
tive decision making, inflation aversion of the fiscal authority is substantial, i.e. if rl is
large.
Unpleasant monetazist and fiscal arithmetic can occur only if the discount rate
substantially exceeds the interest rate. Indeed, a lazger fiscal blisspoint unambiguously
raises the long-run primazy fiscal deficit if authorities are patient ( i.e. S-r). If authorities
are impatient, in contrast, the long-run deficit may decline if the weight attached to debt
stabilisation in the objective function of monetary authorities is sufficiently smallZO.
Intuitively, the burden of adjustment associated with lazger short-run primary deficits is
not met through monetisation. Instead, it is shifted to the future through debt accumu-
lation. With the monetary authority being strong, the burden is eventually paid by the
fiscal authorities in terms of lower primary deficits. Indeed, the expression for the long-
run primary deficit in Table 1 reveals that unpleasant fiscal arithmetic occurs only if
both (3 and a aze lazge ( i.e. a(lfr(3)~1): a high value of (3 indicates substantial intertem-
poral shifting, while a high value of a indicates a strong position of the monetary
authorities. Given our assumption that monetary authorities caze more about inflation
(relative to debt stabilisation) than do fiscal authorities, i.e. that )Jrl~x, unpleasant fiscal
arithmetic is less likely to occur with cooperation: the faster adjustment implies less debt
accumulation as compared to the Nash open-loop equilibrium (see Proposition 1).
The issue of conservativeness of the central bank has encountered a lot of interest
(see e.g. Rogoff (1985), Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and Schaling (1995) and Cukierman
(1992)). In our framework, a more conservative central bank, as measured by a lower
value of x, implies that the fiscal authorities face a larger adjustment burden from debt
stabilisation. This yields the following proposition:
Proposition 4
A more conservative central bank reduces the adjustment speed and raises steady-state
debt. In the cooperative equilibrium (ij S~r), a more conservative central bank reduces
steady-state primary fiscal deficits but raises steady-state money growth. In the open-
20 Only the weight the monetary player attaches to debt stabilisation appears in the condition for
unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Intuitively, unpleasant fiscal arithmetic originates in the unwillingness of the
monetary player to adjust, as indicated by a small value of K. In the same way, only the weight attached
to debt stabilisation by the fiscal player enters the condition for unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.
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loop case, in contrast, a more conservative central bank reduces both steady-state
primary fiscal deficits and money growth if ~r(S-r), i.e. iffiscal authorities are not too
strong.
Proof :
According to the definitions in Tables 1 and 2, a decrease in x implies that the adjust-
ment speed of the cooperative equilibrium and the Nash open-loop equilibrium, h~ and
ho, decrease. Since steady-state debt is negatively related to the adjustment speed (cf.
Table 1), a decrease of x increases steady-state debt (given our assumptions that
(rfrd -m)~0 and S~r). This proves the first part of the proposition.
In the cooperative equilibrium, x does not affect ac according to Table 2. Hence,
changes in x affect f~(oo) and m~(ao) only by changing (3~. If S-r, (3~ equals 0 and
changes of x exert no effect at all. If S~r, a decrease in x reduces the adjustment speed,
implying an increase in (3~. A higher (3~ implies higher steady-state government debt
and, consequently, lower steady-state primary fiscal deficits and higher steady-state
money growth, as stated in the middle part of the proposition.
In the Nash open-loop equilibrium, a decrease in x increases both ao and (30.
According to the definition in Table 1, the long-run primary fiscal deficit, f o(oo),
decreases. Long-run money growth, m"(oo), decreases if x is lowered, as long as the
decrease in ( 1-ao) exceeds the increase in (ltr(3o). A decrease of x reduces (1-a`)
by ~ and leads to an increase in (lfr(3o) of
r(b-r) The first effect dominates the
(~ tx)Z (~ t K)2
second effect if ~- r(8-T) ~o. This results in the last part of the proposition. 0
(~tK)2 (~ tK)2
Without cooperation, a more conservative central bank may be counterproductive
in reducing long-run inflation if authorities are impatient and at the same time the fiscal
authorities are strong (in the sense that they attach a low priority to stabilising debt).21
Hence, making a central bank more conservative is not enough to ensure low inflation
rates. Low inflation rates aze sustainable only if fiscal authoríties are disciplined (i.e.
they attach substantial weight to debt stabilisation) and patient (i.e. S does not exceed r
Z' The condition for a more conservative central bank to raise long-run money growth coincides with
the condition for a lower target value for money growth to raise long-run money growth in the Nash
open-loop case. If the monetary authorities do not sufficiently care about debt stabilisation, the model may
become unstable (i.e. if ~"~0).
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by a large mazgin). This suggests that a conservative central bank needs to be comple-
mented by fiscal reforms to achieve long-run price stability. Whereas a more conserva-
tive central bank may raise inflation in the long run, it succeeds in strengthening fiscal
discipline by reducing fiscal deficits in the long run.zZ
In the presence of cooperation, a more conservative central bank raises the
intertemporal shifting of the adjustment burden to the future because it reduces the
overall concern about debt accumulation. This allows larger fiscal deficits and lower
money growth in the short run, but requires lower deficits and higher money growth in
the long run.
2.6 Stackelberg Equilibria of the Debt Stabilisation Game
Central bank independence is another issue that has received much attention in recent
yeazs. Several countries have granted, or are intending to grant, their central banks more
independence from political authorities. Furthermore, the independence of the European
Central Bank (ECB) is an important part of the Maastricht treaty on the EMU. At the
same time, this treaty requires that the EMU members make their national banks more
independent.
This section investigates the impact of central bank independence on government
debt stabilisationZ' by compazing the Nash open-loop equilibrium analysed above with
the open-loop equilibria in which either the central bank or the fiscal authorities act as
Stackelberg leader. The Stackelberg leader has a first-mover advantage when selecting
optimal policies, and thus takes into account the response of the follower(s). The first-
mover advantage gives the leader a strategic advantage in the debt stabilisation game.
Accordingly, on the scale of central bank independence, fiscal leadership represents the
case of a dependent central bank, the Nash equilibrium is an intermediate case, while
monetary leadership corresponds to independent monetary authorities.
In the context of the EMU, we can provide an alternative interpretation for
Stackelberg leadership of the monetary authorities. In particulaz, whereas each national
central bank confronts a single fiscal authority, the European Central Bank (ECB) deals
with several decentralised fiscal authorities. This is likely to strengthen the strategic
Z2 Only with positive public assets in the initial equilibrium (i.e. d(o) negative) may fiscal policy
become more expansionary in the short run.
Z' See Cotarelli (1993) for a detailed survey on seigniorage, central bank credit to the government and
central bank independence in practice.
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position of the ECB compared to that of the national central banks. Accordingly,
comparing the Nash equilibrium ( representing national decision making on monetazy
policy) and the Stackelberg equilibrium with monetary leadership ( representing monetary
policy set on the European level), we can explore the impact of moving monetary
decision making from the national to the supranational level within the EMU.
With Stackelberg leadership, the general formulations of the solutions provided in
the first part of Table 1 remain valid.24 The values of a, which measures the intratem-
poral adjustment burden of the fiscal player, and 4 are contained in Table 5. As in the
Nash equilibrium, the relationship between ~ and the measure of intertemporal shifting
of the adjustment burden, ~3, is given by (3-(S-r)l~.
Table 5
4 and a in both Stackelberg Open-Loop Equilibria
Monetary authority Fiscal authority
Stackelberg leader Stackelberg leader
4 ,l(~.-r(8 -r))-r(b -r)(~l tx-r(b -r))
~l -r(b -r)
a 1 t xr(8 -r)
~.(x -r(8 - r)) -xr(8 -r)
x(x -r(8 -r)) tnx2 -r(b -r)(,l tx-r(8 -r))
x-r(b -r)
rlxZ - ~.r(b -r)
x(x-r(8 -r))txZrl -xr(8 -r)
Stability requires that ~,(~,-r(S-r))-r(S-r)(~.fx-r(S-ry0 incase the monetary authorities aze
Stackelberg leader, and x(x - r(S -r))fx Zrl -r(S -r)(1,.fx -r(S -r)y0 in case the fiscal authorities
are Stackelberg leader. These conditions aze met if intertemporal shifting is absent,
i.e.S-r, and the debt weights ~, and x aze positive. In the presence of intertemporal shif-
ting, however, stability requires that the follower attaches a sufficient weight to debt
stabilisation. Intuitively, the stronger strategic position allows the Stackelberg leader to
shift the burden of stabilising debt towards the follower. This results in explosive
behaviour of debt if this follower is not willing to adjust due to a low priority for debt
stabilisation.
The ability of the leader to lazgely avoid adjustment makes the stability condi-
24 Compared to the Nash equilibrium, however, the Stackelberg equilibria yield different expressions
for the adjustment speed and the relationship between the adjustment speed and the indicator for inter-
temporal shifting, p. Appendix C contains the derivation of the Stackelberg solutions.
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tions in the Stackelberg game more stringent than in the Nash equilibrium. To illustrate,
with monetary leadership, the stability condition in the Stackelberg game excludes
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic in the Nash equilibrium.25 Hence, if a more conserva-
tive central bank is counterproductive in achieving long-run price stability, a more
independent central bank produces explosive debt behaviour and is thus counter-
productive as well. Intuitively, making the central bank 'stronger' by making it more
conservative or more independent fails to achieve long-run price stability if the fiscal
authorities are undisciplined and impatient. This may explain why, in the Maastricht
treaty for EMU, a conservative ECB is combined with strict debt ceilings and surveillan-
ce of national fiscal policies.
With fiscal leadership, the equilibrium can be stable even if unpleasant fiscal
arithmetic is present in the Nash open-loop game, i.e. if x-r(S-r)~0. The reason is that
the fiscal player cares about money growth, i.e. r)~0. Hence, it will not push all the ad-
justment unto the central bank. Nevertheless, stability requires that the central bank is
not too conservative (i.e. cares little about debt stabilisation, as indicated by a small
value of x), especially if the fiscal authorities caze only little about money growth.
The Stackelberg game with fiscal leadership is the only open-loop equilibrium in
which the weight the fiscal authority attaches to money growth, rl, affects the equilibri-
um. This is because, as Stackelberg leader, the fiscal player takes into account how the
central bank alters its monetary policy in response to fiscal policy. Hence, through the
response of monetary policy, the government perceives an indirect effect of its fiscal
policy on money growth.
The intratemporal adjustment parameter, a, reflects the stronger strategic position
of the Stackelberg leader. The case without intertemporal shifting (i.e. S-r) and mone-
tary leadership illustrates this. In that case, the fiscal authorities' shaze of the adjustment
burden is one (i.e. a-1), indicating that, as Stackelberg leader, the central bank can shift
the entire adjustment burden to the follower. Indeed, the central bank is at its blisspoint
in the long run (i.e. m(t)-m and d(t)-d).
With fiscal leadership and in the absence of intertemporal shifting, the entire
burden falls on the monetazy authorities (i.e. a-0) only if the fiscal authorities do not
care about money growth at all (i.e. r1-0). With r1~0, fiscal leadership yields less
~5 Stability of the Nash open-loop equilibrium requires ~,fx-r(S-ry0 (see Table 2), while unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic requires ~.-r(S-r)~0 ( see Proposition 3). These two inequalities imply that
~,(~,-r(S-r))-r(S-r)(~.fx-r(S-r)~0, thereby violating the stability condition of the Stackelberg open-loop
equilibrium with monetary leadership.
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extreme results than monetary leadership. However, the monetary authorities' adjustment
burden under fiscal leadership exceeds that in the Nash equilibrium because the fiscal
authorities (i.e. the Stackelberg leader) care less about money growth (compared to debt
stabilisation) than do the monetary authorities (i.e. the Stackelberg follower), i.e. rl~~,lx.
Accordingly, the adjustment burden of the central bank (i.e. 1-a) -and thus money
growth (and inflation)- is lowest under monetary leadership and highest under fiscal
leadership, with the Nash equilibrium as an intermediate case. If policy authorities are
patient (i.e. S-r)26, a more independent central bank thus strengthens policy discipline by
reducing both money growth and fiscal deficits.
In the presence of intertemporal shifting (i.e. S~r), the fiscal player absorbs more
than 1000~0 of the adjustment burden if it acts as a Stackelberg follower (i.e. a~l). The
reason is that the monetary player behaves strategically by reducing money growth
below its blisspoint. By marginally decreasing money growth from its blisspoint, the
central bank forces the fiscal player to intensify its efforts to reduce public debt. This
yields a first-order gain in central-bank welfare by bringing debt closer to its target (as
d(oo)~d if S~r). The loss in welfare due to the decline in money growth away from the
blisspoint is only second order. This yields the following proposition:
Proposition 5
Among open-loop equilibria, steady-state money growth and primary fiscal deficits are
lowest with Stackelberg leadership of the central bank and (if ~Jrlx) highest with
Stackelberg leadership of the f:scal authorities. The Nash equilibrium coincides with the
Stackelberg equilibrium with the central bank as leader only if x-0. It coincides with the
Stackelberg equilibrium with the fiscal authorities as leader only if 7,,-rlx.
Proof:
From Table 1, it follows that mM(oo)~mo(w) if (1-a~(1}ra~Ql-a~(ltr(3~. Using the
definitions in Tables 2 and 5, this equality can be reduced to x~,(~,-r(S-r)p0. Stability
requires ur(S-r) and ~0 (see footnote 25). Hence, mM(oo)-mo(oo) requires x-0. Similar-
ly, mo(oo)~mF(oo) if (I -aoxlfr(3~~(1-aF)(lfr(3F), which holds if xZ(~,-r~xy0. Stability
requires that x~0. Hence, mo(oo)-mF(oo) requires that ~-r~x. f M(oo)~f o(oo) requires that
aM(lfr(i"`yao(ltr(3~. This condition reduces to ~,Zx~O. Finally, j o(oo)~f F(oo) if
ao(1}rpoya`(lfr(iF) which reduces to x(~,-r~xxx-r(S-r)y0. (]
Z6 In the absence of intertemporal shifting, the stability conditions are met as long as ~, and K are
positive.
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The Stackelberg leader undertakes no action to stabilise debt. Instead, it uses its instru-
ment strategically to force more adjustment unto the other player, i.e. the follower. This
makes this equilibrium particulazly inefficient as reflected in substantial debt accumula-
tion. The following proposition can be formulated:
Proposition 6
In open-loop games, steady-state debt is higher under Stackelberg leadership than in the
Nash equilibrium if, compared to the follower, the leader cares more about debt
stabilisation than about the instrument controlled by the follower.
Proof:
First we solve d M( oo)~d o(oo). From Table 1 and R-(S-r)I0, this inequality holds if
OM~~o. Using the expressions in Tables 2 and 5 this condition can be written as
a,(~.-r(S-r))-r(S-r)[~.}x-r(S-r)]~(~l-r(S-r))[~.fx-r(S-r)] which holds if xu0. Stability
rey::ires ;. -0. Hence, the inequality is met if x~0, which implies that, compares to the
fiscal authority, the central bank cazes more about debt stabilisation than about fiscal
deficits (since the central bank does not caze about fiscal deficits at all).
Next, we solve d"~(co)~d o(oo). 0~'c4~~ holds if: x(x -r(S -r)}~x Ztt - r(S -r)[~,tx -r(S -r)p
(x-r(S-r))[~,fx-r(S-r)], which can be reduced to x(7~-r~xy0. Stability requires x~0. Hence,
the inequality is met if the priority that the fiscal authority attaches to debt stabilisation
relative to money growth, 11r~, exceeds the conesponding relative priority of the central
bank, x. ~
This proposition implies that, compared to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg
equilibrium with the central bank as leader yields higher steady-state debt because the
central bank does not care about the instrument controlled by the fiscal authorities, i.e.
primary fiscal deficits. Compazed to the Nash game, the Stackelberg game with fiscal
leadership yields also higher steady-state debt because the fiscal player, although caring
about money growth (i.e. r1~0), attaches a higher relative priority to debt
stabilisation than does the monetary player, (i.e. 1Jrl~x).
Hence, we can conclude that, starting from an initial situation with a rather
dependent central bank (i.e. fiscal Stackelberg leadership), making the central bank less
dependent increases discipline on all fronts in the steady-state: money growth, primary
fiscal deficits, and debt all decline. An even more independent central bank (i.e. moving
from a Nash equilibrium to the Stackelberg equilibrium with monetary leadership)
reduces steady-state money growth and primary fiscal deficits even more. However,
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public debt increases. This may explain the fear that moving towazds an EMU (where
the monetary authorities have a stronger strategic position than with national decision
making) results in excessive debt accumulation.
2.7 Numerical Simulations with the Model
The analytical results from the preceding sections can be illustrated succinctly by a









The initial situation features a stock of government debt that exceeds the debt
tazget and policymakers featuring a high rate of time preference. The fiscal player has a
positive primary deficit tazget and the monetary player a zero money growth target. A
value of x of 0.01, implies that the Central Bank is not ultra-conservative. Cooperative
policies give an equal weight to objectives of the fiscal and monetary player. A debt
target of 600~0 of GDP is chosen for this economy which could reflect the desire to
comply with the entrance criterium for the European Monetary Union. Doubts are often
raised whether the EU will satisfy the fiscal convergence criteria in 1999, when the
introduction of the common currency is plannedZ'.
Z' A steady-state debt ratio of 600~0 of GDP results from primary fiscal deficits of 3ol0 of GDP and a
net of output growth real interest rate of So~o, as the Delors Committee assumed when advocating such
debt and deficit targets. As the simulations will show, however, it can take a fairly long time before new
steady-states are reached. The quick convergence implicitly assumed by the Delors Committee implicitly
seems to be rather on the optimistic side. Corsetti and Roubini (1993) test the sustainability of current
government debt accumulation in the EU. They find that the current process of government debt accumu-
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With this set of model pazameters the cooperative, open-loop Nash and open-loop
Stackelberg equilibria are given as follows:
Table 7
Government Debt Stabilisation as a Differential Game
variable Cooperation Nash open- Stackelberg Stackelberg
loop Mon.lead. Fisc.lead.
m(0) 0.040 0.042 0.021 0.065
f(0) -0.051 - 0.032 -0.048 -0.023
~0)trd(0) -0.011 0.008 - 0.008 0.017
h 0.143 0.101 0.122 0.109
d(oo) 0.643 0.674 0.809 0.709
m(oo) 0.014 0.018 0.010 0.027
~oo) -0.011 -0.008 - 0.042 -0.001
~oo)trd(oo) 0.015 0.019 - 0.010 0.027
a 0.60 0.50 1.24 0.50
(3 1.26 2.17 6.16 3.21
LF (to) 0.029 0.025 0.051 0.028
LM(t~) 0.015 0.02 0.014 0.035
The adjustment paths of government debt, primary fiscal deficit and money creation are
displayed in Figures la-c:
steady-states are reached. The quick convergence implicitly assumed by the Delors Committee implicitly
seems to be rather on the optimistic side. Corsetti and Roubini (1993) test the sustainability of current
government debt accumulation in the EU. They find that the current process of government debt accumu-
lation in Italy, Belgium and Ireland is not sustainable in the long run.
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Figure Ib Primary Fiscal Deficit Dynamics
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Money Growth
lo 15 20 25 30
time
- Cooperation - Nash open-loop
- - CB Stackelberg - -- Fisc Stackelberg
Figure 1 c Money Growth Dynamics
With respect to debt stabilisation, the numerical example displays the general properties
derived in Propositions 1 and 6: steady-state debt is lowest in the cooperative equilib-
rium and highest in the Stackelberg equilibria. Of course, also the analytical results
derived in Propositions 2 and 5 regarding steady-state primary fiscal deficits and money
growth apply: steady-state primary deficits are highest with fiscal leadership and lowest
with monetary leadership, whereas money growth is lowest with monetary leadership
and highest with fiscal leadership.
The losses incurred by the monetary and fiscal player depend -apart from the
model parameters- on which type of interaction prevails. Figure 2 displays the losses of
both players in the different equilibria. The Pareto frontier that is drawn contains the
combinations of {LF(to),LM(to)} that arise under cooperation if w varies. In particu-
laz, if w increases the objectives of the fiscal authority in the cooperative decision
making process aze more dominant. In that case, losses of the fiscal authorities aze lower
and the losses of the monetary player higher. Therefore, the weighting of the objectives
of both players -as measured by w- plays a crucial role in the outcomes under cooperati-
on. The most important solution concept to determine this "bargaining" weight is the
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"Nash bargaining solutioni28. The Nash bazgaining solution, wNe, is defined as the value
of w that maximises the cooperation gains compazed to the Nash outcome. It is found
from maximising the distances of all players from the Nash threatpoint under coopera-
tive decision making:
W NB -maR~ (LC -LN ~ (LC - LN ~
(14)
where L~ denotes losses of player i under cooperation and L,~, losses in the Nash 'threat-
point' when players act noncooperatively. The w that is produced by the Nash-bargaining
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Figure 2 Distibution of Losses
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ZB See Douven (1995), Chapter 3, for a more detailed discussion of the concepts behind the Nash-
bargaining solution.
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Consider next the possibility of making the Central Bank more conservative. If x goes to
zero, the following picture emerges:
Table 8
Govemment Debt Stabilisation with an uhra-Conservative Central Bank
variable Cooperation Nash open- Stackelberg Stackelberg
loop Mon.lead. Fisc.lead.
m(0) 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000
J(0) -0.037 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054
,(0)trd(0) 0.003 - 0.014 -0.014 -0.014
h 0.090 0.060 0.060 0.060
d(ao) 0.689 0.762 0.762 0.762
m(oo) 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000
~ao) -0.013 -0.030 - 0.030 -0.030
f(oo)trd(oo) 0.015 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
a 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00
(3 2.63 4.76 4.76 4.76
LF (ta) 0.028 0.051 0.051 0.051
LM(t~) 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
Outcomes coincide in the noncooperative equilibria if x-0: actually no real dynamic
interaction between the two players occurs since the monetary player fixes money
growth at its preferred level and leaves the adjustment burden from debt stabilisation to
the fiscal player, implying that a equals one in the noncooperative equilibria. A more
conservative Central Bank slows down the adjustment speed considerably and leads to a
higher steady-state level of govenvnent debt, as was noticed in Proposition 4. The
increased adjustment burden that the fiscal authority faces if the monetary authority is
more conservative, causes the effects on steady-state primary fiscal deficits and money
growth as formulated in the second part of Proposition 4. Steady-state deficits decrease
in all equilibria, while money growth decreases except in the cooperative equilibrium.
A increase in the rate of output growth, facilitates debt stabilisation because
higher economic growth reduces the interest burden of outstanding debt. An increase of
g by 1,So~o reduces r from 40~o to 2,5"~o and brings about the following situation:
Macroeconomic Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilisation 63
Table 9
An Increase in the Growth Rate of Real Output
variable Cooperation Nash open- Stackelberg Stackelberg
loop Mon.lead. Fisc.lead.
m(0) 0.034 0.034 0.021 0.047
~0) -0.042 -0.024 - 0.034 -0.019
f(0)frd(0) -0.017 0.001 -0.009 0.006
h 0.143 0.102 0.122 0.110
d(ao) 0.643 0.674 0.796 0.707
m(w) 0.010 0.013 0.006 0.019
~oo) -0.006 -0.003 -0.026 0.002
f(oo)trd(oo) 0.010 0.014 -0.006 0.020
a 0.60 0.50 1.19 0.50
(3 1.72 2.95 7.82 4.29
LF (to) 0.022 0.019 0.031 0.020
LM(t~) 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.023
With an increase in the rate of economic growth, government debt stabilisation is
achieved more easily and the required adjustments in the primary fiscal deficit and the
rate of money growth are smaller. As compared to the initial situation in Table 9, more
of the adjustment burden is shifted to the future, since (3 is higher, both in the coopera-
tive and noncooperative cases.
Consider next the effects of a change in rl, the weight that the fiscal player
attaches to monetary stability. r) only affects actual policies in case of the cooperative
equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium with fiscal leadership, in the other equilibria





variable Cooper- Nash open- Stackelberg Stackelberg
ation loop Mon.lead. Fisc.lead
m(0) 0.054 0.042 0.021 0.062
,~(0) -0.044 -0.032 -0.048 -0.022
~O~rd(0) - 0.004 0.008 -0.008 0.018
h 0.160 0.101 0.122 0.111
d(ao) 0.635 0.674 0.809 0.809
m(oo) 0.018 0.018 0.010 0.052
,~(ao) -0.008 - 0.008 - 0.042 0.020
fioo)trd(oo) 0.017 0.019 -0.010 0.052
a 0.50 0.50 1.24 -0.24
R 1.04 2.17 6.16 6.16
LF (to) 0.019 0.020 0.050 0.015
LM(t~) 0.019 0.020 0.014 0.053
A compazison of the outcomes in Tables 7 and 10 enables us to check the
comparative dynamic effects of tl that were derived in Tables 4 and 6. By
reducing rl, the dynamic game becomes symmetric as the fiscal player becomes
relatively less interested in the monetary tazget and more in the fiscal objective. In the
cooperative equilibrium, therefore, the fiscal authority is able to shift more of the
adjustment burden to the monetary authority as witnesses the decrease in a. This feature
is even more pronounced in the equilibrium with Stackelberg leadership of the fiscal
authority: with the fiscal player no longer caring about inflation, it succeeds in increas-
ing fiscal deficits towazds its target and shifting the adjustment burden from debt
stabilisation to the monetary authority, as witness the negative a and the high inflation
that results.
Conclusion
This chapter has extended the analysis of Tabellini ( 1986) on the strategic interaction
between monetary and fiscal authorities implied by the dynamic government budget
constraint. In particular, we derived and interpreted closed-form solutions for the
dynamics of the fiscal deficit, money growth and government debt in the cooperative
and Nash open-loop equilibria. Cooperation among the authorities internalises the
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positive spillovers from debt stabilisation efforts and thus results in faster adjustment
and lower steady-state debt. It may, however, boost steady-state inflation if the central
bank is weak. Among the noncooperative equilibria Stackelberg equilibria produced the
largest stocks of steady-state debt as the Stackelberg leader exploits its strategic
advantage to avoid adjustment.
The unpleasant monetazist arithmetic was reformulated in a dynamic game-
theoretic framework in which both fiscal and monetary policy aze determined endoge-
nously. We found that a strong fiscal player -in the sense of not taking much responsi-
bility for debt stabilisation- yields unpleasant monetazist azithmetic. Moreover, we
explored the impact of a more conservative central bank. In the cooperative equilibrium,
a more conservative central bank boosts long-run inflation by reducing the aggregate
concern for debt stabilisation. In the Nash open-loop equilibrium, in contrast, a more
conservative central bank reduces long run inflation as long as the fiscal player cazes
sufficiently about debt stabilisation and policymakers aze relatively patient. Hence, to
reduce long-run inflation, one may want either policy cooperation or a conservative
central bank but not both together. Moreover, as an instrument to foster long-term price
stability under decentralized policymaking, a more conservative central bank needs to be
complemented by patient and disciplined fiscal authorities to prevent debt accumulation
from undermining price stability. The analysis of Stackelberg equilibria revealed that the
same holds true for a more independent central bank. These results provide a case for
establishing ceilings on public debt and surveillance of national fiscal policy to help an
independent, conservative European Central Bank achieve long-run price stability in the
EMU.
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Appendix A. Analytical Solutions of the Cooperative and Nash Open-Loop Equilibria
The {d(t),p'(t)} systems that result from the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities aze linear
dynamic systems of the form,
x - Axib




The adjustment speed, h, of the dynamic systems is defined as the absolute value of the stable eigenvalue
of A. The eigenvalues are the roots from the characteristic polynomial that is found by solving det(A-
-w~-0 where w is the vector of eigenvalues. If the dynamic systems are saddlepoint stable, the co-state
variables p'(t) will take initial values p'(0) such that the system is placed on its unique converging
dynamic trajectory, given the initial stock of debt d(0). The initial value of the forward-looking variables,
p'(0), is found by applying the method proposed by Judd (1982):
- take the Laplace29 transform L[(.),s] of the dynamic system, z-Axtb:
L[s,s] -A.L[x,s] tt[b,s] (A.3)
- use the fact that L[z,s]- s.L[x,s]-x(0). Equating both expressions for L[z,s] yields:
L[x,s] - (sl -A)-~ [L[b,s] tx(0)] (A.4)
- impose the condition that p'(0) adjusts in such a manner that saddlepoint stability of the dynamic system
is ensured, given the initial stock of government debt, d(0). This implies that L[b,z]tx(0)-0, where z is
any unstable eigenvalue of A. Imposing this condition gives p'(0).
I The cooperative equilrbrium
The cooperative equilibrium is characterised by the following {d(t),p'(t)} system:




The inverse of the transient matrix A of (A.5) is equal to:







The stable eigenvalue of A determines the adjustment speed, hc, of the dynamic system (A.5):
(A.5)
(A.6)
Z' The Laplace transform ofJ(t), F(s) is defined as: F(s)-f,j(t)e-S""-`~dt .
k
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hc--18t 1 82t4Ac--18t 1 8Zt4I(1 t 1)(w,ltx)-r(8-r)l
2 2 2 2 w wTftl
(A.7)
~c--det(A) is equal to the product of the adjustment speed, h`~, and the unstable eigenvalue of the average
system, zc-hcfS:
!'c-hc(hct8)-( 1 t 1 )(w,ltx)-r(8-r) (A.8)
w wT)tl
Note that z` is equal to hctS, since the trace of A, S, has to be equal to the sum of -h~ and z`. If we
define (3c as a~, we can write the steady-state of the system as:
0
d~(~)-átpc(jtrd-m)
pc(~) - (w,l tx) (f t rd-m)
Oc
Using the first order conditions in (5), we can write f`~(oo) and m~(oo) as:
fc(~)-.f - ~c(m) -Ï- (w~tx)(f
trd-m)
w wOc
mc(~)-m~ wc(~) -mt (w~'x)(f'rd-m)
wT) tl (w~ tl) pc
(A.9)
(A.10)
1 1} (w~,x)(~,w 1}1)
Ifwedefineac- w and(1-ac)- w~ 1 andnotefurthermorethat n -ltrpc
lt 1 lt 1 Ac
w wt)tl w wqtl
we can rewrite (A.10) as:
f`(~)-.f -ac(1trPc)(Ï trd-m)






Subtracting f(~) and m~(oo), we arrive at:
fc(~) -m c(~) -f -m -(1 trpc)(f t rd -m) - - rd -rpc(f t rd -m)
(A.11)
(A.12)





A solution to (A.13) remains bounded if pc(0) satisfies:
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(zc-(ó-r))(fZm td(0))-(W t(w~}1))((wz~x~tWc(0))-0 (A.14)
The unstable eigenvalue f of the adjustment matrix A is equal to h~tS. Therefore, we can rewrite (A.14)
as:
c
( h c}r )(f - m) }(h c tr)d(0)
Wc(0) - h }ó
- (w.l tx)d
1 ~ 1 h ~tó
w wtltl
According to the first order conditions of (5), we write the short-run changes inJ(t) and m([) as:
ctr f-m td
fc(0)-f- pc(o) -.f- 1
[(h )(hc}ó (0))-(wz}x)~)
w w 1} 1 h ct8
w wn~l
c}r f -m ,d
mc(0)-mt pc(~) -m, 1 [(h )(hctó
(0))-("xtx)d]
wrl'1 wrltl 1} 1 hctó
w wrltl
Using the definitions of a`, P~ and 4~, we can rewrite (A.16) as:
fc(0) -f - ac[(1-h cPc)(f'rd-m)t(h ctr)(d(0)-~l
m c(~) -m t(1-ac)[(1-h oPc)(f'rd-m)t(h ctr)(d(~)-~]
Subtracting Jr(0) and m`~(0) yields:
fc(0) -m c(0) - h ~Pc (ftrd-m) t h c(d-d(0) )- rd(0)
II The Nash open-loop equilibrium
The dynamic system of the Nash open-loop equilibrium is given by:
d r -1 -1 d~t) --m
pF --,l ó-r 0 pF(t) t,ld






The three eigenvalues of A in ( A.19) are -ho, zo-hotS and S-r. The adjustment speed of (A.19) is equal
to:
ho--lót 1 ó2t~o--lót 1 óZt4[xtx-r(8-r)l2 2 2 2
(A.20)
The inverse of A equals,
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(ó-r)2 ó-r ó-r




If we define (io asaó, we can write the Nash open-loop equilibrium as:
0




pcB( )- x(f trd-m)
~ - Ao
Using the first order conditions in (6) and ( 7), we can write Ja(oo) and mo(oo) as:
.Ïo(~) -f - pF(m) -Ï -
,~ (f t rd - m)
Do
m o(~) - m t WM(~,) -m, x(f'rd
- m)
~o
Defining ao- ZZxand ( 1-ao)- ~Kx, we can rewrite (A.23) as:
,f o(~) -Ï - ao(1'r P~(f'rd -m)




Subtracting f (oo) and mo(oo), we find:
fo(~)-mo(W)-f-m-(1`rP~(f'rd-m)--rd-r(io(ftrd-m) (A.25)
Find the initial state of the Nash open-loop equilibrium by taking the Laplace transform of (A.19):
(s-(8-r))Z -(s-(ó-r)) -(s-(8-r))










A solution to (A.26) remains bounded as long as for given values of the unstable eigenvalues S-r and
i~-hofS, pF(t) and pM(t) take such initial values that both of the following conditions hold,
(hotr)(hoátd(0))-hódó-pF(0)-hóó-WM(~)-0
x pF(0) - x p~(0) -0
(A.27)





P~(0) - K [( h }r )(f -m) t (h otr~(0) - ( ~ `K )dl~tK hotó hot8
Substituting (A.28) into the first order conditions (6) and (7), we find:




mo(0)-mtw~(0)-mtx [(h }r)(f-m)t(hotrkt(0))-( ~}x MJ
~tK hotb hot8
0
With the definitions of ao and (30, and noting that h}r -1 -hopo and z}K -(ltr(io)ho'o (A.29) can
ható hot8
be rewritten as:
fo(0) -f - ao[ (1-h oP~ U'rd-m) t(h atr) (d(0) -d)]
m o(0) - m t(1-a~ [(1-h oP~ (ftrd-m) t(h otr) (á(0) -d)l
If we subtract f(0) and mo(0), we find:
fo(0) - m o(0) - h opo(ftrd-m) t h o(d-d(0) )- rd(0)
Appendix B Comparative Statics of the Cooperative and Nash Open-Loop Equilibria
(A.30)
(A.31)
If we calculate the partial derivatives of initial values, steady-states and the adjustment speed w.r.t. the
model parameters, we can infer the effects of changes in the model parameters. If we assume that S~r",
ftrd~m and d(0)~d we can sign the partial derivatives in the Cooperative and Nash open loop equilibria
as follows:
'o These follow since: ha'r -1 -(ó-r) -1- h o(ó -r) and
hota hota o0
- h oQ~o K) -h o[1- r(Qor) ]..l tx
hóta
" The signs of the various partial derivatives in the case where S-r are found by noting that S-r
implies (iP and po-0.
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- of the initial money creation, m(0):
dmc(0)- (1-a~ [( á-r )(f.rd-m)t(d(0)-d)]~0
dJl ac IIZ~4ec (hctá)Z dx ~tx (hotá)2 82t4eo
dmc(0)- (1-a~ [( á-r ) ~,rd-m)}(d(o)-d)]~0





















df (~)-ac(1-hcpc) ~ 0an
cdJ' (t1)-ac(I.rpc)hc ~ 0
dd
c~
~ ( ) --ac(hctr) ~ 0
dd(0)








o(dm 0)-1-(1-ao)(1-hopo) ~ 0
dm
0dm (0)--(1-ao)(l~rp~ha ~ 0
i~
0
d~(0~) -(1-ao)(ho'r) ' ~
0 1 a~ (~)--( - [(1-hop~(f'rd-m)'(r'h~(á(~)-~]
dl xtx
0a [ á-r ~,rd-in)t(d(0)-d)]~0
á2t4eo (ho,á)z
~dK)-~ x[(1-hopo- o~`Z)(á2r) o)(ftrd-m)
(h t8) á t4e
,(ho,r- (~`x) )(d(~)-~1"a
á~t4eo
0~ (U)-(1-a~(1-hopo) ~ 0
~
o~
~ ( )-ao(1-hopo) i 0
dm
~o(~) -ao(1'rp~ho ~ 0
dd
o~
~ ( )--aa(hotr) ~ 0
dd(o)
- of the adjustment speed, h:
dd(0)
- of steady-state government debt:
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dhc- 1 ~ ~
dx ac bZ,40c








dh c - Q
dho- 1
dx b2t4Ao










~c(m)- -pc (f-mtrd) ~ p ~o(m)- - po(f-in.rd) ~ 0d~ pcac dl Do
~c(m)- - pc (f-m,rd) ~ p ~o(m)- -~o(f-mtrd) ~ 0
dK ~Ocac dc ~o
dd c(~) - pc ~ ~
df
dd c()-- pc ~ odm




- of steady-state money creation:
dmc(m)- -(laa~~c (f-m,rd) ~ 0
ax
dmc(~)- (1-ac} r(ic ~.-m.rd) ~ 0
dK ac ~ pc
dmc(~) - (1-a~(1'rP~ ~ 0
dÍ
dn`c(m)- 1-(1-a~(1'rP~ ~~ odin
~c(~) - r(1-a~(1'rp~ ~ 0
dd
dm c(") - 0
dd(0)
ddo(m) - po ~ ~
df
~o(m)- -po ~ 0
dm




~dz")- - ó~(f-mtrd) ~ 0
e
dmo(~)- x-r(b-r)~.-mtrd) ~i 0
dK Do'
dmo(w)- (1-aoj(ltrp~ ~ 0
~
dmo(m) - 1 -(1-a~j(1'r~~ " o
dm
dmo(m)- r(1-a~(ltrp~j ~ 0
dd
dn` o(m) - 0
dd(0)
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- of steady-state fiscal deficit:
~a~~)' ~c (j-mtrd) ~ 0
~~)- Qp~((-mtrd) ~ 0c
c
~ (m) - 1 - ac(t'ra~ " p
dfo(m)- (x-r(b-r))(f-mtrd) ~~ p
dx ~o'
~~)- ó~(j-mtrd) ~ 0
A
0
dÍ (m)- 1-ao(1'r(i~ a~ 0
~
~o(m) - ao(1'rP~ ~ 0dm
~o(m) - -rao(1'rP~ ~ 0
dd ad




~ (m) - ac(ltrjic) ~ 0
dm
c
~ (~)- -rac(ltr(ic) ~ 0
Appendix C Analytical Solutions of the Stackelberg Open-Loop Equilibria
1 The Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with the monetary authoriry as leader
Optimal monetary policy is found by minimising the following present value Hamiltonian:
H M(t) - 2 (m(t) -m)s
, 2(d(t) -~x
FrM(t)(rd(t) tf- pF(t) - m(t)) t pM(t)((a -T)W f(t) -~ (d(t) -~)
73
(C.l)
where pM(t) denotes a co-state variable that the Stackelberg leader attaches to the co-state variable
associated with govemment debt by the Stackelberg follower, pF(t). Optimal fiscal policies of the Stackel-
berg follower are the same as in the Nash equilibrium, as given in (8). The first-order
optimisation by the monetary player are given by:





t pM(t)a - PM -. PM - rpM(t) t é~M(t)
awF(t)
The dynamic system of the Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with the monetary authority leading can be
written as:
d r -1 -1 0 d(t) --m
,;F -~ a-r o o ,,F(t) xd.
i1M --K o a -T íti i~M(t) xCt




The dynamic system consists of two backward-looking variables, d(t) and pM(t), and two forward-looking
variables, pF(t) and pM(t). Saddlepoint stability requires that det(A)-7~(7,.-r(S-r))-r(S-r)(~tK-r(S-r)y0
where A is the transient matrix of (C.3) Recursively solving (C.3) in steady-state, we arrive at the
following expressions for steady-state debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficit:
dM(~)-dt (ó-r)(x-r(ó-r))(ftrd-m)
det(A)
fM(„) -.f-PF(„)-f- ,l (r(b-r)-,l)(f'rd-m)
det(A)
m M(~) -m f pM(~) -mt ~8 -r)(f trd-m)det(A)
Ifwe define l1M-det(A)~(À-r(S-r)) and aM-~(l-r(S-r))~(],(~ - r(S-r)-Kr(S-r)), (C.4) can be rewritten as:
dM(~)-át (iM(ftrd-m)
.ÍM(~) -.f-wF(~) -f-aM(1 traM)(ftrd-m)
m M(~) -m t pM(~) -mt(1-a~)(1 trPM)(f'rd-m)
where pM equals (S-r)I~M.
11 The Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with the fiscal authority as leader
Optimal fiscal policy is found by minimising the following present value Hamiltonian:
N F(t) - 2 (Í(t) -fl2 t 2(m tp~(t) -m)z ~ ~ (d(t) -~z
wF(t)(rd(t) t.Jtt)-m-PM(t)) t PF(t)((ó -r)WM(t)-K(d(t)-~)
in which pF(t) denotes a co-state variable that the Stackelberg leader attaches to the co-state variable
associated with government debt by the Stackelberg follower, pM(t). Optimal fiscal policies of the Stackel-
berg follower, the monetary authority, are the same as in the Nash equilibrium, as given in (]0). The first
order conditions for the optimisation by the fiscal authoriry are given by:
a~~t) -o- Itt) -f- wP(t)
-a~(~)tpF(t)ó-WF ~- pF--1l(d(t)-d)t(b-r)PF(t)tKpF(l) (C.7)
- aW (t) }PF(t)ó -




The dynamic system of the Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with the fiscal authorities leading equals:
d r -1 -1 0
d(t)
~F -.l ó -r 0 x pF(t)
k~ --K 0 Ó- r 0 W~(t)
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The dynamic system consists of two backward-looking variables, d(t) and pF(t), and two forward-looking
variables, pF(t) and pM(t). Saddlepoint stability requires that det(A}-x(x-r(S-r)~x2rl-r(S-rx~,tx-r(S-r)p0
where A is the transient matrix of ( C.8). Recursively solving (C.8) in steady-state gives the following
expressions for steady-state debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficit:
dF(~) -dt (ó -r)(x-r(b -r))(f trd-m)
det(A)
fF(~) -f- i~F(") -f-
(xZrl -,lr(b -r))ÍÍ~'rd-m) (C.9)
det(A)
m F(~) - m t wM(~) - m t
x(x-r(ó -r)) (f trd-m)
det(A)
Ifwedefine~F-det(A)I(x-r(S-r))andaF-(xZrl-~.r(S-r))I(x(x-r(S-r)-~r(S-r)), ( C.9)canberewrittenas:
dF(~) -dt jiF(f trd-m)
.fF(~) -f -W~(m) -f -aF(I trpF)(f trd-m)
(C.10)
m F(~) -m t pM(~) -mt(1-aF)(I trPF)(Í~trd-m)
where (3F equals (S-r)IDF.
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Chapter 3
Money, Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt in a Monetary Union'
Introduction
The completing of the Economic and Monetazy Union (EMU) by 1999 with the
establishment of an independent common central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB),
that manages the common monetary policy has considerable economic, institutional and
political consequences. Concerning the economic consequences, the ECB will control a
stock of European base money of some 500 bin ~ and will be a major player at the
European Union (EU) level and even at a global level. Its monetary policy will have a
major influence on inflation and the business cycle in the EU. Political aspects of the ECB
concern the question how individual countries and interests will influence the decision
making process in the ECB and in pazticulaz how independent the ECB will be. Alesina and
Grilli (1993) and von Hagen and Suppel (1994) analyse the conduct of ECB monetary
policy from a stabilisation perspective. Garrett (1993) discusses the political aspects of the
EMU and ECB policymaking. Levine (1993) and Levine and Brociner (1994) analyse the
effects of fiscal policy coordination in the EMU.
The design of fiscal policy in EMU will lazgely remain a national issue in the EMU
due to the 'subsidiazity principle': the design and implementation of fiscal policy should as
much as possible be delegated to the different countries. The Delors Report (1989) whose
recommendations served as an important input of the final Maastricht Treaty on EMU,
expressed a feaz of excessive government debt accumulation in the EMU: without binding
rules on fiscal policies, unsound public finance in some EU countries will endanger the
credibility of low-inflation policies of the ECB. A forced monetisation of fiscal deficits by
the ECB to 'bail-out' undisciplined national fiscal authorities transfers the adjustment
burden of unsound public finance in a part of the EU to the entire EU in the form of a
higher European inflation rate. To avoid a deficit and inflationary bias in the EMU, the
Delors Committee proposes limits on fiscal deficits and government debt and a high degree
of ECB independence. An additional source of pressure on the ECB to relax monetary
' This chapter is the result of a joint research project with Lans Bovenberg and Matthias Raith and has
appeared as CentER Discussion Paper 9634. Earlier versions where presented at a seminars in Rotterdam,
Antwerpen and the 'Journées AFSE' conference held in June 1995 in Nantes. Comments of seminar
participants were helpful to improve this chapter.
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policies could come from the European Commission that might consider borrowing from
the ECB a less troublesome way to generate revenues than increasing contributions of the
member states. The European Commission (1993) addresses the current problems in the EU
with fiscal discipline in detail.
This study stresses the public finance consequences of monetary policies pursued by
the ECB. A conflict between fiscal authorities of the individual countries in the EU and the
ECB azises on whether fiscal or monetary instruments should be adjusted to stabilise
government debt in the EMiJ. Tabellini (1986) formulated a differential game between a
fiscal and a r~onetary authority on such a government debt stabilisation problem between
monetary and fiscal authorities in a closed economy setting. The current analysis applies
the Tabellini (1986) framework to a monetary union with a common Central Bank and
extends the results in van Aazle, Bovenberg and Raith (1995a) and (1995b).
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 describes a differential game
on debt stabilisation between a fiscal authority and a national monetary authority. Three
different non-cooperative solution concepts are explored: the Nash equilibrium in which all
players act simultaneously, the Stackelberg equilibrium with the monetary authority acting
as a Stackelberg leader and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the fiscal authority acting as
Stackelberg leader. Section 3 considers the problem of government debt stabilisation in a
monetary union in which national monetary authorities have been replaced by a single
monetary authority. Section 4 compares the outcomes under national monetary policy -
Section 2- with a monetary union -section 3. Section 5 considers a numerical example to
illustrate the results from the theoretical part.
3.2 Debt Stabilisation with National Monetary Policy
The countries that enter the EMU do so from different starting positions. Table 1 in Chapter
1, p.5, provided already information on gross government indebtedness, interest payments
on government debt, primary fiscal deficits, seigniorage -all expressed of fractions of GDP-
and inflation rates in the different EU countries. (gross) Government indebtedness (column
2), the burden from interest payments (column 3), primary fiscal deficits (columns 4 and
5), seigniorage (columns 6 and 7) and inflation (columns 10 and 11) display considerable
variation both across countries and over time. Weighted EU averages are found in the last
row and can be used to divide the EU into two parts: a part that is more and a part that is
less heavily indebted than the EU average. The first part encompasses Belgium, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, while the other countries have below average
government debt. When looking at inflation, Belgium and the Netherlands move to the
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below EU average group, whereas Portugal, Spain and the UK move to the above average
group. Roughly speaking, a division between the Northern and the Southern part of the EU
is present. On average, the Northern part is characterised by lower fiscal deficits,
government indebtedness, monetisation and inflation than the Southern part.
Doubts are ofren raised whether the EU will satisfy the fiscal convergence criteria
in 1999, when the introduction of the common currency is plannedZ. Corsetti and Roubini
(1993) test the sustainability of the process of government debt accumulation in the EU.
They find that the current process of government debt accumulation in Italy, Belgitun and
Ireland is not sustainable in the long run.
Tabellini ( 1986) develops a differential game between a fiscal and a monetary
authority on stabilising govenunent debt in a national setting. Chapter 2 extended the
Tabellini (1986) analysis in several directions in the context of national monetary policies.
This chapter extends the setting with national monetary policies to a monetary union of two
(or more) countries. We compare debt stabilisation in a monetary union with debt
stabilisation in case of national monetary policies, representing the pre-EMU situation where
every country implements a national monetary policy.
In a national setting, the dynamic government budget constraint relates the change
in the government debt to GDP ratio, d(a dot above a variable denotes its time derivative),
to interest payments, rd(t), the primary fiscal deficit, f(t), of the fiscal authority and money
creation or seigniorage, m(t), of the monetary authority:
d -rd(t) }}(t) -m(t) (1)
in which r represents the interest rate minus the growth rate of output. We assume that r
is given and independent of the amount of government debt at time t. Alesina e.a. (1992)
investigate default risk premia on government debt in the OECD and find that risk premia
have been absent or small. Money creation and inflation are positively related as long as
the economy is on the increasing part of the seigniorage Laffer curve'.
Z A steady-state debt ratio of 60"~0 of GDP results from primary fiscal deficits of 3"~0 of GDP and a net
of output growth real interest rate of 5"~0, as the Delors Committee assumed when advocating such debt and
deficit targets. As the simulations will show, however, it can take a fairly long time before new steady-states
are achieved. The quick convergence implicitly assumed by the Delors Committee implicitly seems to be
rather optimistic.
' At the increasing part of the Laffer curve the interest elasticity of money demand is less than 1 in
absolute value. Empirical studies on money demand in industrial countries (see e.g. Boughton (1991)) indicate
that inflation in industrial countries is indeed well below the seigniorage maximizing rate of inflation.
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If the primary deficit plus the interest payments exceeds the seigniorage revenues
generated by the monetary authority, government debt accumulation allows policymakers
to shift the adjustment burden to the future. Fiscal consolidation, therefore, can be achieved
in two manners: increasing monetisation or reducing primary fiscal deficits. As both
instruments aze delegated to different authorities, a conflict arises between the monetary
authority and the fiscal authority about the division of the adjustment burden from fiscal
consolidation. Government solvency is ensured if the following transversality condition -
generally referred to as the no-Ponzi game condition4- is met:
lim d~(t) e-" - 0 i-1,2 (2)
~-m
Following Tabellini (1986), we formalise the strategic interaction between monetary
and fiscal authorities by specifying instruments, objectives and the game structure. Consider
the following intertemporal loss function of the fiscal authority, which depends on the time




The control variable of the fiscal authority of country 1 is the primary fiscal deficit f(t)5.
The minimisation problem of the fiscal authorities is carried out subject to the dynamic
government budget constraint, (1), the transversality condition on government debt (2) and
the initial stock of government debt, d(0). f and dF~ represent the primazy fiscal deficit and
government debt targets of the fiscal authority. Iff and c~ aze positive, fiscal policies will
tend to exhibit a fiscal deficit biasb. The fiscal policy targets reflect the institutional and
political structures in which decision making on fiscal policies takes place and are assumed
to be given in the remainder of the analysis. ~, measures the degree of fiscal discipline of
the fiscal authority as it reflects the importance fiscal authority attribute to government debt
stabilisation.
The subjective rate of time preference, S, determines how much future losses aze
" Empirical studies on government solvency -using the implications of the No-Ponzi game condition- in
Europe are found in Grilli (1989) and Corsetti and Roubini (1993). Baglioni and Cherubini (1993) study the
case of Italy.
5 von Hagen (1992) analyses the budgeting procedures in the EU.
6 See von Hagen and Harden (1995) on the emergence of "fiscal illusion" in the political system, inducing
a bias towards fiscal deficits and accumulation of government debt.
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discounted by the policymaker. If S~r, the subjective costs of an additional unit of debt aze
lower than their objective costs and additional debt is preferred by policymakers. In the
remainder of the analysis, we assume that such a form of impatience is present. As in
Tabellini (1986), government debt features in the loss functions because higher levels of
debt imply lazger tax distortions to service interest payments. Moreover, the larger the stock
of public debt, the larger the required adjustments in taxes associated with fluctuations in
the interest rate and the growth rate of real output. A high level of public debt is also likely
to crowd out private investment, and it may induce undesirable intergenerational redistribu-
tions of wealth, if Ricardian equivalence does not hold.
Monetary policy by the monetary authority is implemented such as to minimize the




We concentrate on three different non-cooperative equilibria of the differential game
between the monetary and fiscal authority on debt stabilisation. The three equilibria are the
Nash open-loop equilibrium, in which both players act simultaneously, the Stackelberg
open-loop equilibrium with the monetary authority acting as Stackelberg leader and the
Stackelberg equilibrium with the fiscal authority acting as Stackelberg leader. We
concentrate on open-loop strategies instead of subgame-perfect closed-loop strategies as the
latter do not allow to derive an analytical solution so that one has to rely on numerical
simulation'. Details on these equilibria in non-cooperative differential games are found in
Basar and Olsder (1982)8.
The Nash open-loop equilibrium is found by solving the dynamic optimisation
problems of both players simultaneously. The present value Hamiltonian of the fiscal
authority, HF(t), is given by,
' For details on the Nash closed-loop equilibria of the debt stabilisation game, see Tabellini (1986). van
Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith (1995a) compare the open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria with national
monetary policy and a monetary union. The cooperative equilibrium is extensively studied in van Aarle,
Bovenberg and Raith (19956).
e The Nash equilibria are time-consistent but the open-loop equilibrium is not subgame-perfect like the
closed-loop equilibrium. The Stackelberg equilibria are not time-consistent and require therefore the presence
of a commitment technology, e.g. reputational forces. We assume indeed that such commitment technologies
are available in the dynamic debt stabilisation game between monetary and fiscal authorities.
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HF(t) - 2(Í(t) :fl2 } 2(d(t)-dF)2 } F~~(t)(rd(t)}f(t)-m(t)) (5)
is which pF(t) denotes the co-state variable attached in the optimisation problem to
government debt of country 1 at time t. It is sometimes referred to as the "cost of public
funds", as it measures the costs from an additional unit of government debt that requires
higher future taxes to pay its amortisation. This co-state variable is an important variable:
the concern about government debt stabilisation that it reflects, determines the actual
policies that players pursue at each point in time. The first order conditions of this dynamic
optimisation problem characterise the optimal policies of the different players. The first
order conditions from the optimisation problem of the fiscal authority are given by:
.Íït) -f - wF(t)
~F - - ~l (d(t) -d F) t(b -r) F~F(t)
The present value Hamiltonian of the monetary authority HM(t),
(6)
HM(t) - 2 (m(t)-m)Z } ~(d(t)-d M)2 t ~M(t)(rd(t) tf(t)-m(t)) (7)
is minimised if,
m(t) -m}4~M(t)
pM - -ti (d(t) -d M) t(8 -r) 4~M(t)
(8)
(6) and (8) show how the desire to stabilise government debt, as measured by the co-state
variables p'(t) influences fiscal and monetary policies. Together, (6) and (8) determine the
Nash open-loop equilibrium and can be combined to a system of linear differential
equations describing the dynamics of govemment debt, d(t), and the co-state variable(s)
associated with government debt, p'(t). This system of linear differential equations is
analysed in Appendix A. The second column of Table 1 provides steady-state government
debt, primary fiscal deficit and money creation of the Nash open-loop equilibrium.
In the Nash open-loop equilibrium all players implement their policies
simultaneously. In the Stackelberg equilibrium one player, the Stackelberg leader, obtains
a more dominant role, enabling it to set its policies before the other player(s). By moving
first and considering the preferred policy of the other player, the Stackelberg leader has a
strategic advantage that enables it to shift most of the adjustment burden from debt
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stabilisation to the other player and to have a better performance with respect to the other
objective(s). A strong and independent central bank could have such a strategic advantage
in the dynamic interaction with the fiscal authority on the issue of government debt
stabilisation. On the other hand, the fiscal player can be a Stackelberg leader in the
government debt stabilisation game with a weak and dependent central bank9.
In case of Stackelberg leadership of the monetary authority, the monetary player
considers in its decision problem that the fiscal authorities react according to (6). If it can
act as a Stackelberg leader towards the fiscal player, its present value Hamiltonian becomes:
H M(t) - 2(m(t) -m)2 t 2(d(t) -d M)2 } pM(t)(rd(t) tf - pF(t) -m(t))
t pM(t)(-~.(d(t)-d M)) t (a -r)wF(t))
(9)
in which p`"(t) is a co-state variable, attached to the co-state variable, p~(t), of the
Stackelberg follower, the fiscal authority. The first-order conditions that result from
minimising (9) are:
m(t) - m } 4~M(t)
pM-- S(d(t) -d M) t(S -T) pM(l) t~. pM(t) (10)
pM - rpM(t) t pM(t)
(6) and (10) together describe the policies in the Stackelberg equilibrium with Stackelberg
leadership of the monetary authority. (10) reveals that the monetary authority considers the
desire of the fiscal authority to stabilise government debt, as summarised by 7,,, when
deciding on optimal monetary policy. Appendix A provides the dynamic system
{d(t),~F(t),pM(t),pM(t)} that characterises the Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with
Stackelberg leadership of the monetary authority. The second column of Table 1 describes
the steady-state of the Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with leadership of the monetary
player, i.e. an independent central bank.
Consider next the case where the fiscal authority obtains Stackelberg leadership in
the debt stabilisation game with the monetary authority: a situation with a dependent central
bank. When selecting its prefened fiscal policy, the fiscal authority considers that the
monetary authority sets its policy according to (8). The first-order conditions governing
optimal fiscal policy with Stackelberg leadership change from (6) into:




~F - -7~ (d(t) -d F) t (ó -r) ~F(t) t t pF(t) (11)
pF-rpF(t) t pF(t)
pF(t) is an additional co-state variable attached by the fiscal player to the co-state variables
of the monetary player, pM(t). (11) shows that the fiscal authority when acting as a
Stackelberg leader considers the desire -reflected by the preference parameter T- of the
monetary authority to stabilise government debt by increasing money creation. With (8),
(11) describes the Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with the fiscal authority acting as
Stackelberg leader towards the monetary authority. The steady-state of the Stackelberg
open-loop equilibrium with Stackelberg leadership of the fiscal authorities, i.e. a dependent
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To avoid dynamic instability and violation of the no-Ponzi game condition, we impose the
condition that the dynamic systems that describe Nash and Stackelberg equilibria aze
(saddlepoint) stable'o. Stability is ensured if ~ is positive in case of the Nash
equilibrium and negative in the Stackelberg equilibria. The stability conditions ( see Table
1) for the Stackelberg equilibria aze more strict than in the Nash equilibrium where
~,~t~r(S -r) suffices, given our assumption that S~r. Stability in the Stackelberg equilibrium
with monetary leadership requires that ~r(S -r) whereas stability in the Stackelberg
equilibrium with fiscal leadership requires that T~r(S-r). These conditions imply that
stability of the Stackelberg equilibria holds only if the Stackelberg follower cazes
sufficiently about government debt stabilisation.
A compazison of the three non-cooperative equilibria leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 1
(a) Steady-state government debt is lower in the Nash equilibrium than in both Stackelberg
equilibria. (b) Steady-state money growth and primary fiscal defcits are lower in the
Stackelberg equilibrium with monetary leadership than in the Nash equilibrium. (c)
Steady-state money growth and primary fiscal deficits are higher with fiscal leadership than
in the Nash equilibrium.
Proof:
Expressions for steady-state debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficit are found in
Table 1. Result (a): the inequality d"(oo)~(oo) reduces to ~,T(S -r)
[(S-r)(f-mfrdM)f~,(dF-dM)]~0 while d"(oo)~dM(oo) reduces to ~,i(S-r)
[(S -r)(f-mfrdF)fT(áM-áF)]~0. Provided that the expressions inside the brackets are positive
and given our earlier assumptions that 110, Z~0 and S~r, part (a) results. Result (b):
mM(oo)~m"(ao) reduces to ~,(~,-r(S-r)) [(S-r)(f-mfrd~f~(dF-d~]~0 whilefM(oo)~f"(ao)
implies ~T[(S -r)(f-m~-rd~t~,(dF-d~]~0. Note that ~.-r(S -r)~0 is implied by the stability
condition in case of Stackelberg leadership of the monetary authority. Result (c): fF(oo)~
f"'(oo) reduces to i(ti-r(S-r)) [(S-r)(f-mfrdF)-~r(dM-dF)]~0 while mF(ao)~m"(oo) holds if
~,t[(S-r)(f-mfrdF)~(dM-dr)]~0. t-r(S-r)~0 is implied by the stability condition in case
'o The system of linear differential equations, .ti-Ax(t)tb, is globally stable if all eigenvalues of the
transition matrix A are negative. The system is saddlepoint stable if the number of backward-looking variables
equals the number of negative eigenvalues and the number of the forward-looking variables equals the number
of unstable eigenvalues. In all other cases the system is dynamically unstable and the transversality condition
(2) is violated.
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of Stackelberg leadership of the fiscal authority. 0
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is the following: the Stackelberg leader uses its
strategic position to shift most of the adjustment burden to the Stackelberg follower. By
moving first, it can constrain the action of the Stackelberg follower to a range that is
optimal for himself. From the point of view of government debt stabilisation the
Stackelberg leadership of one of the authorities affects the performance negatively. Its
Stackelberg leadership, however, allows the Stackelberg leader to perform better on its other
objectives as compazed to the Nash equilibrium. The higher adjustment burden from
stabilising debt that is put on the Stackelberg follower implies that it performs less on its
other objectives. Part (b) and (c) indicate these effects.
3.3 Debt, Deficits and Money Growth with a Common Currency
The introduction of a common cunency issued and controlled by the ECB has important
implications for public finance in the EU countries because the govenvnent budget
constraints will link fiscal policies of the EU countries with the monetary policies of the
ECB. In particulaz, the ECB controls money creation in the EU and redistributes the
revenues from money creation towazds the EU countries. Both the level of money creation
and the redistribution of its revenues over the countries will have an impact on dynamics
of fiscal deficits and govenunent debt in the EMLJ. We explore the interaction between
fiscal and monetary policies in the context of a monetary union of two countries. Country
1 and country 2 receive a shaze of ECB base money creation or seigniorage, m~{t),
according to their shares in the ECB which are denoted by A and 1-A, respectively. The
dynamic government budget constraints of country 1 and 2 relate primary fiscal deficits in
country 1 and 2, f(t) and f2(t), monetisation by the ECB, m~{t), interest payments on







d,(t) and f,(t) are respectively country 1's outstanding government debt and primary fiscal
deficit relative to country 1's GDP. Government debt and primary fiscal deficit of country
2 as a fraction of its GDP aze denoted by dZ(t) and jZ(t). We assume that the high degree
of integration of financial and goods markets in the EU makes that r is equal in both
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countries, and independent of the stock of outstanding government debt.
m~1t) denotes base money creation or seigniorage of the ECB, in relation to EU
GDP. Dividing OmE{t) by the shaze, w, of country 1 in EU GDP gives seigniorage revenues
of country 1 in relation to GDP of country 1. If the distribution of seigniorage is based on
the economic size of a country, i.e. if 8-w and 1-8-1-w, seigniorage revenues that both
countries receive will equal m~{t). Sibert (1994) endogenises the seigniorage distribution
{0,1-0} in her modelling of the ECB. In the current analysis we assume that the seigniorage
distribution is exogenously given" .
We approach the issue of fiscal consolidation in the EMLJ in a 3-player differential
game between the ECB and the two fiscal authorities in country 1 and 2. Consider again
the following intertemporal loss function of the fiscal authority of country 1, which depends
on the time profiles of the primary fiscal deficit and government debt:
LF~(t~-2 f{(fi(t) ft)Zt~,(dt(t)-di )2 }e-atr-rddt
~o
(13)
The control vaziable of the fiscal authorities of country 1 is the primary fiscal deficit f(t).
The minimization problem of the fiscal authorities is catried out subject to the dynamic
government budget constraint, (12a), the transversality condition on govennment debt (2)
and the initial stock of government debt, d,(0).
The fiscal authorities in country 2 minimize a similar intertemporal loss function:
LFZ(t) - 2 f{(fZ(t) fZ)2 } ~(d2(t)-d2)2 }e -a~r-ra~~
0
(14)
subject to the dynamic government budget constraint of country 2(12b), the transversality
condition in (2) and the initial stock of government debt, dZ(0)1z.
The ECB selects money growth such as to minimise the following loss function:
" One might consider the seigniorage distribution pazameters as being the outcome ofa Nash bargaining
game between the countries who have a vote in the decision making process inside the ECB.
" For analytical tractabiliry in the remainder of the analysis we have assumed that fiscal players in both
countries have the same rate of time preference.




subject to the dynamic government budget constraints in (12), the transversality conditions
in (2) and given the initial stocks of debt d,(0) and dZ(0). Money growth, mE(t), is the policy
instrtunent of the ECB. Apart from a money growth -viz. inflation- tazget, the ECB is
assumed to prefer low government debt in both countries. Government debt of country 1
and country 2 are weighted by the shares in EU GDP, w and 1-w, respectively. t measures
the degree of ECB conservativeness. If T is equal to 0, the ECB only cazes about price
stability and it will not engage in monetisation of debt. Such an extreme conservative ECB
is not likely to arise in practice: countries are likely to use their voting power in the ECB
and to form coalitions that seek to increase monetisation to stabilise government debt or to
change the seigniorage redistribution by the ECB if government debt is high13.
We assume that the ECB cares about debt in each country separately, as tax
distortions in each country are assumed to rise with the square of the tax rate. Therefore,
monetary authorities prefer debt to be symmetrically distributed across countries. In that
case monetary policy of the ECB is relatively sensitive to individual debt positions'".
The same non-cooperative equilibria as studied in section 2 can be calculated in case
where a monetary union with a common central bank has replaced national monetazy
policy. Appendix B provides the dynamic systems associated with the three equilibria in
case of a monetary union. The dynamic systems that result aze too complex to allow for an
insightful analytical solution. If we assume some symmetry between both fiscal players an
attractive analytica] solution, however, can be derived. In this section we therefore apply
the method introduced by Aoki (1981) to derive an analytical solution to the dynamic
systems. This method decomposes system dynamics into an"average" and a"difference"
p~u
The average system describes the EU economy as a whole and its characteristics are
" Cukierman (1992), lets the preferences and characteristics of the median EU country be decisive in ECB
monetary policies.
'" In van Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith ( 1995a) the ECB cares about average debt in the EU. In that case
[w(d,(t)-d~t(1-~u)(dj(t)-d~]~ enters ( 15). Monetary policy in that case is less sensitive to individual debt
positions. Results in the remainder of the analysis are not all independent of the form of the loss function of
the ECB.
'S See Fukada (1993) for a n-country model where dynamics are decomposed into an average and n-1
difference systems.
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similar to a situation with national monetary policy as analysed in section 2. The difference
system describes cross-country differences in our two-country EU. In our analysis, we
consider country 1 to represent the Southern pazt of the EU that is assumed to have a higher
initial stock of government debt, a higher primary fiscal deficit tazget, a higher monetary
target ( with national monetary policy) and higher debt targets than country 2 that represents
the Northern part of the EU, i.e. d,(0)?d2(0), f~2, in,?inZ, d;'?dZ and d;~?dZ. In debates on
EMU concerns about this kind of asymmetries aze often raised1ó.
Studying the dynamics of the difference system is very useful if we aze interested
in the issue of convergence in debt and deficits in the EMU and in the absence of EMU.
Details on actual convergence in the EU aze found in the "Monetary and Economic
Convergence Report" that the European Commission ( 1995) produces every year to inform
about the progress that has been achieved in meeting the convergence criteria of the
Maastricht Treaty.
The symmetry conditions that we need to impose to be able to decompose dynamics
into an average and a difference part, aze that the two countries aze of equal size and
receive a seigniorage shares according to their economic size, i.e that w-A-1-w-1-8-'Iz, and
that both fiscal players attach equal priority to government debt stabilisation, i.e. that ~,-9.
Assuming such symmetries, we can solve the dynamics of the average and difference
systems in a straightforwazd manner. We define averages and differences of a vaziable x
as x,,-t~x(x~tx2) and xox,-xZ, respectively. From the average and difference systems the
country variables follow directly: x~-x,,f ~hxD and xZ-x,, -~~ixD.
Note that Table 1 in section 2 also provides averages and differences of steady-state
debt, primary fiscal deficits and money growth of a two-country EU where national
monetary policy still prevails, or a two-speed EMU that might precede a full one-speed
EMU, as some have proposed. Averages in that case aze found when replacing {f,m,áFd"'}
by { f,,, m,,, dÁ, ~} in Table 1 while differences result when replacing {f, m, dF dM} by
-F{fmmadadó}.
Appendix C gives the dynamic average and difference systems that result in the
three different equilibria of the two-country EMU. With the aid of decomposition into
averages and differences of vaziables it is straightforwazd to derive the steady-state of the
Nash open-loop equilibrium and the Stackelberg open-loop equilibria with leadership of the
16 See e.g. arguments made in Alesina and Grilli (1993), Giovanniní and Spaventa (1991) and Buiter and
Kletzer (1991).
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ECB and of the fiscal players", respectively. To ensure that the transversality condition (2)
is satisfied and a process of explosive government debt is ruled out, we assume again that
the dynamics of the average and relative systems are saddlepoint stable. Table 2 shows
steady-state average and difference government debt, money growth and primary fiscal
deficit in the monetary union.
The decomposition into averages and differences provided by Table 2 is very useful
as it gives immediate insight how asymmetries between countries affect the actual policies
and outcomes in a monetary union. It is possible to formulate the following proposition on
government debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficits in a monetary union:
Proposition 2
(a) Average steady-state debt is lower in the Nash equilibrium than in both Stackelberg
equilibria. Steady-state money growth and average primary fiscal deficits are lower than
in the Nash equilibrium if the ECB is Stackelberg leader and higher if the fiscal authorities
are Stackelberg leader. (b) Differences in steady-state government debt are higher and
differences in steady-state primary fiscal deficits are lower with Stackelberg leadership of
the ECB than in the Nash-equilibrium. D~erences in steady-state government debt and
differences in steady-state primary fiscal deficit are higher with Stackelberg leadership of
the fiscal authorities than in the Nash equilibrium, if (S-r)fo~(i-r(S-r))dó.
" The current setup with a decomposition into averages and differences does not allow the fiscal
authorities to differ in their strategic position versus the ECB. Thus, a situation where only one fiscal
authority is Stackelberg leader or where the ECB is Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis only one fiscal authority and
plays Nash with the other fiscal authority cannot be analysed here. In this framework there is no direct
conflict between both fiscal authorities and the equilibrium where both fiscal authorities have a strategic
advantage vis-à-vis the ECB does not imply a form of unsustainable "Stackelberg warfare" between both. In
van Aazle, Bovenberg and Raith (1995a) we allow for the possibility that the fiscal authorities form a fiscal
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Proof:
(a) is found when reducing the same inequalities as in Proposition 1, replacing the variables
found in Table 1(steady-state with national monetary policy) by the variables found in
Table 2(steady-state averages in a monetary union). Steady-state differences in government
debt and primary fiscal deficits aze found in Table 2. The inequality dó(~o)~dó(oo) reduces
to: ~,i(S-r)[(S-r)f~f).dó]~0. Given our assumptions that ~0, i~0, S~r, fo~0 and da0, this
inequality holds throughout. f ó(~)~f ó(~) can be rewritten as: ~,T[(S-r)f'ota,dó]~0.
do(oo)~dD(oo) implies that ~,ii2(S-r)[(S-r)f'of(r(S-r) -i)do]~0.fó(oo) ~jó(oo), finally, holds
if ti~2(t-r(S-r))[(S-r)f'of(r(S-r)-T)dp]~0. 0
Part (a) of Proposition 2 offers a generalisation of Proposition 1 to a monetary union and
suggests that similar incentives prevail in a monetary union as with national monetary
policy. According to (b) an independent ECB increases the discrepancies in steady-state
government debt in the monetary union as compazed to the Nash equilibrium although
steady-state differences in primary fiscal deficit aze reduced. These effects occur because
an independent ECB leaves most of the adjustment burden with the fiscal authorities in the
participating countries. Country 1 faces a higher adjustment burden than country 2 and a
non-accommodating ECB implies an increase in steady-state differences in debt and a
reduction in steady-state differences in primary fiscal deficits. A monetary union with a
dependent ECB is likely to increase further the discrepancies in government indebtedness
and primary fiscal deficits, as compared to the Nash equilibrium.
The initial stock of government debt of influences monetary and fiscal policies
during the adjustment towazds steady-state but does not affect the steady-state itself. The
country with a higher than average initial stock of government debt has a larger adjustment
burden than the country with a below average initial stock of debt. Consequently, its
primary fiscal deficit during the adjustment towazds steady-state is lower than the average
fiscal deficit whereas the other country can afford to have an above average fiscal deficit.
Moreover, with national monetary policies the first country needs to generate more
seigniorage revenues than average whereas the other country will have below average
money growth. In the long-run, however, the impact of the initial stock of government debt
of both countries vanishes and debt, deficits and money growth depend exclusively on the
preference parameters, the net interest rate of debt and the rate of time preferences as
Tables 1 and 2 reveal. The numerical analysis of Section 5, later on, illustrates the
adjustment towazds steady-state for a numerical example.
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3.4 A Comparison with pre-EMU Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction
It is interesting to compaze the performance of monetary and fiscal policy under the EMLT
regime, as analysed in Section 3 with a"pre-EMiJ" regime with national central banks as
analysed in Section 2. In our setup a full monetary union implies that monetazy policy has
been centralised at a European level. In the model of Section 3, a monetary union results
in both countries having the same rate of money growth - set by the ECB-, i.e.
m~(t)-mz(t)-m~t), and therefore the same rate of inflation. A regime with national monetary
policies on the other hand could represent a"two-speed" EMLJ in which groups ofcountries
in the EMU follow their own preferred monetary policy, independent of the other EMiJ-
part, and where a full monetary union is not yet achieved. Such a comparison allows us to
analyse the consequences of a monetary union between countries that differ in initial
government indebtedness and~or policy tazgets.
The model of fiscal and monetary policy interaction in a monetary union of two
countries of Section 3, reduces to the model of monetary and fiscal policy interaction with
a national monetary authority of section 2, if 9-w-1 (in case of country 1) or 1-A-1-w-1
(in case of country 2). Consider first the case where the countries do not differ in debt and
primary fiscal deficit targets, i.e. d;-á2-áÁ and f, f2 f,,, and have the same initial stock
of government debt. Assume that the ECB and the former national monetazy authorities
have the same money growth and debt targets and the same degree of conservativeness, i.e.
m,-mz-m,,-mE, d;'-dM-d~-dF and i equal with national monetary policy and an ECB. In
that case the difference part of the dynamic system vanishes and the average system will
describe dynamics of debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficit in both countries. We
can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 3
Compared with national monetary policies, a monetary union between identical countries
will not change dynamics of government debt, primary fiscal deficit and money growth in
the Nash open-loop equilibrium and in the Stackelberg open-loop with the monetary
authority leading. A monetary union results in higher steady-state debt, money growth and
primary ftscal deficits if the fiscal authorities are Stackelberg leader.
Proof:
In case of symmetric countries, fA-f, dÁ dF and if we assume that mE-m, dÉ dM (ECB has
same tazgets as national central bank), steady-state debt, money growth ( inflation) and
primary fiscal deficit coincide in case of national monetary policy and a monetary union
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if the Nash open-loop equilibrium or the Stackelberg equilibrium with monetary leadership
prevails (cf. Tables 1 and 2). Steady-state debt is higher in the monetary union with fiscal
leadership than in the case of national monetary policy and fiscal leadership, d,F,~(oo)~dF(oo),
if Ta,r(S-r) [(S-r)(f-mfrdF)f-r(dM-dF)]~0. Steady-state money growth is higher in a
monetazy union with fiscal leadership than in case of national monetary policy and fiscal
leadership, mÉ(oo)~mF(oo) ift~,r[(S-r)(f-mfrdF)~r(c~"-áF)]~0. Steady-state primary fiscal
deficits and money growth are higher in a monetary union with fiscal leadership than in the
case of national monetary policy and fiscal leadership, fÁ(oop~(oo), if t(i-r(S-r))
[(S-r)(f-mtrdF)-~(dM-dF)]~0. Provided that the term in brackets is positive, Proposition
3 holds. ~
With identícal countries the difference system vanishes. The average system -which
is identical to the closed-economy dynamic system (provided that the preference function
of the ECB equals the preference function of the national central bank) in the Nash
equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium with monetary leadership- then describes
dynamics of government debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficits in both countries.
In case of Stackelberg leadership of the fiscal authorities, the ECB is exploited by two
fiscal authorities instead of one as with a national central bank. A monetary union with a
dependent ECB will therefore produce even higher debt, inflation and fiscal deficits than
with national central banks that aze dependent.
Consider next a monetary union of asymmetric countries: assume that the primary
fiscal deficit target, the money growth target of the monetary authority before the monetary
union and the debt target of country 1 exceed the tazgets of country 2, i.e. fo~0, mo~0 and
do~0. The decomposition into averages and differences enables us to calculate the
differences between an EU with national monetary policy and a monetary union between
the same countries. We derive the following result, assuming that the money and debt target
of the ECB coincides with the average tazgets of the national central banks, i.e. mE-in,, and
á -áM.E A'
Proposition 4
Compared with national monetary policies, a monetary union of asymmetric countries: (a)
will not change average steady-state debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficits in the
Nash open-loop equilibrium and with Stackelberg leadership of the ECB. With Stackelberg
leadership of the fiscal authorities a monetary union increases average debt, money
creation and primaryfiscal deficits, (b) will increase steady-state differences in government
debt and decrease steady-state differences in primary fiscal deficit in the Nash equilibrium
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if (S -r)mdtdó and in the case of Stackelberg leadership of the monetary authority. In case
of Stackelberg leadership of the fiscal authorities the impact ojamonetary union on steady-
state differences in government debt andprimary fiscal deficits is generally ambiguous.'B
Proof:
Average debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficits with national monetary policy are
found when replacing f with fA, m with m,,, dF with dÁ and dM with dÁ in Table 1. If we
assume that mÉ mA and dÉdÁ the expressions of steady-state average debt, money growth
and primary fiscal deficit in the monetary union and with national monetary policy coincide
in case of the Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium with monetary leadership.
With fiscal leadership, steady-state average debt is higher in a monetary union than with
national monetary policies if TAr(S-r) [(S-r)(fA-mAfrUA)~C(a -dF)p0. Steady-state money
growth is higher in a monetary union if iar[(S-r)(rA-mAfYUA)~C(dM-dF)p0 and primary
fiscal deficits are higher ifi(t-r(S-r))[(S-r)(fA-mAfYaA)~r(dM-dF)p0. Given our eazlier
assumptions, (a) results. Steady-state differences with national monetary policy aze found
when replacing {f,m, dF,dM} by {fo,mo,dD,aó} in Table 1. Writing out the inequalities one
finds that the difference in steady-state debt is higher in a monetary union than with
national monetary policies if (S-r)[(S-r)mo-idó]I~,~O in the Nash equilibrium and if
(S-r)[(r(S-r)-~,)ino-TrdDjl0,,~0 in case ofmonetary leadership. The steady-state difference
in primary fiscal deficit is smaller with a monetary union than with national monetary
policy if -~,[(S-r)mo-id ó]ION~O in the Nash equihbrium and if -~.[(r(S-r)-~,}mo-Trd ó y0,,r~0
in case of monetary leadership. 0
Part (a) of Proposition 4 confirms much of the fear implicit in the Report of the
Delors Committee of the inflationary consequences of a dependent ECB -i.e. Stackelberg
leadership of the fiscal authorities- that is forced to monetise a substantial part of the
financing requirements ofundisciplined national fiscal authorities. According to (b), whether
a monetary union increases steady-state convergence in debt and deficits depends on the
18 If the fiscal authorities are Stackelberg leader, a monetary union will increase steady-state differences
in government debt if,
-~(s-r(8-r))(S-r)[(r(8-r)-2)fDtr~ldó]t0o[~(b-r)fDt(r(b-r)-r)((b-r)mo-tdD)]~oand steady-state
differences in primary fiscal deficit if.
-~(s -r(b -r))[(8 -r)fD t(r(8 -r) - s)dó] t 0 c[(á -r)mo-sdD] ~0 .
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mode of interaction between ECB and fiscal authorities and on the particulaz set of
modelpazameters that is deemed realistic.
The information on the properties of the average and difference systems in
Proposition 4 enables us to calculate the impact of entering a monetary union from an
individual country perspective as country vaziables can easily be calculated from the
average and difference systems. The average system is not affected by entering the
monetary union in case of the Nash equilibrium and with Stackelberg leadership of the
monetary authority and the impact of entering a monetary union is easy to determine in that
case. In case of country 1(2), steady-state debt is higher (lower) and steady-state money
growth and primary fiscal deficits aze lower (higher) in a monetary union than with national
monetary policy in case of the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg leadership of the monetary
authority19. Rows 2 and 3 of Table 3 give the individual country effects from entering a
monetary union with asymmetric countries in the Nash case and with an independent ECB,
respectively.
The individual country effects in case of Stackelberg leadership of the fiscal
authorities are ambiguous in principle. The more symmetric both countries become the less
important aze the effects of a monetary union on steady-state differences and the average
effect dominates. If (twice) the difference effect is smaller than the average effect, a
monetazy union will increase steady-state government debt money creation and primazy
fiscal deficits in both countries. The first line (I) in row 4 of Table 3 gives the individual
country effects if the average effect dominates.
If (twice) the differential effect of a monetary union dominates also other outcomes
may result in the long run. In that case, the effects of a monetary union with a dependent
ECB aze opposite in both countries. If e.g. a monetazy union with a dependent ECB
increases steady-state differences in government debt and primary fiscal deficits20, country
I experiences an increase in debt and primary fiscal deficit and a decrease in money growth
whereas country 2 will experience lower debt and deficits but higher money growth. The
second line (II) in row 4 of Table 3 gives the individual country effects if the difference
effect dominates.
19 We assume that the conditions necessary for Proposition 4 to hold -as stated in its proof- are satisfied.
Zo See the conditions in footnote 18 for this to be the case.
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Table 3
Individual Country Effects from Entering EMU
d~(~) dz(~) . r(~) .Íz(~) m~(~) mz(~)
Nash t - - t - f
Mon. Stack f - - f - t
Fiscal (I) f t t t f t
Stack (II) fl- fl- t~- f~- - f
Important for these results aze the assumptions that money growth and debt targets of the
ECB aze equal to the average money growth and debt tazgets of the former national central
banks, i.e. mE-m,, and dE-dÁ and that the ECB gives the same priority to debt stabilisation
than the former national banks. In that case the ECB and the national central banks aze
characterised by the same value of t and are equally conservative.
From the perspective of country 1, the ECB is monetising less of the fiscal deficits
than its former national central bank. The loss of seigniorage revenues when entering the
monetary union puts additional pressure on government debt accumulation. The higher
steady-state debt is met with lower steady-state primary fiscal deficits in the Nash
equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium with monetary leadership. Country 2
experiences the opposite: the ECB is more accommodating than its former national central
bank. The increase in seigniorage revenues allows a reduction in steady-state debt and an
increase in primary fiscal deficits in both equilibria. While Propositions 3 and 4 compaze
Stackelberg leadership of the fiscal authorities in a two-country monetary union with the
single country case it can be generalized to a n-country monetary union as well: in that case
the term il2 in the last column of Table 2 is replaced by Tln. We can formulate the
following result:
Proposition S
A monetary union with a weak ECB creates higher average debt, average primary ftscal
deftcits and money growthlinjlation if more countries participate. There is, however, a limit
to the number of countries that can join a monetary union with a weak ECB if dynamic
instability is to be precluded. As long as the number of countries is less than:
n~`-i(i -r(S -r))~rOM a monetary union with a dependent ECB is not dynamically unstable.
The maximum number of countries that can participate increases if the ECB cares more
about debt stabilisation and the fiscal authorities less, i.e. iji is high and ~, is low. If the
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union with a weak ECB consists of more countries than n~`, the only feasible solution is in
fact the Nash equilibrium.
Proof:
Average steady-state government debt, primary fiscal deficits and money growth with a
monetary union of n-countries is found when replacing t~2 by tln in the last column of
Table 2. An increase in n increases t~ (which is negative in case of stability) and by that
average steady-state government debt, primary fiscal deficits and money growth in the
monetary union. Taking the limit for n~oo, gives the Nash equilibrium. Dynamic stability
of a n-country monetary union holds as long as r~,,-T~n(t -r(S -r))~0. If n?~r(2 -r(S -r))IrON,
this inequality fails to hold. An increase of t raises n~` as
an~ - 2t-r(ó-r)t t(z-r(ó-r) is
as r~N r~~,(,ltt-r(8-r))
positive given our assumption that i-r(S-r)~0. An increase in ~, decreases n~`
as an~-- s(t -r(ó -r) is negative. (]
a.l r~N(,l tt -r(ó -r))
If the fiscal authorities caze little about debt stabilisation, i.e. if ~, is small, they do
not use their strategic advantage to force high monetisation by a weak ECB to reduce
government debt. On the other hand, if the ECB cares much about debt stabilisation, i.e.
if i is lazge, less of the adjustment burden is postponed to the future. In both cases the
number of countries that can participate in the monetary union without generating an
unstable process of government debt accumulation increases. Figure 1 pictures n' as a
function of ~, and T(S and r have been put equal to 0.1 and O.OS21), respectively:
21 A higher rate of time preference reduces n' if r(S-r)(2t-r(S-r))-i(it~,)~0. A higher rate of (net)




Figure 1 n~` as a function of ~, and T.
Several scenazios aze possible for a country that decides to enter the monetary
union22: a country with a dependent national bank, i.e. Stackelberg leadership of the fiscal
authority could enter a monetary union with an independent ECB, an ECB that plays Nash
with the fiscal authorities or a monetary union with also a dependent ECB. Alternatively,
a country with an independent central bank could enter a monetary union with a dependent
ECB. In all these cases, the consequences from giving up monetary independence and
entering a monetary union can be calculated with the framework of Sections 2 and 3.
Changes in the institutional setting in which monetary and fiscal authorities interact may
have a profound impact on the country's performance on debt and inflation stabilisation. In
particulaz, the change from one extreme to the other extreme is likely to cause abrupt
changes.
Z' See Currie (1992) and Levine and Pearlman (1992) for such `scenario' approaches. Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1995) address the question under which circumstances a monetary union is feasible in the sense
of improving welfare (or at least not deteriorating) of its participants.
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3.5 A Numerical Example
To illustrate the theoretical results we obtained in Sections 2-4 consider next a stylised
numerical example of a two-country EU. Table 4 gives the values of the modelparameters
that we use throughout our example:
Table 4
A Numerical Example
country 1 country 2 averagel difference
ECB
d(0) 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.4
m 0.01 0.000 0.005 0.01
f 0.015 0.005 0.01 0.01
áF 0.60 0.60 0.60 0
áM 0.60 0.60 0.60 0
1 0.03 T 0.02
r 0.04 S 0.1
Initial debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficit targets are chosen conform the
asymmetries between country 1 and 2 we introduced in Section 3: country 1 has a higher
stock of initial debt and a higher money growth and deficit target than country 2. The debt
target was set for all policymakers to 0.6, the tazget value of the Maastricht Treaty. We
impose again the symmetry conditions regarding {~,,t,S,r}. Assume that this setting
describes a two-country EU with country 1 representing the high debt countries and country
2 the low debt countries. Table 5 calculates steady-state debt, primary fiscal deficits and
money growth both in case where the countries would maintain national monetary policies




National Monetary Policy vs. EMU
Nash Mon Stack leader Fisc Stack leader
(o~o GDP) Nat. CB ECBIEMU Nat. CB ECBIEMU Nat. CB ECBIEMU
d,~(oo) 0.643 0.643 0.679 0.679 0.751 0.851
do(oo) 0.013 0.025 0.023 0.046 0.044 0.148
d,(oo) 0.649 0.655 0.690 0.702 0.773 0.925
dz(ao) 0.649 0.630 0.667 0.656 0.729 0.777
f~(ao) -0.006 -0.006 -0.024 -0.024 0.025 0.055
fo(oo) 0.014 0.007 0.008 -0.003 0.023 0.043
f,(oo) 0.000 -0.003 -0.020 -0.023 0.037 0.076
f2(ao) -0.013 -0.010 - 0.029 -0.026 0.014 0.033
m,~(oo) 0.019 0.019 0.003 0.003 0.055 0.089
mD(oo) 0.014 0 0.007 0 0.025 0
m,(oo) 0.026 0.019 0.007 0.003 0.068 0.089
mZ(oo) 0.012 0.019 -0.002 0.003 0.043 0.089
A careful look at Table 5 confirms the analytical results found in Propositions 1-4
and the results in Table 3. The magnitude of the differences in steady-state government
debt, primary fiscal deficits and money growth between the different equilibria and between
the case of national monetary policies and an EMiJ with an ECB are relatively small,
reflecting a strong degree of convergence in debt, deficits and money growth. This result
depends on the assumptions in this numerical example that all policymakers have the same
debt target and that the differences in primary fiscal deficit and money growth targets are
relatively small. Of course, increasing the differences in debt, deficit and money growth
targets will produce stronger divergences in the long-run.
Figures 2a-c show dynamics of government debt, primary fiscal deficit and money
growth with national monetary policy in the Nash case, the monetary Stackelberg leadership
case and the fiscal Stackelberg leadership case, respectively.
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Figure 2a
Nash Open-Loop case with National Central Banks
Initial debt in country 1 is below the steady-state level, thereby inducing a small initial
decline in money growth (compared to steady-state money growth) and a small increase in
primary fiscal deficits. Since country 2 its initial debt is above steady-state an initial
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Figure 2b
Independent National Central Banks
Compazed to the Nash equilibrium in Figure 2a, an independent monetary authority
succeeds in shifting much of the adjustment burden to the fiscal authorities. The lower
money growth that results, however, is obtained at the cost of higher debt and lower fiscal
deficits, a result proved earlier in Proposition 1.
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Figure 2c
Dependent National Central Banks
A dependent central bank produces less debt stabilisation, higher money growth and
deficits, compazed to the Nash equilibrium as the fiscal authority shifts as much as possible
the adjustment burden from debt stabilisation to the monetary authority.
Figures 3a-d shows dynamics of government debt, primary fiscal deficit and money
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Comparing Figures 3a and 3b and money growth as found in Figure 3d with national
monetary policy in Figures 2a and 2b gives the result (a) of Proposition 4 that the monetary
union between both countries does not affect average debt, deficit and money growth in
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Figure 3d
Money Growth in a Monetary Union
Comparing Figure 3c and money growth with a weak ECB in Figure 3d with Figure 2c
illustrates the result (b) of Proposition 4 that (average) debt, deficits and money growth
increase when moving from national monetary policy to a monetary union, if monetary
authorities are dependent.
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The creation of a monetary union with a common central bank in the EU has azoused much
attention. This paper focused on the consequences of a monetary union from the perspective
of government debt stabilisation. The problem of government debt stabilisation has played
a central role in the debate on monetary and fiscal convergence initiated by the Report of
the Delors Committee.
Following Tabellini (1986), the problem of government debt stabilisation was
analysed as a differential game between a monetary authority who controls monetisation
and a fiscal player that controls primary fiscal deficits. The problem of government debt
stabilisation was first analysed in the context of national monetary policies. Next, we
considered a monetary union in which monetary policy has been centralised. The
consequences of establishing a monetary union between two countries with asymmetric
policy preferences were investigated. The analysis revealed the importance of the degree
of independence of national central banks and the ECB on the dynamics of government
debt, money growth and primary fiscal deficits. A dependent ECB was shown to risk a
strong inflationary-, and deficit bias in the EU.
Future reseazch effort could be directed at modifying some of the assumptions made
in the analysis. In particular one may want to change the assumption that the preferences
of the ECB are an average of the individual countries, that the (net) interest rate on
government debt is equal in both countries and independent of the level of debt and that
the rate of time preference of all players is equal. Also the role of the seigniorage
distribution function and the different scenarios that a country faces when entering a
monetary union could be subject of a more detailed analysis.
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Appendix A System Dynamics with National Monetary Policy
l The Nash open-loop equilibrrum
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(A.1)
The dynamic system consists of one backward-looking variables, d(t), and two forward-looking variables,
pF(t) and uM(t). Saddlepoint stability requires that det(A)-(S-r)(r(S-r)-~,-T)~0. The inverse of the transient






The steady-state of the Nash open-loop equilibrium can be written as:
d(~)- (8-r)2(f-m)tx(ó-rktFtt(8-rMM
~N






in which tlNequals -det(A)-(S-r)(~.fT-r(S-r)). Using the first order conditions in (6) and (8), we can write
f(oo) and m(oo) as:
.Ít~) -f - pF(~) -f -




II The Stackelberg open-loop equrlibrrum with the monetary authoriry as leader
(A.4)










The dynamic system consists of two backward-looking variables, d(r) and pM(t), and two forward-looking
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cr(ó-r) sr r(r(ó-r)-~) ,l(.L-r(ó-r))
-t(8-r) -i -(r(ó-r)-,l) (ó-r)(r(ó-r)-,l-t).
(A.6)
The steady-state of the Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with monetary leadership can be written as:
d(m)- (b-r)(r(ó-r)-,l)(f-m)t(r(ó-r)-,l)AdFtr(ó-r)iáM
~M
~ p(~) - ,l(r(8 -r)-A)(f -m) tr(r(ó -r) -.l -i),ldFt.lrtdM
(A.7)
~M
p~y(~) - Tr(ó -r)(f-m) tTfÁdFtr(r(ó -r)-Á)Td M
eM
in which 4Mequals -det(A)-(2~~r-r(S-r))r(S-r)-~.2. Using the first order conditions in (6) and (8), we can






III The Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with the fiscal authority as leader
(A.8)














The dynamic system consists of two backward-looking vaziables, d(t) and pF(t), and two forward-looking
variables, pF(t) and ItM(t). Saddlepoint stability requires that det(A)-t~-[l~t2t-r(S-r)]r(S-r) where A is the
transient matrix of (B.8). The inverse of the transient matrix A is equal to:




-l(8-r) t-r(ó-r) -~. (ó-r)(r(ó-r)-x-r)f
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r(r(ó-r)-s) sr r(r(ó-r)-,l-s) -i2
(A.10)
The steady-state of the Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with the fiscal authority acting as Stackelberg
leader can be written as:
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in which t1F equals -det(A)-(~,}2t-r(S-r)]r(S-r)-tz. Using the first order conditions in (6) and (8), we can
write J(oo) and m(oo) as:
,Í(~) -f - WF(~) -Í.-





Appendix B Dynamic Systems of the Nash Open-loop and Stackelberg Open-loop Equilibria with
a Monetary Union
The Nash open-loop equilibrium is given by:
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Appendix C Average and Difference Systems of the Different Equilibria with a Monetary Union
Defining averages of a variable x as x~ 'fi(x~txz) and differences in x as xDx~ -xz, we can decompose the
dynamics of (B 1), (B2) and (B3) into average and a difference systems ifwe impose the symmetry conditions
9-w-1-0-1-w-~~x and ~-9.









































where det(A) equals (S-r)(r(S-r)-~,-s). The steady-state ofthe Nash open-loop equilibrium, therefore, can be
written as:
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(8 -r) [(ó -r)(fA-mE) t Ad~ t TdE]
dA(~) - ~
N
F ~ [(b -r)(fA-mE) t (r(8 -r)-r)d,i t TdE1
WA(~) - Q
N
T [(b -r)(fA-mE) t ,ld~ t (r(b -r)-A~E]
W~(~)-?
in which 4N equals
~N







-det(A). Using the first order conditions, we can write fA(w), m~oo) and f~ ( oo) as:
F ~ [(8 -r)(fA-m~ t (r(8 -r)-TM~ t rdE]










The dynamic system consists of one backward-looking variable, d,~(t), and two forward-looking variables,
uA(t) and pA(t). If we impose the condition that 0~0 the system will be saddlepoint stable.
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(C.8)
in which det(A) equals ~Z-(2~,tt-r(S-r))r(S-r). Steady-state debt and the steady-state co-state variables














with OM-det(A). Using the first order conditions, we can write j(oo), mE(oo) and fD(~o) as:
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The dynamic system consists of two backward-looking variables, d,,(t) and p,E,(t), and two forward-looking
variables, pA(t) and pr,(t). If we impose the condition that ~M~O the system will be (saddlepoint) stable.
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whereas its difference part is given by:
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The inverse of the matrix A that governs system dynamics of the average and difference systems equals:
(á-r)(r(ó-r)-2) r(8-r) 2r(ó-r)-t -~(E-r)
A-~- 1
det(A)
t(r(8-r)-z) tr r(r(8-r)-,l-t) -(t)2
2 2 2 2 2
-,l(S -r) r -r(b -r) -2,l (b -r)(r(ó -r)-.1-t)
(C.13)
in which det(A) equals tZl2-[~t3lZr-r(S-r)]r(S-r). Steady-state debt and the steady-state co-state variables
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in which ~~ det(A). Using the first order conditions in (9), (11) and ( 13), we can write fA(oo), m~{oo) and fo(~)
as:
mE(~)-mEt2WA(~)-mEt
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The dynamic system consists of two backward-looking variables, dA(t) and p~(t), and two forward-looking
variables, p~(t) and p~(t). If we impose the condition that 4F~0 the system will be (saddlepoint) stable.
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Is there a Tragedy of a Common Central Bank?'
Introduction
A great deal of uncertainty prevails about the degree to which a European Central Bank
(ECB) can be exploited as common property by undisciplined governments, forcing the
monetary authority to monetise outstanding public debt and thus boosting inflation in the
whole European Union (EU). The fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty
apply to the phase of adjustment towards the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) but
do not provide guidance about desirable fiscal adjustment once the EMU is fully
implemented. Bovenberg, Kremers and Masson (1991) describe several channels through
which monetary unification can reduce fiscal discipline: with a common currency, the
cost of borrowing and public debt can not be internalized through relative monetary
adjustments, implying that it is partially shifted to other EU countries. Moreover, since
the elimination of currency risk encourages the residents of other countries to invest in
government debt, the pressures for bailouts through budgetary transfers also increase. In
addition, as monetary policy can no longer be used to stabilise country-specific shocks,
fiscal policy may have to bear a larger burden of stimulating the economy.
Employing simulation analysis, Levine (1993) and Levine and Pearlman (1992)
show how a common central bank induces excessive fiscal deficits and high goverrunent
debt, if it cannot commit to low inflation. Moreover, fiscal coordination aggravates fiscal
profligacy, although it may help in the presence of fiscal externalities as is shown by
Levine and Brociner (1994).
Much theoretical work has been devoted to analysing the effect of fiscal and
monetary interaction on the evolution of government debt. In an intertemporal setting
this gives rise to a number of interesting economic and strategic aspects. Sargent and
Wallace (1981) have shown that "unpleasant" effects can arise if a central bank reacts to
fiscal policy and is being constrained by the necessity to monetise fiscal deficits.
Tabellini (1986) demonstrated in a simple strategic setting that without a specific
' This chapter results from a joint research project with Lans Bovenberg and Matthias Raith and is
based on a paper that is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control and a chapter in
the book by Karadeleglou ( ed.) "Exchange Rate Determination". An earlier version was presented at the
AEA conference 'Exchange Rate Determination', held in March 1995 in Stuttgart.
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leadership structure, strategies in the stabilisation of government debt can be ranked. In
particular, he shows that public debt increases if policymakers cannot commit themselves
to an optimal strategy, but instead behave in a subgame-perfect manner. When this idea
is projected to a multi-country setting, it gives rise to vazious fears connected with a
common central bank, whose seigniorage is shared by all countries that participate in the
EMU.
We address the question whether fiscal authorities in the EMU can exploit the
ECB by forcing it to increase monetisation in a dynamic debt stabilisation game in
which both fiscal authorities and the ECB have a common objective, namely stabilisation
of government debt, and individual objectives. We focus on how monetary unification
alters the dynamic strategic interaction of monetary and fiscal authorities in such a
conflict on government debt stabilisation. In a closed economy, a single monetary
authority interacts with a single fiscal authority. In a monetary union, in contrast, a
single monetary authority is confronted with several fiscal authorities. The implied
changes in strategic interactions, which are intrinsic elements of monetary unification,
continue to operate in a more complete analysis that would include also other relevant
channels.
In order to do so, we extend the elegant framework of Tabellini (1986) to a two-
country setting. We derive optimal open-loop and feedback strategies, with and without
cooperation between fiscal players, and we compare the outcomes with the case of
strategic interaction between governments and their own individual national central
banks. We find that in a symmetric union the open-loop strategies in the national and
international setting coincide. This results holds irrespective of whether or not fiscal
authorities cooperate with each other. The absence of exploitation of the ECB is not
necessazily surprising in this case, because with open-loop strategies players are able to
commit themselves to their optimal strategies.
The more realistic setting, though, involves feedback strategies. As Tabellini
(1986) has shown, in a national setting feedback strategies slow down stabilisation of
debt compazed to open-loop strategies. This results is confirmed in the extended two-
country case. However, we find that with feedback strategies, public debt stabilisation
occurs quicker with a common central bank than with individual central banks. This
result conflicts with the widespread feaz of the ECB being abused as exploitable
common property. The explanation for more fiscal and monetary discipline in a
monetary union lies in the weakening of the strategic position of the fiscal authorities
compazed to that of the monetary authorities. This disciplining effect of the monetary
union vanishes as soon as fiscal authorities cooperate their fiscal policies in the
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interaction with the ECB. Accordingly, the outcomes with fiscal cooperation between
two symmetric countries in a monetary union coincide with that under national central
banks where fiscal authorities do not cooperate. Moving to a monetary union thus
improves fiscal discipline and monetary stability only as long as governments fail to
cooperate. Thus, from a purely strategic perspective, if one is interested in fiscal
discipline, we find arguments in favour of the ECB. The ECB cannot be viewed as
common property, but rather as a strategic player, whose power rises if the relative size
of individual countries declines as their number increases, provided that the fiscal players
fail to coordinate their fiscal policies.
Section 2 formulates the model and describes the general structure of the
solutions. Section 3 deals with non-cooperative Nash open-loop strategies while Section
4 studies Nash feedback strategies. Alternative specifications of parameters allow us to
compaze the performance of in the ECB regime with that under a regime of national
central banks. In Section 5, we consider the cooperation between fiscal authorities and
analyse both open-loop and feedback behaviour against a common central bank. Section
6 extends the results of Sections 3 and 4 which are based on the assumption of
symmetry of the participating countries, by considering asymmetries in the initial level of
debt and differences in objectives of the fiscal players. A conclusion summazizes our
main results and possible policy implications of our analysis.
4.2 Debt Stabilisation as a Differential Game
In an insightful analysis, Tabellini (1986) analyses the process of government debt
accumulation as the outcome of the dynamic interaction of monetary and fiscal
authorities. Government debt dynamics evolve according to the dynamic government
budget constraint which connects the primary fiscal deficit, F(t), which is controlled by
the fiscal authority, money creation or seigniorage, M-dMldt, interest payments on
outstanding government debt, i(t)D(t), and changes in outstanding government debt, D,
D- i(t) D(t) t F(t) -M(t) (1)
where D(t) denotes the nominal level of government debt at time t and i(t) the nominal
interest rate. Dividing both sides of the budget constraint by the level of national income,
Y(t), and denoting the normalized vaziables by lower case letters, i.e. d-D~Y, f-F~Y and
m- M~Y, ( 1) can be rewritten as,
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d -rd(t) tf(t) -m(t) (1')
where r equals the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate of nominal
GDP, i.e. ri-g with g-dY~dtz. In order to keep the dynamic analysis tractable, we
assume that the growth rate of real national income is constant and that nominal interest
rates adjust one-to-one to changes in inflation, implying that r is constant'.
Consider first the case where a European Monetary Union (EMU) has been
established that consists for simplicity of two countries that shaze a common central
bank, the ECB. In order to explore the debt dynamics of both countries we need to
consider the dynamic government budget constraints of both countries. With a common
central bank we must specify how seigniorage is distributed between both countries. We
therefore assume that a fraction 6 of the ECB seigniorage is allocated to country 1, while
the remaining fraction, 1-6, goes to country 2. Thus, we can write the two government
budget constraints as,
cit -rdt(t) }.fi(t) - e m(t)
W
d2 - rd2(t) }f2(t) - i-W
m(t),
(2)
where m(t) denotes the change in the monetary base in relation to European GDP and w
is the share of country 1 in European GDP. For simplicity, we assume that both
countries feature the same growth rate of real output, so that the relative size of countries
remains constant over time. With integrated financial and goods markets, real interest
rates aze at the same level across the two countries. Therefore r has the same value for
both countries.
If the distribution of seigniorage is determined by the economic size of countries,
i.e. if A-w, each country receives the same amount of seigniorage from the ECB as from
a national central bank, provided that both would implement the same monetary policy.
However, other rules may be worth considering. To save on notation, we write (2) in
2 The growth rate of output equals the growth rate of real output gy-dyldt plus the rate of inflation
rz-dP~dt, where P(t) denotes the aggregate price level.
' Endogenising r as e.g. a function of the outstanding amount of government debt, i.e. r(t)-h(d(t))
would amount to introducing an endogenous default risk premium on government debt. This would give
rise to a nonlinear differential equation (1') as an optimization constraint, which would yield significantly
more complicated dynamics. Alesina e.a. (1992) study empirically the emergence of endogenous default
risk premia in OECD countries.
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vector notation,
d- rd(t) t Btft (t) t Baf'2 - Bm m(t)





We assume that policymakers interact strategically in two stages. In the first stage
they calculate optimal fiscal and monetazy policies in order to satisfy a specified set of
economic goals, i.e. targets for real as well as nominal vaziables. For simplicity one may
assume that all policymakers target the same variables, but have individual preferences
regarding their respective weights. Hence, they care differently about the same issues.
Policymakers optimise for given dynamic constraints of the international economy,
which, however, do not include the government budget constraints (2). This results in
unconstrained optimal strategies which we denote by m, f, and fZ. For simplicity, we
will look only at optimal strategies that are constant over time4. In the second stage,
policymakers again optimise intertemporally, but now targeting tmconstrained strategies
while having to satisfy the intertemporal government budget constraints so as to prevent
unlimited debt accumulation. Their preferences aze thus chazacterised by political instead
of economic objectivess.
The fiscal authority of country 1(i-1,2) is assumed to minimise its intertemporal
loss function, L,{t), which features squazed deviations of the primary fiscal deficit and
government debt from their target values, f and d;:
' See Pindyck (1977) for a numerical analysis of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy
over time in a dynamic macroeconomic model.
5 This two-stage optimization procedure, which was introduced by Tabellini (1986) is, of course,
questionable from a strategic point of view. The main advantage of the two-stage analysis clearly lies in
its practicability. Furthermore, taking a complete economic model into consideration often leads to
endogenisation of interest rates, which would make the govemment budget constraints nonlinear. Despite
this theoretical caveat, the severity of the resulting mistakes for macroeconomic policy evaluation is surely
debatable, as the common approach in the traditional literature is to ignore the budget constraint
altogether. Also, Tabellini (1986) mentions the problem that the unconstrained optimal policies remain
unchanged across regime switches, thus making the analysis vulnerable to the Lucas critique. Again, this
theoretical drawback should not be ignored, but rather assessed on the basis of its empirical relevance.
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Concern about government indebtedness could be based on the efficiency losses due to
undesirable allocative and distributive effects induced by high government debt. Tabellini
(1986) refers to more serious tax distortions as well as possible crowding out effects on
capital accumulation. Moreover, in the context of the EMU, debt convergence is dictated
also by the Maastricht criteria. Hence, debt stabilisation can be considered as an
independent policy tazget, even though we abstract from default risk. In the remainder of
the analysis we will assume that the initial amount of government debt, d,{0), is
significantly higher than its target value, implying that government debt stabilisation is
indeed a relevant policy problem.
Q,' ` 0
With Q;- the debt objective becomes (d-d;)'Q;(d-d;)-Q;"(d,-d;~)2
o Q;~
}Q;22(d, -d,2)Z, thus allowing for the possibility that a government cazes also about
stabilisation of the level of debt abroad. We assume that both governments discount time
with the same rate of time preference Sl
The ECB is concerned about its unconstrained monetazy target, as well as the
levels of debt of both countries:
Lm(t) - 2f{(m(s) -m)2 t(d(s) -dm)'Qm(d(s) -dm)}e-a~~s-`~ds
r
(4)
where the ECB's concern about the levels of national debt is chazacterised by the matrix
Qm. The ECB is assumed to care about the deviation of average debt in the EMU, but
not its distribution over both countries. Hence the matrix Q,„ can be written
as Q~ -T f
w2 w(1 w)l . The parameter T reflects the ECB sensitivity to general
`w(1-w) (1-w)z J
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economic conditions in the unionb. The more independent the ECB is, i.e. the lower the
value of T, the more it is able to shift the burden of debt stabilisation to the fiscal
authorities. By focusing on the interaction between the central bank and only one of the
fiscal authorities (i.e. A-w-1) for a constant value of t, we can compare the performance
of the ECB with that of an individually optimizing national bank in a non-cooperative
setting'.
The fiscal and monetary authorities set their respective policy instrtunents such as
to minimise their intertemporal loss functions subject to the dynamic government budget
constraints (2), the initial amount of the government debt, d,{0), and a transversality
condition that excludes situations where government debt accumulates at a rate faster
than r and would become insolvent:
lim d~(t) e -" i E{1,2}
~,m
(5)
This transversality condition that precludes government insolvency is usually referred to
as the 'No-Ponzi game' condition. Empirical implications of this condition can be used
to evaluate government solvency, see e.g. Corsetti and Roubini (1993) for an application
of such government solvency tests to the EU.
The problem of government debt stabilisation creates a(dynamic) conflict
between monetary and fiscal players as both have an instrument -the fiscal player
controls the primary deficit and the monetary player monetisation- that can contribute in
stabilising debt which is of common interest. Such strategic interaction of monetary and
6 Alternatively, the ECB might be concerned about the average deviation of debt in the two countries
from the debt target. In that case, Q,„, would have the form Q,~ - t . This specification would be
more appropriate if one considered the ECB from the perspective of monetary cooperation of national
central banks. In that case, the ECB reacts to the distribution of debt, with the logical implication that
monetary policy is affected by the distribution of seigniorage. As long as seigniorage is distributed
according to economic size, i.e. 6-cu, our main results as formulated in Propositions 1-3
will also apply to that case.
' A comparison with a constant value of z should be viewed as a benchmazk case for a
strategic analysis. Despite the fact that differences in central bank independence within the European
Union are still considerable, the differences in strategies and the resulting outcomes with national central
banks and with a European central bank can only be highlighted if both are assumed to feature the same
political objectives (i.e. m and d) and the same degree of conservativenesslindependence, z.
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fiscal authorities on the dynamic problem of goven:unent debt stabilisation, can be
analysed with the aid of differential game theory.
With the lineaz-quadratic optimization problems described above, it is natural to
propose solutions for the policy strategies which aze linear functions of the state
variables, the levels of debt:
f,.(t) - ao - ai' d(t) a~' -(a;,a?), i-1,2 (6a)
m(t) - am t am' d(t) am' -(am,am) (6b)
By inserting these reaction functions into the budget constraint, one obtains the following
dynamic equation for the levels of debt,
ci-I'd(t) tc
I'-[rl-Blal'-BZa2'-Bmam'] c-[Blao}B2a2-Bmam]
With d set equal to zero, we arrive at steady-state levels of debt,
d' - -I'-Ic
so that the analytical solution of d(t) can be written as




In the remainder of the analysis, we consider different forms of strategic interaction
between the three players. Each form yields a different value for I' and c that determine
the dynamic behaviour of government debt in both countries, and together with the
proposed reaction functions (6a) and (6b) also that of primary fiscal deficits and money
growth.
4.3 Noncooperative Policies: Open-Loop Nash Strategies
Without cooperation between any of the authorities in the monetary union, we must
consider the optimization problem of each individual player. The most important non-
cooperative solution concept is the Nash equilibrium where all players implement their
policies simultaneously and noncooperatively. This section analyses open-loop Nash
strategies while section 4 focuses on feedback Nash strategies. In both sections the fiscal
authorities do not cooperate in the interaction with the ECB. In section 5 we analyse the
effects of fiscal cooperation on debt, deficits and inflation.
The simplest form of noncooperative behaviour is given by the open-loop
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strategies of each institution. In this case, each player solves his intertemporal
optimisation problem, being restricted by the time path of government debt while taking
the intertemporal strategies of the other players as given. Since the complete time-path of
policies is fixed at the beginning of the planning period, the open-loop strategies of
policies are often referred to as precommitment policies. Thus, their plausibility depends
on how well policymakers can adhere to announced strategies.
The optimisation problem of each player is solved by minimising the current
value Hamiltonian composed of the respective preference function and the two budget
constraints of eq.(2). The present value Hamiltonian of fiscal authority i(i-1,2) is
defined as:
hi F~ -~[(~;(t) -f~)2 t(d(t) - di)~Qi(d(t) - di) t~,t [rd(t) t Bl.fi(t) tBaf'2(t) - Bmm(t) ] (10)
The first-order conditions associated with minimising the Hamiltonian are given by:
f(t) -f; - B,' ~.;(t)
~.; - (óf-r) k,(t) - Q;(d(t) -d;)
(lla)
(llb)
The static optimality condition (l la) results in f,{t) being a linear function of the shadow
price of government debt, ~,;(t). With our proposed linear policy functions in eq.(6), ~,,{t)
must also be a linear function of d(t), i.e. ~,;(t)-k;-~K,d(t) where k; is a 2x1 vector and K;
a 2x2 matrix. Differentiating with respect to time yields ~.,-K,d. This implies that the
dynamic optimality condition (l lb) can be rewritten as,
Ktd-[(óf-r)K~ -Qt]d(t) }(óf-r)k~ tQ;á; (12)






For a given matrix I', (13a) determines the matrix K;, which can be substituted into (13b)
to obtain k;. By substituting ~,;(t)-k;fK;d(t) into (11 a) we can solve for the feedback
coefficients of f,{t) in (6a): a;f- B;'k; and a;-B;'K;. Note that the general solution is
still undetermined since we do not yet have a solution for I' and c.
The present value Hamiltonían of the ECB is the given by:
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H Ece(t) - 2 [(m(t) -m)z } (d(t) -dm)~Qm(d(t) -dm) t ~,m [Td(t) tBifi(t) }B~2(t) -Bmm(t)]
(14)
The first-order conditions from minimising the present value Hamiltonian of the ECB aze
given by:
m(t) - m t Bm ~,m(t)
1~m - (bm -T) ~m(t) -Qm(d(t) -d~)
(15a)
(15b)
With the co-state variable being a lineaz function of debt, i.e. ~,,„(t)-kmfKmd(t), and
~,,,;K,„d, (15b) then can be rewritten as,
Km d - [(bm -T)Km -Qm] d(t) t (~1m -T)km } Qmdm (16)
Comparing (16) and (7) and applying the method of undetennined coefficients, gives two
equations to solve for K,„ and k,,,:
(8m -T)Km -Qm-KmI'
(Sm -T)km tQmdm -Kmc
(17a)
(17b)
The solutions of K,,, and k,„ can be used to determine the feedback coefficients in the
reaction function (6b) of the ECB, resulting in: ammfBm'k,,, and am'-B,„'K,„.
Substituting the solutions for a,', aZ' and a,,; into (7) and using the method of
undetermined coefficients provides a solution for I',
I'-TI-B1BiK1-BZBZKZ-BmBmKm (18)
With (13a), (17a) and (18), we have four equations to determine all the matrices K„ K2,
Km and I'. Substituting the solutions for a~, a2 and am into (7) and using the method of
undetermined coefficients provides a solution for the constant,
c-Blf1fByfz-Bmm-B1Bik1-BZBZ1r2-BmBmkm (19)
(13b), (17b) and (19) yield four equations to solve for k„ k2, km and c.
These system of equations aze non-linear, so that in general we are unable to
obtain a solution analytically. In order to compare the different types of strategic
interaction, we therefore provide numerical simulations for the outcomes of the
differential games. We use the same set of pazameters for all simulations, unless
indicated otherwise. In the two-country case, we assume that both countries aze
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symmetric and of the same size (co-'h). Fiscal authorities care only about their own
country's debt (Q~~~-QZZ2-0.04 and Q,22-Q2"-0). The ECB, in contrast, is concerned
about debt in both countries, giving this objective the same weight as the two fiscal
players (z-0.04). These values generate time paths for national debt that are compatible
with empirical estimates of debt adjustment for countries with an objective of debt
stabilisation. In accordance with the 30~o Maastricht criterion for total budget deficits, we
assume that both countries feature the same target for the primary fiscal deficit of 10~0 of
GDP ~fz0.01). Monetary policy is aimed at monetary stability (m-0). Initial debt
levels are at the approximate European average of 700~0 of GDP, while debt targets are
set at SOo~o of GDP (á,-d2d,,,-0.5), so that they lie well within the bounds of the
Maastricht Treaty. All policymakers feature the same discount rate (S~Sm0.1), and the
interest factor, r, remains constant at r-0.03.
We first explore the sensitivity of the solution with respect to 0, the proportion of
seigniorage that country 1 has access to. Figure 1 shows the simulation results for values
of 0-0, 0.5 and 1.
a) Debt of Country 1 b) Fiscal Policy of Country 1
Figure 1 Open-Loop Nash Solutions for 8-0 (dashed), 0.5 (solid) and 1(dotted)
Figure la shows the adjustment of government debt. The dashed path for 0-0 displays
the slowest adjustment of debt and the highest long run level of debt, since all
seigniorage of the ECB is transferred to country 2. Without any seigniorage transfer,
country 1 has to cut its fiscal deficit most, leading to the lower curve in Figure lb. If
country 1 receives all seigniorage of the ECB, i.e. if 0-1, the situation is reversed. Since
both countries aze completely symmetric in the benchmazk case, their debt and fiscal
deficit display identical adjustment paths if 8-0.5.
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Monetary policy is completely independent of the distribution of seigniorage. The
following lemma indicates that this result remains valid for much weaker assumptions of
symmetry than those that we have imposed in our simulated benchmark case.
Lemma 1
With open-loop strategies, monetary policy is independent of the distribution of
seigniorage if both fiscal authorities attach the same weight to the stabilisation of
national debt and the ECB cares only about the deviation of average debt.
The proof, which is found in the appendix, is obtained by first assuming a general
solution structure that satisfies the lemma, and subsequently showing that a unique
solution exists to such a structure which satisfies the optimality conditions for a stable
solution. As one can check from the formal analysis, this result holds even if the two
countries feature different initial levels of debt or if their policy targets differ.
If monetary policy of the ECB cazing only about average debt in the union is
independent of the seigniorage distribution, the suggestion arises that average debt itself
must be independent of the seigniorage distribution. The following lemma can be
derived, whose proof is given in the appendix,
Lemma 2
With open-loop strategies, average debt is independent of the distribution of seigniorage,
if both fiscal authorities attach the same weight to the stabilisation of national debt and
the ECB cares only about the deviation of average debt.
An important question concerns the performance of a regime with a monetary
union and a common central bank, compazed to a regime with national central banks. To
focus on the strategic consequences of such a regime switch, we keep the economic
background fixed and assume the ECB features the same preference pazameters as the
national central banks, i.e. in-m,-inz, dm á,-áz, T-T,-iz and S,„-S,„,-SmZ. The effects
from the regime switch aze summarised in Proposition 1,
Proposition 1
With open-loop strategies, a common central bank, caring only about the deviation of
average debt, pursues the same monetary policy as a national central banl~ if fiscal
authorities feature symmetric preferences and countries feature the same initial levels of
debt to GDP. Moreover, also government debts and fiscal deficits are the same as in the
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closed economy, if countries receive a share of ECB seigniorage equal to their share in
aggregate GDP (i. e. A-co).
The proof which makes use of the two lemmas derived earlier is found in the
appendix. According to Proposition 1, if policymakers aze able to precommit their
strategies, implementing a common central bank will not affect the strategic interaction
of monetary and fiscal authorities on government debt stabilisation, as long as countries
are symmetric in preferences and initial debt and seigniorage of the common central
bank is distributed according to economic size of the countries that participate in the
ECB. Indeed, if monetary authorities can precommit, monetary unification does not
enhance further the credibility of announced anti-inflation policies. This is no longer so
if a lack of precommitment opportunities makes credibility an important issue.
Accordingly, we now turn to the feedback strategies of the Nash equilibrium.
4.4 Noncooperative Policies: Feedback-Nasó Strategies
In contrast to open-loop strategies, feedback strategies ímply that the players cannot
precommit their policies. These time-consistent strategies seem more realistic than open-
loop strategies as policymakers typically lack a commitment technology. Indeed,
countries may want to join the EMiJ in order to enhance the credibility of their policies.
In order to obtain optimal feedback strategies, each player solves his optimization
problem taking into account that at each point in time the other players react to the
levels of debt according to (6), rather than taking the other players policies as
exogenously given like in the open-loop case. As a result the present value Hamiltonian
of fiscal player i(i-1,2) equals,
H F' - 2 [ (f(t) -f,)z t (d(t) -d,)~Q;(d(t) -d,)
}~i(t) [(rl - Bj a~ -Bm a,'~) d(t) {B;f(t) }(Bj aj- Bm am) )
(20)
(with j-1,2 and j~i), which is minimised if
.f(t) -f; -B,~~,;(t) (21a)
~.;-[(óf-r)ItajBj tamB~;]~;(t)-Q;(d(t)-d~)
(21b)
For the costate vector ~.,{t) we assume again a lineaz function of d(t), i.e. ~,,{t)-k;fK,d(t).




} [(af-')1 } a~Bj t amBml k( }Q;di
(22)
Comparing (22) and (7) and applying the method of undetermined coefficients, results in
two equations,
[(SJ-r)I}a~Bj tafiB,,;]K~-Qi-K~P
[(óf-r)1 t a~B~ t amBm]k; }Q,d, -K c
With the aid of (18), (23) can be rewritten as,
[St,l - I'~ -K~Bi.B;~] K - Qi -K~ I'





For a given matrix I', equation (24a) determines the matrix K;, which can be substituted
into (24b) to obtain k;. By substituting ~,,{t)-k;fK~i(t) into ( 21a), the feedback
coefficients of f,{t) in (6a) aze again given as a;f-B;'K; and a;'-B;'k;.
The analysis for the ECB is analogous and yields the solution for the other
feedback coefficients. The present value Hamiltonian of the ECB is the given by:
HECe(t) - 2 [(m(t) -m)Z t (d(t) -dm)~Qm(d(t) -d,„)
}~m(t) L(rl - Bl ai- BZ a 2)d(t) - Bm m(t) t B~ a i} BZ a~]
(25)
The first-order conditions from minimising the present value Hamiltonian of the ECB aze
given by:
m(t) - m t B,;, ~lm(t)
~m -[(a m - r) I} a i Bi t az Bz] ~.m(t) - Qm(d(t) - d~)
(26a)
(26b)
With the co-state variable being a linear function of debt, i.e. ~,,,,(t)-k,„fK,„d(t), and
~,,„-Kmci, (26b) then can be rewritten as,
27
Kmii-{[(óm - r)I t a1Bi t a2B2]K,„ - Qm}d(t) }[(8,„ -r) } a1Bi t a1B2lk,„ }Qmd,„
Compazing (27) and (7), applying the method of undetennined coefficients and using
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(18), provides two more equations to solve for K„ and km:
[Sml-P~-KmBmB~]K -Qm-KmI'
[SmI-P~ -KmBmB,;,]km tQmdm -KmC
(28a)
(28b)
As before, the system is closed by (18)-(19) but now yielding different feedback
coefficients a~ and a~ (j-1,2,m).
In case of feedback strategies, the current level of debt influences policies through
the reactions of the other players, implying that feedback strategies produce additional
nonlineazities. Consequently, finding analytical solutions of I' and c is even more
difficult than in the open-loop case. We therefore concentrate again on numerical results.
In order to conduct simulation experiments, we use the same benchmazk model as in the
preceding section. Hence, we employ the same parameters in a different strategic setting.
For the case of 6-co-1, we first reproduce in Figure 2 the results of Tabellini (1986) for
the evolution of debt, deficit and money growth in the single country case with its own
central bank.
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Figure 2 Open-Loop ( dashed) vs. Feedback (solid) Nash Solutions for Country 1 with
a National CB
As mentioned, in the feedback case each player explicitly takes into account the
reactions of the other player(s) towards changes in public debt. In particulaz, if players
use feedback strategies they take into account that part of their own contributions to
stabilising government debt accumulation will be undone by a reduced effort of the other
players that is evoked. Cleazly, this countervailing effect reduces the individual benefits
of employing the player's own instruments to cut debt accumulation. Such adverse
incentive problems imply that each player will put less effort in debt stabilisation,
resulting in slower adjustment and higher stocks of debt in Figure 2a. Figures 2b and 2c
show that in the feedback case, both the fiscal and monetazy players initially move
towazds their individual policy tazgets, thereby trying to shift the problem of debt
stabilisation to the other players. This results in a higher level of debt than in the open-
loop case as seen already. Accordingly, in the long run, feedback policies must become
more accommodating and players move away from their individual policy tazgets.
We now turn to a comparison of the feedback strategies in the monetary union
with the institutional setting of national central banks. To focus on the strategic
implications, we switch only the institutional setting while leaving the preferences of the
players unaltered. Figure 3 compazes the outcomes under feedback strategies in both
regimes.
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Figure 3 Feedback-Nash Solutions in Country 1 in case of a ECB ( solid) and a National
CB (dashed)
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Figure 3 shows that, instead of exploiting the ECB, fiscal authorities become more
disciplined in a monetary union. In particular, Figure 3b reveals that fiscal deficits are
lower if fiscal authorities have to deal with a common monetary institution rather than
their own national central bank. Moreover, Figure 3c indicates that the ECB is more
successful in reducing inflation than a national central bank, if both central banks feature
the same policy preferences.
The intuition behind the additional fiscal discipline in a monetary union is as
follows. With feedback strategies, each fiscal player individually exerts less impact on
monetary policy in a monetary union than in a situation of national central banks. As a
result, the fiscal players take into account a smaller countervailing response of the
t
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monetary player compared to the case where they would interact with a national central
bank. In particular, a reduction by the fiscal player of the fiscal deficit to stabilise
government debt causes the monetary authority to reduce money growth by a smaller
amount in a monetary union than under national monetary policies, thereby producing a
larger net reduction of public debt. Hence, in a monetazy union, the fiscal players
perceive higher benefits from cutting fiscal deficits than under national monetazy policy
making.
When implementing its monetary policies, the ECB, in contrast, takes into
account the same offsetting aggregate response of the various fiscal authorities as a
national central bank would in its interaction with its national fiscal authority. The
overall effect of the weaker strategic position of the fiscal authorities in a monetary
union is to reduce debt accumulation (see Figure 3c), primary fiscal deficits (because the
fiscal authorities perceive higher benefits from debt stabilisation) and money growth
(because the lower stocks of debt induce the ECB to reduce money growth). Hence, a
common central bank is more successful in fighting inflation than a national central bank
as the fiscal authorities contribute more to the common objective of reducing public debt.
Alternatively, we can interpret the disciplining effects of a monetary union as
follows: compazed to the situation with noncooperative national monetary policies,
monetary unification in a way implies that monetary policies aze set cooperatively. The
implicit cooperation of the monetary authorities in a monetary union strengthens the
strategic position of the monetary authorities compazed to that of the fiscal authorities
which continue to set their policies noncooperatively.
How do the feedback results compare with those of the open-loop strategies in
case of two symmetric countries and a ECB? Figure 4 compares the outcomes under
feedback and open-loop strategies in a monetary union with 6-w-0.5.
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Figure 4 Open-Loop (dashed) vs. Feedback (solid) Nash Solutions with an ECB (A-0.5)
As in Figure 2, feedback strategies still lead to slower adjustment of debt and
higher steady-state debt than with open-loop strategies. Accordingly, the results of
Tabellini (1986) concerning debt dynamics in a closed economy setting with feedback
and open-loop strategies appeaz to generalize to two-country setting. However, if we
compare the time paths of the policy vaziables in Figures 4b and 4c, we find them to be
different than with national monetary policymaking as found in Figures 2b and 2c in
case of feedback strategies. In contrast with Figure 2b, Figure 4b shows that in a
monetazy union governments deviate further from their fiscal tazgets, whereas Figure 4c
indicates that the ECB moves closer to its monetary tazget with feedback strategies.
Intuitively, the fiscal player is forced to do more adjustment in the monetary union as the
stronger monetary player does less adjustment with feedback strategies. In that sense the
monetary union acts as a substitute for an explicit commitment device for monetary
policy.
These results also extend to a union of more than two countries. As the number
of fiscal players increases, the weight of each individual fiscal player decreases.
Accordingly, each fiscal player perceives a smaller response of the ECB when setting its
policy. Our conclusions conflict sharply with the notion of the ECB as a common
properiy that individual countries attempt to exploit. Indeed, if there is any exploitation,
it rather involves the ECB itself taking advantage of its stronger strategic position. This
is also confirmed by the losses of both players calculated at time 0 for the individual
regimes. The numerical values obtained from eqs.(3) and (4) are shown in Table 1. For
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convenience, all values have been multiplied by 1000.
Table 1




fiscal authority 3.9 4.6






In our simulations, monetary and fiscal authorities differ only slightly in their
policy tazgets while attaching the same weight to debt stabilisation. Hence, they aze
symmetric in their losses if there is a regime with national central banks. With a
common central bank, however, the monetary authority gains at the cost of the fiscal
authorities. In case of feedback strategies, the common central bank even improves upon
its open-loop performance.
4.5 Fiscal Cooperation
Sections 3 and 4 showed that moving to a monetary union did not affect outcomes with
open-loop strategies and weakened the strategic position of the fiscal authorities in case
of feedback strategies. Therefore the question can be asked how outcomes of the
differential game aze affected if the fiscal authorities in the monetary union8 cooperate
against the ECB. In the context of the EMLJ, such fiscal cooperation may take place in
the ECOFIN, the regulaz meeting of the ministers of finance in the EU.
To study the effects of fiscal cooperation in the EMU, we specify the cooperative
fiscal objective function as a weighted sum of the fiscal player's cost functions:
8 We do not study the effect of fiscal cooperation under national monetary policymaking. A
considerable literature exists that studies the effect of intemational fiscal coordination that aims at
stabilising output fluctuations. For an example in the context of EMiJ see Levine (1993).
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VF(t)-2 f {X(ft(t)-ft)zt(i-X)(f2(t)-fz)zt(d(t)-df)~Qf(d(t)-df)}e-8~`-`~dt (29)
~
where X denotes the weight in the cooperative loss function that is attached to the
welfare losses of country 1'. We assume symmetric debt tazgets, so that d~d,-d2, and
the matrix weighting these targets is given by QrXQ,t(1-x)QZ. As before, we consider
two cases: the case with open-loop and the case with feedback strategies.
Open-loop strategies
As mentioned eazlier, commitment is often an unrealistic form of strategic policy
interaction. However, it serves as a useful benchmark to evaluate the more realistic
feedback strategies. Moreover, the open-loop concept becomes more attractive in the
case of fiscal cooperation because cooperation typically requires commitment of
governments: if fiscal authorities can commit to a joint policy, they are less likely to
defect from their optimal plans. Alternatively, if policymakers aze able to commit to a
specific policy, they aze more likely to cooperate.
The present value Hamiltonian for the two cooperating fiscal players is defined
as:
HF- 2 [X(fi(t) -.ft)z } (1-X)(Íz(t) -.fz)z } (d(t) -d~)~Q;(d(t) -d;)
t kf[rd(t) t Btfi(t) } B~z(t) - Bmm(t) l
yielding the following first-order conditions,
ft(t) -.ft - ~Bi kf(t)
fz(t) -.fz - 1 X Bz kf(t)





Specifying the costate vector as a lineaz function of debt, ~,~(t)-kftK~d(t), and following
the analytical procedure of Section 3, we find
' This weight could be interpreted as the Nash-bargaining solution of the bargaining problem




With cooperating fiscal players, the feedback coefficients in (6a) become:
ao 1B~k a~ 1B~K1-.fl x 1 I 1- X I f
0 1 i i 1 ia2-f2 1-xBZkf aZ- 1-xB2Kf
(33)
The optimisation problem of the ECB is the same as in Section 3 and if all results aze
inserted into (7), the system is closed by:
I'-rl- 1B1BiKf- 1BZBZKf-BmBmK
x 1-x
c-Blf1 }Baf2 - Bmm - 1B1Bikf-1BZBZkf-BmBmkmx 1-x
(34a)
(34b)
which enables again to carry out numerical simulation of the differential game. For the
case of symmetric countries, numerical simulations reproduce Figure 1, irrespective of
the value of x. This provides the following proposition:
Proposition 2
If policymakers are able to commit to optimal (open-loop) strategies, cooperation
between fiscal authorities exerts no additional effect on the outcomes in the monetary
union.
The proof is found in the appendix. According to Proposition 2, economic
performance in a monetary union is the same with or without fiscal cooperation in case
of open-loop strategies. This increases the relevance of the noncooperative open-loop
equilibrium even though the noncooperative equilibrium may not be an attractive
solution concept if agents have access to a commitment technology. Together with
Proposition 1, Proposition 2 implies that the outcome in a monetary union coincides with
that of national central banks in case of open-loop strategies.
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Feedback Strategies
Fiscal authorities can also be assumed to cooperate but nevertheless pursue a subgame-
perfect strategy against the central bank. If the ECB does the same, its feedback
behaviour is taken into account when fiscal players jointly optimise. The present value
Hamiltonian of the fiscal coalition is given by,
HF - 2 [X(fi(t) -.f i)2 } (1-X)(fz(t) -f2)Z t (d(t) -á,)~Q~(d(t) -d,)
t Á,f[(ri- Bm a,'~) d(t) f Blfl (t) t Ba f'2(t) -Bm a m l
and the first-order conditions are,
,fi(t) -.fi - zBikf(t)
.fz(t) -fz - I1xBi kf(t)
~f- [(sf- r) t amBml ~f(t) -Qf(d(t) -àf)







The optimisation problem of the ECB is identical to Section 4, leading to the optimality
conditions (28) and the system is again closed by (34).
If we continue to assume symmetric countries, the most interesting numerical
simulations involve a symmetric distribution of seigniorage (A-c~-0.5). The dynamics of
debt, fiscal deficits and ECB seigniorage turn out to coincide with those of the feedback
case for a closed economy, as found in Figure 2. This results in the following
proposition, whose proof is found in the appendix:
Proposition 3
Symmetric cooperation (x- 0.5) between the fiscal authorities of two identical countries
that play feedback strategies against a common central bank yields the same outcome as
individual fiscal authorities playing feedback strategies against their individual national
central banks.
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Fiscal cooperation clearly strengthens the strategic position of the fiscal
authorities, thus enabling them to pursue higher fiscal deficits at the cost of higher
inflation, higher debt and slower adjustment in the monetary union. An equally
interesting result is that in case of feedback strategies fiscal cooperation in the monetary
union produces the same outcomes as with individual fiscal authorities interacting with
national central banks. Intuitively, in a monetary union with fiscal coordination both
monetary and fiscal authorities cooperate intemally, thereby effectively creating the same
strategic situation as in a closed economy setting with national monetary and fiscal
policymakers interacting strategically on the problem of debt stabilisation.
4.6 An Asymmetric Monetary Union
Asymmetry in initial government indeótedness
The Maastricht criterion for convergence of national debt requires initial debt-GDP ratios
of at most 60 per cent. Currently only few countries comply with this criterion. What
should one expect if low debt countries such as Germany, France or the UK were to
form a union with high debt countries such as Greece, Italy or Belgium? In order to
provide an answer, we introduce asymmetry in initial debt. In particulaz, country 1 stazts
with a debt to GDP-ratio of 80 per cent while country 2 features an initial debt of 100
per cent of GDP. Both countries continue to feature the same tazgets as well as the same
concern about debt stabilisation.
Since average debt rises in the community, one would expect ECB monetary
policy to be more expansionary than the policy of country 1's central bank. While this is
certainly true in the early yeazs of the union, it no longer holds in the long run. Figure
Sa shows that after 5 yeazs monetary policy of the ECB will become less inflationary
than that of country 1's national central bank.'o
'o The timing of effects, of course, depends on the parameters used for simulation. If the central bank
realistically puts less weight on debt stabilisation, the paths in Figure Sa would cross at a later point in
time. However, if debt targets would be higher, we also find that inflation with the ECB decreases while
inflation with a national central bank may increase over time.
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a) Monetary Policy of Country 1 b) Monetary Policy of Country 2
Figure 5 Feedback Noncooperative Solutions for the ECB (solid) and a National CB (dashed)
The explanation of the long-run effects lies again in the stronger strategic position
of the ECB. Since policy tazgets aze the same as before, monetary policy of the ECB
converges towazds the policy of the ECB in a symmetric union. This reflects the notion
that steady-state outcomes are independent of the initial stock of debt with which
countries enter the monetazy union. Two channels contribute to lower inflation in
country 2. First, the low-debt partner reduces the pressure on the monetazy authority to
inflate, and second, the ECB reduces inflation through its stronger strategic position. The
total effect turns out to be quite large as is shown in Figure Sb.
For fiscal deficits, the outcomes match monetary policy. In particulaz, the
disciplinary effect of the monetary union on the government of country 1 is mitigated
through the inflationazy bias due to the higher debt of country 2. Note, however, that in
Figure 6a fiscal deficits in the monetary union are still lower than if country 1 had its
own national central banlc. Hence, in this case, the disciplinary effect dominates the
revenue effect of higher seigniorage. Figure 6b shows that greater discipline is imposed
on the government of country 2, due to the loss of seigniorage, since, in this case, both
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a) Fiscal Policy of Country 1 b) Fiscal Policy of Country 2
Figure 6 Feedback Noncooperative Solutions for the ECB (solid) and a National CB (dashed)
Debt stabilisation is enhanced in both countries if monetary policy is conducted
by a common central bank. However, money creation initially increases from the
perspective of country 1 and decreases for country 2. Hence country 1 enjoys the
additional benefit of quicker debt stabilisation, which one can see by comparing Figures
7a and 7b.
a) National Debt of Country 1
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b) National Debt of Country 2
Figure 7 Feedback Noncooperative Solutions for the ECB (solid) and a National CB (dashed)
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While a monetary union of countries that are asymmetric in their initial debt
clearly enforces convergence in the high-debt country, the opposite is not necessarily true
for the low-debt country. The relevant comparison is not with the outcome of a
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symmetric union, but rather with the performance of a country employing its own
national monetary authority. The initial loss of price stability in the asymmetric union is
compensated by greater fiscal discipline. Moreover, any differences between countries
are only temporary and vanish in the long run. From this viewpoint, a monetary union
should not hinge on the convergence of initial national debt levels.
Asymmetry in preferences
The second important criterion for convergence concerns fiscal deficits. Here the
Maastricht treaty prescribes at most 3 per cent of GDP (including interest payments),
which most European countries currently exceed. What effects should we expect if
countries with low fiscal deficits such as Germany, Luxembourg, or the Netherlands
were to form a union with high-deficit countries such as Greece, Italy, or Spain?
Obviously, fiscal deficits will rise if governments are less concerned about stabilising
national debt. In order to focus exclusively on this aspect, we look at two countries with
the same levels of initial debt (e.g. Germany and Spain) with asymmetry only in their
target values of debt. In particular, we assume that country 1 targets a value of d,-0.5
while country 2 only wants to reduce debt to dZ-0.7. Alternatively, we could assume
different relative weights of the debt objective since this produces the same qualitative
results. Less discipline of one of the union members will clearly put continuous pressure
on the ECB to pursue high rates of money growth, thus counteracting the disciplinary
effect of the monetary union that we found before with symmetric countries. For country
1 the outcome for our pazameter values is permanently higher inflation as can be seen in
Figure 8a. For country 2, Figure 8b shows that the greater discipline of country 1 as well
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Figure 8 Feedback Noncooperative Solutions for the ECB (solid) and a National CB (dashed)
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Since country 2 cazes less about national debt, the ECB is forced to intervene
with a more expansionary monetary policy. With seigniorage being distributed to both
countries, country 2 wítnesses a positive financial externality. Figure 9a illustrates how a
time-consistent government uses the extra freedom to pursue its own fiscal tazget. This
occurs although country 2 is forced to reduce deficits, as is shown in Figure 9b.
a) Fiscal Policy of Country 1
pó, z 3. e., a.,or~u,:á,.~a.p
b) Fiscal Policy of Country 2
Figure 9 Feedback Noncooperative Solutions for the ECB (solid) and a National CB (dashed)
r
The lack of fiscal discipline is transmitted from country 2 to country 1 through
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the interaction with the ECB. Note that this occurs without a change of preferences.
Casual observance of the time series, on the other hand, would suggest that countries
converge in terms of their fiscal deficits. In particular, country 1 with increased deficíts
seems to have become less disciplined, while country 2 with lower deficits appears more
disciplined after joining the union.
As before, country 1 has the advantage of quicker debt reduction due to the
increase in seigniorage. This is illustrated in Figure 10a. For country 2, the lack of fiscal
discipline and the loss of seigniorage after joining the union not only lead to slower debt
stabilisation, but can actually result in a higher level of debt in the 1'ong run, as is shown
in Figure lOb. The result is divergence of national debt levels as a consequence of
monetary union.
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Figure 10 Feedback Noncooperative Solutions for the ECB (solid) and a National CB (dashed)
Asymmetry in preferences produces differences in adjustment paths that do not
vanish in the long run. The simultaneous interaction with a common monetary authority
not only transfers positive but also negative externalities. Moreover, it can also enhance
the divergence of debt. Since fiscal deficits are the control variables of the fiscal players,
they provide good indicators for the underlying preferences of these players. Due to the
externalities, however, these indicators lose their validity once the monetary union has
been formed.
Conclusion
Is it likely that the European Central Bank will become a common exploitable property
which undisciplined governments will seek to abuse to monetise their outstanding
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national debts, as many have azgued? To answer this question, we extended the Tabellini
(1986) framework which analyses the strategic interaction of national monetary and
fiscal policy through the dynamic government budget constraint, to a setting with
national fiscal authorities interacting with a common central bank. In a differential debt
stabilisation game with alternatively a ECB or two national central banks, we analysed
the dynamics of government debt, primary fiscal deficits and money creation, viz.
inflation. In this way it was possible to study the effects of moving from a setting with
national monetary policy to a setting with a monetary union and a common central bank
as in the EMU.
If policymakers aze able commit their optimal strategies, we showed that
switching from a national to a common central bank does not affect policies in a
symmetric union. However, if policymakers behave in a subgame-perfect manner and
implement feedback strategies, which is often considered to be more realistic, the
introduction of a monetary union has noticeable strategic consequences. In particular, the
relative strategic position of the common central bank strengthens as the individual fiscal
players lose power due to their diminished relative economic size. Consequently, with a
monetary union fiscal policy absorb a relatively lazger share of the adjustment burden
from stabilising government debt than with national monetary policy. Hence, fiscal
policy is more disciplined with a monetary union than with national central banks.
Fiscal authorities were shown to regain the power they wielded with national
central banks if they cooperate with each other. Compared to the equilibrium without
fiscal cooperation, debt slows down while inflation and fiscal deficits rise, in case of
feedback strategies. Fiscal cooperation thus results in less disciplined monetary and fiscal
policies. This suggests that, if one is interested in disciplined policies, a monetary union
might be given a better start if it is not immediately accompanied by a political union.
If only for strategic reasons, our analysis suggests that the fear of an exploitable
common central bank is unfounded. On the contrary, a monetary union strengthens the
position of monetary authorities. As long as fiscal authorities do not cooperate, the
strong monetary authority is in a better position to enforce fiscal discipline. Our two-
country analysis can be extended in various directions. For example, the ECB could be
concerned about the average deviation of debt rather than the deviation of average debt.
With Qm specified accordingly, the monetary authority reacts to distribution of debt, with
the logical consequence that monetary policy is no longer independent of the seigniorage
distribution. However, if seigniorage is distributed according to economic size (i.e. 0-w),
all other results characterised in Propositions 1-3 remain valid.
Examining the Maastricht convergence criteria, we found that the nature of the
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asymmetry between countries has important implications for strategic interactions within
a monetary union. In par[icular, if countries differ only in their stocks of initial debt,
inflation rises only temporazily in the low-debt country. The disciplinary effect of the
monetary union eventually results in a monetary union that is even more restrictive than
it would have been in the low-debt country if it had remained outside of the union.
Furthermore, the temporary increase in seigniorage allows the low-debt country a quicker
stabilisation of debt. The high-debt country experiences lower inflation and deficits, and
quicker debt stabilisation. If union members feature asymmetric preferences, a common
central bank affects policy permanently. In pazticular, the least disciplined government
collects less seigniorage due not to only the more disciplined fiscal partner but also the
stronger strategic position of the monetary authorities in a monetary union. For the more
disciplined country, we verify all feazs in the political discussion: inflation as well as
fiscal deficits rise and, in addition, national debt levels diverge.
Our analysis implies, therefore, that convergence criteria should focus on control
rather than state variables. State variables are a measure of past performance, while
control variables indicate current and future performance. Hence, convergence of debt-
levels is not as critical for the success of a monetary union as convergence of fiscal
deficits and inflation. The policy implications of these results are quite clear. From a
strategic perspective, Ireland, for example with a debt-GDP ratio of close to 90 per cent
but fiscal deficits of under 3 per cent of GDP is in a better position to join a monetary
union than, for example France or the UK with debt levels between 50 and 60 per cent
of GDP, but with fiscal deficits of azound 6 per cent. The fact that inflation in France
and the UK is currently lower than in Ireland also indicates that higher deficits in the
former countries are a consequence of fiscal preferences rather than accommodating
monetary policy. Compazed to debt levels, fiscal deficits differ less across European




Proof of Lemma I:
In the lemma we assume that both fiscal authorities put the same weight on the stabilisation of national
debt (i.e. Q,"-QzZZ-q and Q,32-Q2"-0), while the debt preferences of the ECB are characterised by (4). In
order for monetary policy to be independent of the distribution of seigniorage, a~ and a~, must be
independent of A. We have assumed that monetary policy reacts to the weighted average of debt in the
union. With a~,-mtBm'k,~ and a'-B,~'KT, the vector k,~ and the matrix KT must have the structure,
k -~f ~ 1 K -xf wZ ~(1-~)J
~ Ill-c~J ~ Lc,i(1-~) (I-w)x
(A.1)
Figure la shows that the debt of a country adjusts quicker and to a lower steady-steady level, the higher a
country's shaze of seigniorage is. This implies that I' is dependent on 6. The influence of 6 must, however,




After substituting K,~ and I" into (17a), we obtain
K-







~~ ~z e e(1-~)
K~ K' (r-y~~-(Ytx) ~ (A.4)
K21 K~ - (I-e)~ 1-e
I-~
Since we have assumed symmetric matrices Q, and Q2, we can use the last result with either version of
(13a) in order to derive the two equations
q-(óf- r- y~ (r - y~ (A.Sa)
(a~-r-y)K-Y (Y t2Yo - a~i (A.Sb)
From the other equations of (13a) we find K,~'-K,22-KZ"-Ki"-0. With (A.3), ( A.Sa) and (A.Sb) we have
three non-linear equations which determine the three parameters x, y and yo which are all independent of
e.
From (A.Sa) we obtain
Ya-2la,t ajt4l9-Kaf-r)ll (A.6)
which is one of the eigenvalues of I'. Stability of the dynamic system requires the trace of I' to be negative
and its determinant to be positive. Thus, according to (A.2), the conditions 2yo~0 and ya(y-tyy0 must
hold. Note that our parameter specifications allow us to ignore complex solutions.
If we make use of our assumption that fiscal authorities and the ECB share the same rate of time
1-e
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preference (i.e. STS~;S), we can use ( A.3) in order to rewrite (A.Sb) as
t -Y(Y'2Yo-a)
7'hus, only a negative value of y satisfies the stability condition:
Y--ZI(2ya-b)t (2yo-b)Zt4r]~0






which is the second eigenvalue of I'. Hence, in order to ensure stability, we must choose the negative
solution for yo in eq.(A.6) above. Eq.(A.3) implies K~0 if S„~r, as we have assumed. Thus, if we postulate
stability of the dynamic system, the time paths of all variables aze unique, as there is only one stable
solution to the above equations.
Now we apply the assumed structure of k~, in (A.l) to eq.(17.b) and obtain
(ó~ -r)xo t r [~ á~~ t ( 1-w)diii2] - x [~c~ t (1-~)c2] (A.10)
Eq.(19) can be separated into the two equations
eci -f~ - ~(m t xo) - kii (A.11 a)
I-9 (A.lib)
c2-f2-1-~(m}~-kzx
which together yield the weighted average
[~c~ t (1-~)c2] -[~f~ t (1-w)f2] -(m t x~ - [~k~i t (1-~)k~]






If this result is substituted into (A.12), one finds
[bfYo-y-x][~clt(1-w)cZ]-íaf r)[~f~t(1-c.r)fZ]-(ój r)(mtx~rq[md~lt(1-w~2] (A.14)
Eqs.(A.10) and ( A.14) yield unique solutions for Ko and [~uc,t(1-w)cz] which are independent of 9. If we
solve ( A.l la) for k,,, substitute this into eq.(13b) for fiscal player l, and use the solution of K, from (A.4),
we obtain
(b -r)f 9d -( b -y c 8 (b - r)(m (Y K)[c~c t 1-~ c
} (A.15)f ~t ~~ f ~ lt ~{ J t~pÍ- ' ~( ) 2l
which we can rearrange to solve for c,. Analogously, we can derive a solution for cZ by using (A.116).
This shows that the vector c has the structure
e
ca~ ~ (A.16)c- tc
c~ 1-9
1-~
in which co, and c~ and c are parameters that are independent of 6. Finally, by substituting these results
into (A.l la) and (A.i lb), we can derive the solutions for k„ and lc12,
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with the parameters Ic~„ Ic~, and k independent ofA. From eq.(13b) we also obtain the last two ccefficients,
k,ZkZ,-O. O
Proof of Lemma 2:
Average debt can be derived with the help of the general solution given in eq.(9). To determine steady-
state debt, the solution for I' in (A.2) is needed whose inverse equals,
1-0 -81-~
P"~ -IIt Y ~ (A.IB)
YotY Yo(Yo'Y) -(1-9)1 ~ e
If (A.18) is substituted into (8) together with c taken from (A.I6), we obtain,
(1-e)co, -e (1-~)~~
d' - -I'-' c - -1c - Y ~ (A.19)
Yp'Y Yo(Yo'Y) -(1-6) ~ coitAc~(1-co)
Next, we write the adjustment matrix I' in eq.(A.2) as I'-XAX-', with A being the diagonal matrix of
ya 0
eigenvalues, A- and X the matrix of eigenvectors, X- ~ ~(1-g) . This enables to
0 Yo}Y 1-c,~ (1-~)9
write weighted average debt as:






From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that ya, y and [cuc,t(1-w)c2] are independent of 0. Thus average
debt will also be independent of 6. O
Proof of Proposition 1:
We impose the assumption of complete symmetry in the open-loop solutions for I' and c and set 0-ru. 1'his
results in identical levels of debt, which follow the same time path as average debt in (A.20):
d~(t)-d~(0)etro'r~r- ~' [1-etr"~r"] i-1,2 (A.21)
Yo'Y
where c,-cz and d,(0)-d2(0). For symmetric countries, all parameters in the above equation aze
independent of tu, as one can verify from the proof in Lemma 1. Thus, the dynamic equation holds for all
values of ru and, in particular, for cu-1, which characterises the closed economy. If we use this result to
calculate the optimal fiscal deficits, we see that the time paths for the separate countries and the aggregate
of both countries are identical. Finally, since the equation for individual debt is identical to the equation of
1 1
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average debt, regardless of the value of 6, the open-loop policies of the national and the common central
bank are identical. O
Proof of Proposition 2:
If open-loop outcomes are the same with or without fiscal cooperation, then this should be revealed in the
matrices Kr Km and I', as well as in the vectors kh km and c. If Km and r have the same values with or
without cooperation, the fiscal authorities' optimality condition (32a) is satisfied if Kj-xK,f(1-x)KZ,
because then eq.(32a) can be written as,
(óf-r)[xK, t(I-x)Kl] - [xQ, t(I-x)Q2] -[xK, t(I-x)K2]r (A.2z)
If K, and KZ satisfy the non-cooperative optimality conditions ( 13a), they will also satisfy the equation
above.
From the proof of Lemma 1 we know that K,Z'-K,ZZ-K2"-K2'Z-O. Thus implies,
zBiBiKjt I1xBzBxKj-B~BiK~}BZBzKx (A.23)
which shows that K, and K, also satisfy eq.(34a). With analogous reasoning and the fact that k,ZkZ,-O for
the non-cooperative open-loop case, k, and kZ will satisfy (326) and (34b) if
kj-Xk~ t(I-x)~ (A.24)
and km and c are the same with or without cooperation. O
Proof of Proposition 3:
We assume identical countries that are of the same size (w-0.5), an equal distribution of seigniorage
(8-0.5) and symmetric gains from cooperation (x-0.5). In that case the matrices K~ Km and r are
symmetric, so that Kj'-K~ 1, Kj ~-Kj', r"-r32 and r"-r~'. Since the ECB does not distinguish between
countries Km"-Km1d-Km'Z-K Z'.With the help of (346) we can write the first fiscal optimality condition
(37a) as,
[8J,l-r~-2K1B1Bi -2K~BZB2]Kj-KfI'-Qf








Summation over the first two equations yields,




Given the symmetry of K~ we can define a scalar parameter Kf which is defined by, ~fzKrK~'fKj Z
-Kj'tKjZtK~'tKj `-K~ ZtKj Z. Analogously, the symmetry of r implies that we can define a scalar
pazameter i' by Ï'-I'"tr'j-r21tr22-r" trZ'-r"trZ2. If we substitute K~ and i' into eq.(A.27), this reduces to
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dfKf-2Í'ÍCf-Kj -9 (A.28)
For the ECB, the optimality condition (28a) can be decomposed into the four equations,
óm K~' - I'i
iK,;,' -I'irKm~ -(K~1 tK~l )2 - P"K„~~ -1`x'Km2 - 4 i
ámKmz-I'~~KmZ-I's~K~
-(KmZ'K~2)(K„','tKm')-I'~ZK„~,'-I`~K,'p2-át
SmK~' -P~ZKmI -I~KmI -(K~ZtK~)(K~~'Kml) -I'ttK~' -Ia~K~Z- á c
ó m Km - NZKm2 - I'ZZK~ -(K,'~Z tK~z3)2 - P12K~' - I~K,~ - 4 s
Given the structure of Km, we can define a scalar parameter Km which is defined by,
1K -Kii-Kiz-Kzi-Kzz
4 in ~n ~n w m
so that any of the four equations above can be reduced to,
(A.29)
(A.30)
ó,~ K~ -2i'ff,~ - Km - s (A.31)
From (34a) we obtain the four separate equations,
r~ ~ - r -2Kj 1- (K~''K~')
I'~2 - - 2K12 - (K,~2 tKm~Í
I`2' - - 2Kl' - (K~~ `K~1)
IQ2 -r -2KjZ - (K~ZtK~
The sum over the first two equations yields,
(I'ii tP12) - r -2(Kt' tKj ~ - (Km~ tKm~ - (Kmz'Km~




Next we decompose (37b) into two equations, and due to the assumption of symmetry, we can define the
scalar parameters k~2kn-2k~„ e-c,-cz and djdn-dn, so that either of the two equations of (37b) can be
written as,
ó~cf-rk~-K~cftqa~-K~c (A.35)
If we decompose the second optimality condition of the ECB, eq.(28b), and define k,~2km,-2kmz and
d-d ,-dnrz, either of the two equations becomes,
ó,~~,~ - i'~,~ -K~mft s~~ -K,~c (A.36)
Finally, the definition ff, jz lets us write either equation of (34b) as
c -f -m -~Ct-~C~ (A.37)
Thus the solutions for the matrices K~, K,~ and I' and the solutions for the vectors k~, k~, and c can be
reduced to the siz scalars lC~, ÍC,~, i', kr , km and c, which solve the six equations (A.28), (A.31), (A.34)-
(A.36). These, however, are just the optimality conditions of the feedback game between monetary and
fiscal players in case of national monetary policy, as one can verify by setting 0-u~-1 in the equations of
section 4. O
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Chapter 5
Output Stabilisation in the EMU: is there a Case for an EFTS? '
Introduction
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is likely to induce static and dynamic efficiency gains
for the participating countries. The European Commission (1990) studied in detail the possible
gains from EMU in its "One Market, One Money" study. On the other hand, in the EMU,
when completed, national policymakers are limited in their ability to actively stabilise output
fluctuations in their economies induced by macroeconomic shocks. A monetary union implies
that individual monetary policy is replaced by the common monetary policy of the ECB. Common
monetary policy can be directed to stabilise symmetric, that is, EMU-wide shocks but can
not be directed at stabilising asymmetric, that is, country specific shocks. In particular, EMU
implies the loss of the possibility to adjust the nominal exchange rate in case members experience
asymmetric shocks. Loss of the exchange rate instrument as a shock absorber is potentially
harmful if the countries that join the EMU do not constitute an'optimal currency area'.
Countries are less likely to form an optimal currency area if macroeconomic shocks
are predominantly asymmetric, nominal rigidities prevail in the short run, labour mobility
is low and automatic stabilisation from federal taxes and government spendíng is low. A
considerable empirical literature on the degree to which macroeconomic shocks in the EU
are predominantly symmetric or asymmetric, exists currently. Studies by Weber (1991), Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1993), Bayoumi and Prassad (1995) and Christodoulakis, Dimelis and
Kollintzas (1995) suggest that asymmetric shocks are fairly important in most countries of
the European Union (EU). Decressin and Fatás (1995) analyse labour mobility in the US and
the EU and find evidence that labour mobility is considerably smaller in the EU than in the
US. Finally, a number of studies analysed the automatic stabilisation from federal taxes and
government spending. Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1991), von Hagen (1991) and Goodhart and
Smith (1993) show that this automatic stabilisation is considerable in mature federations like
the US and Canada. Because of the current small size of the federal EU budget (about 1.30~0
of EU GDP), such automatic stabilisation from federal taxes and government spending is
currently fairly small in the EU. The significance of asymmetric shocks, limited labour mobility
' This chapter is the outcome of a joint research project with Svend-Erik Hougaard Jensen and has appeared
as CentER Discussion Paper 9677. We thank Richard Nahuis and ]an Lemmen for comments on this chapter.
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and low automatic stabilisation from federal taxes and government expenditures cast doubts
whether the EU is actually an optimal currency area.
EMU, therefore, is likely to shoulder the national fiscal authorities with a higher
adjustment burden from stabilising output fluctuations. The scope for national fiscal policies
to stabilise business cycle fluctuations will be limited in the EMU, however, if rigid fiscal
stringency and convergence criteria are imposed. Moreover, the increasing integration of goods,
labour and capital markets makes tax bases more mobile w.r.t. increases in the tax rates and
increases the spillovers in case of uncoordinated fiscal policies.
Hughes Hallett and Vines (1993) compare economic performance ofEMU with a regime
of floating exchange rates, using simulation tools. It is pointed out that EMU, compared to
flexible exchange rates, performs poorly when hitby asymmetric shocks, featuring an independent
ECB and low fiscal policy flexibility and lacking fiscal coordination. Jensen and Jensen (1995)
analyse the costs in terms of foregone output from complying with the convergence criteria
of the Maastricht Treaty for a small EU country.
This paper focuses on stabilisation policies in an EMU confronted with symmetric
and asymmetric shocks. We consider a system of fiscal transfers that aims at stabilising
asymmetric shocks in the EMU. In case of asymmetric shocks, such a transfer system might
act as a substitute for the shock-absorbing capacity ofexchange rate realignments like in the
EMS and for the automatic stabilising role of federal government spending and taxation that
occurs in mature fiscal federations. It is shown how such a European System of Fiscal Transfers
(EFTS) can increase macroeconomic efficiency in the monetary union by providing the
participating countries cushion against asymmetric shocks. Such a transfer system was advocated
by van der Ploeg (1991) who suggested to supplement the Maastricht Treaty on EMU with
an EFTS aiming at counteracting the consequences of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks
in a monetary union. While some work has been developed on such an EFTS, notably by
Italianer and van Heukelen (1993) and von Hagen and Hammond (1995), the full implications
of such a system have remained largely unexplored.
Section 2 introduces a stylized two-country EMU model that will serve as our analytical
device. A system of fiscal transfers that aims at stabilising differences in business cycle
fluctuations in the EU is proposed. Section 3 solves the model and derives its analytical
properties. In section 4 numerical simulation of the model is used to study the dynamic
adjustment in the EMU afrer symmetric and asymmetric output shocks.
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5.2 A two-Country EMU model
Consider an EMU that consists of two countries. Assume that the economies ofboth countries
aze given as follows,
Table 1
A two-Country EMU Model
Country 1
(la) y(t) - ac(t) - yr(t) f oy'(t) t rls(t) t v(t)
(2a) m(t) -p `(t) -xy(t) -,li(t)
(3a) c(r) -p'(t) -P(t)
(~) i(t) - Kt) tP `
(Sa) P `(t) - 4tP(t) } (1-F~)P ~(t)




(lb) y'(t) --ac(t) -yr'(t) toy(t) tqs'(t) t v'(t)
(2b) m'(t) -p"(t) -xy'(t) - ~,i(t)
(3b) c(t) -p'(t) -p(t)
(4b) i(t)-r'(t)tp"
(Sb) p`?(t) - gP'(t) } (1-4t)P(t)
(66) s'(t) -f'(t) -n(t)
á
(7b) p'(t) - ó f w'(t)e - at`"-`l dt
~ p - ó (~t) -P(t))
(8a) w(t) - ó E~f{p(t) t vy(t) }e -ac:-~ddt
~o
~ w - ó(w(t) -P(t) - vY(t))




~ w' - ó(w'(t) -P t (t) - vY ~(t))
where y(t) denotes real output at time t, c(t) competitiveness of country 1 vis-à-vis country
2, m(t) nominal money balances, p(t) the domestic output price level, p`(t) the consumer price
level and w(t) the nominal wage. i(t) and r(t) are the nominal and real interest rates. s(t) is
an index of the fiscal stance. The variables of the second country aze indicated with an asterisk.
Variables aze in logazithms and defined as deviations from their long term non inflationary,
balanced growth path Z. The policy reaction functions that are given by (9)-(11) and explained
2 See OECD (1995) for recent estimates of the NAIRU in the EU. Jaeger and Parkinson (1994) investigate
the presence of"hysteresis" in unemployment due to interaction between the NAIRU and cyclical unemployment.
The European unemployment is to a considerable extent a structural unemployment problem rather than the
cyclical unemployment that we consider here. See European Commission (1995) for the breakdown of European
unemployment into structural and cyclical parts. The OECD (1994) Jobs Study analyses the unemployment
problem in the OECD countries in great detail.
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later on, close the model. To solve the model later on in an insightful manner it is assumed
that the countries do not differ w.r.t. the structural parameters that feature in (1)-(9).
(1) gives aggregate demand as a function of competitiveness, the real interest rate,
foreign output, fiscal policy and demand shocks that hit the economy. u(t) is an aggregate
demand shock that hits the economy: it impacts the economy at t-0, aRer which it decays
exponentially: u(t)-u(0)e-P`. p measures how long the shock impacts upon the economy.
If p equals zero, the shock is permanent while if p is positive, the shock has
some persistence but dies out gradually. In the limiting case where p goes to
infinity, the shock dies out instantaneously.
The demand for the common currency is given by (2). The EU-wide nominal
interest rate, i(t), clears the European money mazket. The supply of the common currency
is controlled by the ECB. Monetary policy of the ECB and its impact on macroeconomic
performance is considered in the next section. (3) defines the competitiveness of country 1
vis-à-vis country 2 as the difference of output prices 3. (4) and (5) define the nominal
interest rate and the consumer price level which is a weighted average of the price level of
domestic and foreign goods. The fiscal stance (6) is defined as the real fiscal deficit, J(t),
plus the net real fiscal transfer from country 2 to country 1, n(t), as a consequence of the
EFTS.
(7) and (8) describe the price and wage formation process in the presence of staggered
price and wage contracts of the type introduced by Taylor (1980a) and Calvo (1983). In case
of staggered contracts only a fraction, S, of all nominal contracts are renewed in a period.
The average length of a contract, therefore, equals 1~5. (7) determines the price level as a
weighted average of all outstanding wage contracts, implying that the price level is a
predetermined variable and the economy displays Keynesian price-stickiness in the short run.
Differentiating w.r.t. time gives the rate of inflation as a function of the real wage'. Wages
' With flexible exchange rates competitiveness is measured by the real exchange rate which is defined as
c-e(t)}p'(t)-p(t) in which e(t) denotes the nominal exchange rate between country 1 and 2. Normalising, the
final conversion rate, E(r), to 1 implies that the real exchange rate, c(t)-p'(t)-p(t), since e(t)-1n(E(t)~0, in that
case. The choice of the final conversion rates of national currencies to the new common currency is by no means
a trivial issue in practice, as the analysis of Giovannini (1992) shows.
" Differentiating (7) and (8) w.r.t. time gives:
p-8(-8 fw(c)e-au-~)dT.x,(t))-ó(w(t)-P(t))
w - 8 ( 8f {P(t) t (3Y(z)}e -ect-r)di -P(t) - aYít) ) - 8 (w(t) -P(t) - (3Y(t))
r
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in (8) equal the weighted average of expected future prices and excess demand. Nominal
wages aze forwazd looking and changes instantaneously upon the arrival of new information.
E, denotes the expectations operator. Since in this analysis output shocks aze deterministic
rather than stochastic, the assumption of rational expectations of the wage setters implies
perfect foresight and we can disregazd the expectations operator.
Staggered wage and price setting gives rise to nominal rigidities in the economy and
unemployment persistence if the economy is hit by a negative output shock. From a policy
perspective, the nominal rigidities create a Phillips curve alike trade-off between price and
output stability, in the short run 5. S reflects the institutional rigidities that limit the adjustment
of prices in goods and labour markets. A higher value of S implies that a higher fraction of
outstanding wage contract renews instantaneously. In that case, the higher price and wage
flexibility dampens business cycle fluctuationsb. Note, finally, that the forward-looking character
of nominal wages implies that (anticipated) macroeconomic policies affect the behaviour of
wages by altering the expectations on future prices and excess demand.
The analysis abstains from modelling the interaction of the EU and the rest of the
world explicitly and treats the EU as a more or less closed economy. To some extent this
simplification might be defended by the empirical observation that in case of most EU countries
intra-EU trade dominates extra-EU trade to a large extent'. The impact of changes in the
world economy on the EU might take the form of an output shock v,{t) in thís analysis. A
decline in competitiveness of the EU economy in world trade then might be represented as
a negative output shock. See the European Commission (1990), Chapter 6 and Kenen (1993)
on the external dimensions and implications of EMU.
Throughout the analysis we will assume that the structural model pazazneters coincide
in both countries and that the countries are of equal size, simplifying assumptions that are
5 See Taylor (1980b) for an empirical analysis of staggered contracts and the output inflation trade-off.
6 The European Commission (1990) recognises the importance of a higher degree of price and wage flexibility:
"(..) it is worth mentioning here that wage-price flexibility remains the basic adjustment channel as a substitute
for the nominal exchange rate. (..) However, in so far as nominal rigidities hamper market adjustments, fiscal
policy measures can alleviate temporary country-specific disequilibria.This is indeed the traditional role of fiscal
policy as a tool for stabilisation." (p.102)
' See van Aarle (1996) for an empirical analysis of intra-EU trade and foreign direct investment. It is found
that in 1980 55.70"~0 of total exports of the EU 12 countries had other countries in the EU 12 as destination.
In 1994 this number had increased to 63.34"~0, indicating at increasing integration of goods markets in the EU.
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useful in deriving macroeconomic equilibrium of the two-country EMU a. We assume,
furthermore, that national fiscal policies aze aimed at stabilising national business cycle
fluctuations, apart from an exogenous component, f:
.tit) -f - x (y(t) -7
f'(t) -f' -xC~'(t) -y7
(9a)
(9b)
(9) implies that the fiscal deficit is increased if the economy is in recession and decreased
if output is above the tazgeted level of output, y. viz. y. Fiscal policies affect the economy
because of their influence on aggregate demand (1).
Consider next the introduction of a system of fiscal transfers (EFTS) that is designed
to alleviate the adjustment burden ofasymmetric shocks in a monetazy union. Its basic working
is summarised as follows by van der Ploeg (1991), p. 144:
"The task of the EFTS is to make exchange-rate changes unnecessary by transferring
income from one country to another country when there are such shifts inpreferences
[i.e. asymmetric shocksJ. Inpractice, the scheme operates by transferring income from
individuals of one nation to individuals of another nation and replaces, to a certain
extent, the national unemployment compensation schemes. One could envisage a
Community-wide tax, which in itselfwould act as anautomatic stabiliser, whose proceeds
are used to frnance a Community-wide unemployment compensation scheme. It is crucial
that such a version of the EFTS is budget-neutral. (..) It is apity that the Delors report
does not contain any recommendations for the establishment ofa EFTS, because without
it regional imbalances induced by shifts in preferences may persist. "
von Hagen and Hammond (1995) construct an insurance based system offiscal transfers
and investigate a number of desirable properties of such a system. The stabilisation scheme
considered in this paper is slightly different from the system of von Hagen and Hammond
(1995): it acts as an automatic output stabiliser rather than directly offsetting asymmetric
shocks like in von Hagen and Hammond. More specifically, it automatically transfers resources
from countries experiencing a boom to countries that suffer from recession:
` If both countries differ in their structural parameters the adjustment processes in both economies will
differ even when hit by the same symmetric macroeconomic shock. In that case it becomes difficult, if not
impossible, to determine how much of the outcomes are due to the fact that countries differ in their structural
parameters and how much is due to the symmetric and asymmetric macroeconomic shocks themselves.
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n(t) - ~ (Y ~(t)-Y(t))
(10)
The transfer system 9 aims at stabilising the divergence in the business cycles ofboth countries
and does not affect the business cycle of the aggregate EU economy that is only affected
by ECB monetary policy and average fiscal policy in the EU'o. (10) has the considerable
advantage for the policymakers that there is no need to estimate the actual size of the asymmetric
macroeconomic shocks. A disadvantage in practice could be that countries might have a strategic
incentive to reduce their own stabilisation effort in the knowledge that this lack of activism -
implying a low value of x- will be partly compensated by higher fiscal transfers from the
EFTS. In our analysis we will abstract from such strategic considerations.
5.3 EMU Averages and Differences
To solve the model we use the Aoki factorization of the variables into averages and differences.
Assuming both countries to be of equal size, averages of a variable aze defined as
x,,(t)-'h(x(t)fx~`(t)) and differences as xo(t)-x(t)-x~`(t). The individual country variables,
consequently, are defined as x(t)-xA(t)f'?zxo(t) and x~`(t)-x,,(t)-'hxo(t). This method has the
advantage that dynamics are decomposed into two independent dynamic sub-systems: an average
system that gives the dynamics of the aggregate EU economy and a difference system that
describes differences between the two countries. Thus, the average system is particularly suited
to study macroeconomic vaziables at the level of the aggregate EU economy, whereas the
difference system is suited to address issues of macroeconomic convergence between both
parts of the EU. Moreover, it has the nice property that macroeconomic shocks aze decomposed
into the part that is completely symmetric, the shocks found in the average system, and a
part that is completely asymmetric, the shocks found in the difference system.
The (average) money supply in the monetary union, m,,(t), is controlled by the European
Central Bank. The transmission channel of ECB monetary policy is the EU wide interest rate:
expansionary monetary policy induces a lower nominal interest rate to restore money mazket
' In the context of our two-country EMU model, the transfer system of von Hagen and Hammond might
be defined as: n(t)--~uo(t), implying that a negative asymmetric supply shock in country 1, i.e. uo(t)~0, will
be counteracted by an automatic fiscal transfer from country 2 to country 1.
'o Note that the transfer system aims at stabilisation rather than redistribution since output is defined in
terms of deviations from a long-run balanced growth equilibrium. Redistribution essentially aims at reducing
disparities in long-run equilibrium output (per capita). On allocational and redistributive dimensions of fiscal
transfers in the EU see in particular European Commission (1993).
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equilibrium (2). Since prices are sticky in the short run, the decrease of the nominal interest
rate implies a decrease in the real interest rate which boosts output (1) in the short run. We
assume that monetary policy of the ECB is also set according to a lineaz feedback rule:
m,t(t) - m~ - ~Cy~(t) -YA)
where mA denotes some exogenous, possibly zero money supply tazget. ( I 1) implies that the
money supply is expanded if output is below the targeted level of output, y,,. The resulting
decrease in nominal and real interest rates boosts output in the short run.
r; could be interpreted as a measure ofconservativeness and independence of the ECB:
a value of ~ of zero would amount to an ultra conservativelindependent ECB that only sticks
to its monetary tazget under all circumstances. A more conservative ECB implies that the
fiscal authorities, however, aze facing a higher adjustment burden if symmetric shocks hit
the EU economy. A combination of a conservative ECB and strict fiscal stringency criteria,
implying low values of r; and x leaves the EU economy without effective automatic stabilisation
if symmetric shocks occur. This will lead to suboptimal average economic performance, in
particular ifnominal rigidities are considerable in the short run. Prevalence of the price stability
objective in ECB monetary policy is proclaimed in the Maastricht Treaty although monetary
policies are allowed to foster real economic performance, as long as it does not interfere with
the price stability objective. A strict interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty would amount
to a zero or at least small value of the feedback parameters ~ and x. Given the stabilising
impact of ECB monetary policy on EU aggregate output, at least in the short run because
of the nominal rigidities, it cannot be ruled out that in practice the ECB will pursue policies
that are geared to stabilise to some extent fluctuations of the real aggregate EU economy.
In that case ~ is lazger than zero ".
We can distinguish two alternative institutional settings of EMU: (i) if~-x-~-0, there
is no automatic stabilisation from ECB monetary policy, national fiscal policies or an EFTS.
This regime might be interpreted as the regime envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty, stressing
the dedication of the ECB to price stability, the need for fiscal stringency and the absence
of fiscal bail-out of individual countries by fiscal transfers. (ii) a regime with ~,x,~~0 that
" While certainly interesting because of the interdependencies and extemalities in the EMU, the current
analysis does not consider the strategic interaction that might occur between the ECB and national fiscal authorities.
It is clear that coordination of fiscal policies by both countries or even coordination of monetary and fiscal
policies can be helpful in alleviating the adjustment from symmetric and asymmetric shocks in the EMU. Indeed,
the EC Commission (1990) considers coordination, with autonomy and discipline the three main components
of the budgetary regime in the EMU (p. l13).
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recognizes the inefficiencies that can arise in a monetazy union with the aforementioned policy
assignment ifmacroeconomic shocks are predominantly asymmetric, labour mobility, price
and wage flexibility aze low and if there is little automatic stabilisation from federal expenditures
and taxation.
Table 2 provides the average and difference systems that can be derived from (1)-(11).
Table 2
Average and Difference Systems of the two-Country EMU Model
Average system
(lc) YA(t) --Yr(t) toYA(t) tnSA(t) f UA(t)
(2c) m(t)-p~(t)-KyA(t)-,ti(t)




(7C) pA(t) - Ó fWA(t) E-b~t -`~ ÁI
~ PA - ó (wA(t) -PA(t))
Difference system
(1~ Yn(t) -2ac(t) -Yrn(t) -aYn(t) tnsn(t)tUD(t)
(2~ mD(t) -PD(t) - xYD(t)
(3~ c(t) - - pD(t)
(4~ rD(t) - - p
~
(5~ Pn(t)-(2W-1)PD(t)
(ÓC~Í SD(t) -ÏD(t) t 2z(t)
~o
(~d1 PD(t)-8 f wD(t)e-8~`"-`~dt
~ PD - 8 (wp(t) -Pp(t))
(8c) wA(t) - ó Er,l {PA(t) t ~YA(t)}e
-aa-~ddt
~o
~ wA - ó(wA(t) -PA(t) - ~YA(t))
(9c) .fA(t) -.fA - XCYA(t) -YA)
(11) mA(t) - mA - ~~A(t) -YA)
(8~ wD(t) - 8 E~f {Pn(t) t V yD(t)}Q bU `ddt
~
' wn - ó (wn(t) - PD(t) - "YD(t))
(9~ .fn(t) -.fn - X(Yn(t) -Yo)
(lo) n(t) - -~YD(t)
The average and difference systems provide a good insight into the working of the EU aggregate
economy and factors that create divergences between the two different countries. Intra-EU
imports transmit fluctuations in output, as given by (1), in one part of the EU to the other
part with a propensity 6. Intra-EU trade, therefore, tends to amplify output fluctuations in
the average system and to reduce output fluctuations in the difference system. The relative
competitiveness of country 1 relative to country 2, as defined in (3) does not affect average
output but has a strong distributional impact. Similazly, the EFTS, defined in (10), does not
affect average fiscal stances in (6) but impacts on the difference in fiscal stance and by that
on difference output.
From (1)-(7) and (9)-(11) we can write output in the average and difference systems
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as functions of the price level, wages, structural and policy pazameters and output shocks:





where 0,,-1{y(x~~~,-a~x and Do-1fa~(xt2~). Substituting (12) into (8) gives two dynamic
systems of the price level and the wage rate, the average and difference system:
IW; J - Ai I Wi~t~ J t b t~(t) i E{A,D}
(13)
A;, b„ u,{t) aze found in the Appendix A in (A.6) and (A.11).
The dynamic systems in (13) contain a backwazd-looking vaziable, the price level p,{t)
and a forward-looking variable, the wage rate, w,{t). Saddlepoint stability, therefore, requires
A to have a positive and a negative eigenvalue 'Z. A necessary and sufficient condition for
(13) to display saddlepoint stability is that the determinant of A;, which equals the product
of the eigenvalues, is negative. We can write the adjustment of the dynamic system towazds
its steady-state A in figure 1 as:
P;(t) -(P;(~) -P;(~))e~'~ tP;(~)
w~(t) -(w~(0) - w~(~)) e h'` t w;(~) i E{A,D}
(14)
where h; equals the stable eigenvalue of A;. Steady-state average prices and wages equal:
'Z The eigenvalues aze given by:-~[Trace(A~)t (Trace(A~))~-4Det(A~]where Trace(A~~-vySZl~~,
Trace(Ao~-vyS2(2p-1)l~0, Der(A,~~-vySZl~,, and Det(Aop-2avS'~tso The stable, negative eigenvalue, h„
measures the adjustment speed towards steady state: the adjustment speed, - hb of the dynamic systems is defined
as the absolute value of the stable eigenvalue of A. The adjustment of the system towards steady-state is monotonic
if the discriminant D,-Trace(A,))2-4Det(A,) is positive and oscillatory if it is negative.
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pA(~)-wA(~)-mA} Y [(~ t~1X)YA}T1.fA}uA(~)e '~m]
pD(~) - wD(~) - 2a [ rl (fA } XY~ } up(0) e-aom ]
The initial value of the price level is given because the price level is a predetermined variable.
The initial value of the forward-looking nominal wage follows from the condition that wages
adjust at 1-0 such as to place the dynamic system on its unique saddlepoint stable trajectory
SS along which the economy adjusts to its steady-state. Appendix A derives the unique initial
values w,{0) that satisfy this condition. It is shown that the unique initial level of the average
and difference wage consistent with long-run convergence to the steady-state equals:
wA(Q) - zA}ó pA(Q) } v
S( Y mA }(s~-~rl X)YA } rifA t uA(o) )
S AA íti a, ZA } PA
}S ,,{ u 0
wp(Q) - Z s pp(Q) } Q (~ i~yp }' U p} Z D(P )
D D} D
(16)
in which z; denotes the unstable eigenvalue ofA;. Figure 1 gives the phase diagram that pictures
the dynamics of the average and difference systems (13).
w.,
p; p;
Figure 1 Phase Diagram of the (w,{t),p,{t)) System
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The forward-looking wage rate displays a similar "overshooting" property as the exchange
rate in the Dornbusch (1976) model: the overshooting of the wage rate allows the labour market
to clear in the short run in the presence of price rigidities. An increase at t-0 of the policy
tazgets f or y; e.g. or an unanticipated permanent positive output shock u;(0) imply that the
w;0 locus shifts upwazd to the new w; -0 locus in Figure 2. The wage rate jumps upwards
from A to B on the new stable branch of the dynamic system. From B the system gradually
converges to the new steady-state A' . The initial wage rate overshoots its new long-run






Figure 2 Dynamic Adjustment of Wages and Prices
Because of nominal rigidities in the short run implied by the staggered price and wage contracts,
the average system displays Keynesian features during the adjustment phase: a negative symmetric
shock induces a drop ofoutput which, however, can be counteracted by automatic stabilisation
from monetary and fiscal policy. In the long run, on the other hand, the model displays
neoclassical features with full adjustment of price and wages to ensure that output returns
at its long run (non-inflationary) equilibrium level, which itself is independent of monetary
and fiscal policy. The case for active fiscal stabilisation in the EMiJ of symmetric shocks,
becomes more pressing, if the symmetric shock becomes more prolonged, i.e. ifp gets smaller
and if the degree of price rigidity in the short run increases, i.e S is smaller.
Asymmetric shocks induce a similar adjustment in wages, prices and output in the
difference system. Also the need to stabilise asymmetric shocks gets more pressing if the
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shocks have considerable persistence and if price stickiness is high, i.e. if p and S are small.
Both fiscal flexibility and the EFTS enable to smooth output fluctuations of output in the
difference system when EMLJ is hit by asymmetric shocks. Fiscal flexibility, though, causes
higher steady-state differences in the fiscal deficit whereas EFTS fosters fiscal convergence
in the long run as it partly redistributes the adjustment burden from asymmetric shocks from
the 'unfortunate' to the 'fortunate part' of the EU.
We summarise these possibilities of automatic stabilisation of the average and difference
systems in the following proposition:
Proposition I
(a) Fiscaland monetaryflexibility smoothen fluctuations in average output induced by symmetric
shocks. (b) Fiscalflexibiliry and the EFTS smoothen fluctuations in difference output induced
by asymmetric shocks. (c) In that case the EFTS contributes to smoothen differences in the
fiscal defrcit whereas fiscal flexibility increases the divergence in fiscal deficits.
Proof:
A higher degree of fiscal or monetary flexibility, i.e. a higher value of x or C, increases the
value of zA, the unstable eigenvalue of the average system, if (vyó2)Zt4vyb2
- 2vy8Z - 4~Q
~A ~~A ~A ~
and increases ~A. This implies that the initial jump in the average wage rate after a symmetric
shock, uA(0), that is necessary to bring the economy on the new saddlepath is smaller. This
jump is derived in the appendix as (A.10). From (12) it follows that it also reduces the initial
decline in average output. This results in (a). A higher degree of fiscal flexibility or stabilisation
from the EFTS, i.e. a higher value of x or ~, increases the value of zo, the unstable eigenvalue,
ofthedifferencesystemif (vybZ(2~-1))ZtgvaóZ-2vybZ(2~-1)-8vab2~o,andincreases~D.
~D ~D ~D
This implies that the initial jump in the difference wage rate, wo(0), after an asymmetric shock,
uD(0), that is necessary to bring the economy on the new saddlepath is smaller. This jump
is derived in the appendix as (A.15). From (12) it follows that it also reduces the initial decline
indifference output. This results in (b). Introducing the EFTS increases the degree ofautomatic
stabilisation ofasymmetric shocks. This implies a reduction of the adjustment burden of national
fiscal policies in stabilising the national economy when hit by an asymmetric shock. Therefore
the EFTS fosters the convergence of fiscal deficits. This feature is provided by (c). (]
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Monetary and fiscal flexibility contribute to stabilise the average system when hit by
symmetric shocks. In that case the fiscal deficit and the EU money supply set by the ECB
simply mirror average output fluctuations: average deficits and money supply are set higher
if initial output is lower. A higher degree of fiscal flexibility reduces output fluctuations in
the difference system, however at the cost of higher divergences in the fiscal deficit. The
EFTS also enables to stabilise output fluctuations in the difference systems induced by
asymmetric shocks but has an additional advantage of stabilising the fluctuations in fiscal
deficits in the difference system.
5.4 Numerical Simulations: Symmetric and Asymmetric Shocks in the EMU
Having characterised the analytical solution ofadjustment of the average and difference systems,
we turn to a simulation example to study the macroeconomic adjustment induced by symmetric
and asymmetric shocks that hit the EMU. A distinction is made between a regime (EMU
1) without fiscal flexibility and without an EFTS (x-0 and ~-0), a regime (EMU 2) with
fiscal flexibility but without an EFTS (x-0.5 and i;-0) and finally a regime (EMU 3) without
fiscal flexibility but with an EFTS (x-0 and ~-0.25). Monetary policy of the ECB is assumed
not to be influenced by considerations to stabilise output in any of the three regimes (~-0),
as we are not focusing on monetary policy in the EMU. Table 5 gives the structural and policy
parameters that underlie the simulations.
Table S



























In the initial steady-state that results with this set of structural and policy parameters, all variables
are equal to zero: pÁ(t)-w,,(t) y,,(t)f,,(t)-m,,(t)-0 and pD(t)-wo(t)yD(t)fo(t)-n(t)-0.
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Figure 3 shows the adjustment induced by a symmetric negative output shock of la~o
in the two-country EMU at t-0, i.e. vA(0)--0.01. p takes the value of 0.1, implying that the
shock has considerable persistence. Average output in the EMU declines at the impact of
the symmetric negative demand shock. The nominal wage jumps down to the level consistent
with long-run convergence to the new steady-state. After the initial decrease in output, output
gradually recovers due to the initial decline in real wages. In the second EMU regime, the
stabilising force from fiscal policy also contributes to stabilisation of output in the short run.
The adjustment of prices is very small in this example, reflecting the nominal rigidities in
the economy: with S being equal to 0.33, contracts aze renewed only every 3 yeaz, causing
a high inertia in the prices. Wages and output adjust again to their long run equilibrium of
zero which is approached eventually. Monetary policy does not change of course, since we
assumed m,, and ~ to be equal to 0.
Because ofour symmetry assumption, a symmetric shock has no impact on the difference
system. Therefore, outcomes under a regime with an EFTS but no fiscal flexibility (EMU
3) equal outcomes under the EMU 1 regime without any macroeconomic stabilisers, if a
symmetric output shock hits EMU. The solid lines of the EMU 1 regime coincide, therefore,
in all cases with the dashed lines of the EMU 3 regime. Also we note that, because of the
symmetries that we have imposed, adjustment of macroeconomic variables in both country
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Figure 3
Adjustment after a Symmetric Output Shock (uA(0)--0.01, p-0.1)
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Figure 4 shows the adjustment induced by an asymmetric negative output shock of
lo~o in the 2-country EMU, i.e. v„(0)--0.01. p takes again a value of0.1. Like in the average
system, the wage rate jumps down at the impact of the output shock and gradually recovers
along the saddle-point stable path. The decline in real wages contributes to the gradual recovery
of output. The output divergence in the EMU after an asymmetric shock can be stabilised
by allowing fiscal flexibility as in the EMU 2 regime, or by establishing an EFTS as in the
EMU 3 regime (or introducing both of course). Since we choose x-2~ the effective degree
of stabilisation of output differences is the same in both regimes. An asymmetric shock has
no impact on the average system. The dotted lines of the EMU 2 regime coincide, therefore,
with the dashed lines of the EMU 3 regime, except in case of the fiscal deficit and the EFTS.
Because of the symmetries that we have imposed and the definition ofdifferences ofvariables,
adjustment ofmacroeconomic variables in country 1 identical to the adjustment in the difference
system in Figure 4, whereas adjustment in country 2 exactly mirrors adjustment in country
1: its economy booms and wages jump upward rather than downward, in the EMU 2 regime
it runs fiscal surplus and in the EMU 3 regime it provide a fiscal transfer to country 1.
The EFTS regime not only features output stabilisation but also has the additional
advantage that differences in national fiscal deficits are stabilised as compared to the regime
with fiscal flexibility only, which leads to divergence of fiscal deficits in the EMU. Since
fiscal convergence is stressed in the Maastricht criteria as a fundamental requirement to achieve
nominal and real convergence in the EMU, this seems to be characteristic of the EFTS to
prefer such a transfer system over fiscal flexibility if the EMU faces asymmetric shocks. As
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Adjustment after an Asymmetric Output Shock (uo(0)--0.01, p-0.1)
Output Stabilisation in the EMU: is there a Case for an EFTS? 177
Conclusion
If the countries participating in the EMU do not constitute an optimal currency azea,
macroeconomic performance in the EMU can be seriously affected if it is hit by symmetric
and in particulaz asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. This chapter studied flexibility ofnational
fiscal policies, monetary policy of the ECB and a European Federal Transfer System (EFTS)
as macroeconomic stabilising devices in an EMU hit by symmetric and asymmetric shocks,
featuring nominal rigidities, low labour mobility and little automatic stabilisation from federal
taxes and government spending. The EFTS was defined as an intra-EMU business cycle
stabilising device and did not serve in principle any redistributional or allocational purpose.
With the aid of an analytical model and simulation analysis, this paper showed how
fiscal flexibility stabilises the output fluctuations induced by symmetric and asymmetric shocks.
The EFTS not only stabilises output fluctuations induced by asymmetric shocks but also avoids
the divergence in fiscal deficits that fiscal flexibility creates during the adjustment phase.
Therefore, the EFTS contributes to fiscal convergence in the EMU. Fiscal convergence is
seen by many economists and politicians as anecessary prerequisite for long-run sustainability
of the EMU as witnesses the prominent place of the fiscal stringency criteria in the Maastricht
Treaty.
Fiscal flexibility andlor the EFTS are able to substitute to a certain extent for the loss
of the asymmetric shock absorbing capacity of exchange rate adjustment that EMU implies.
The EFTS to some extent could replicate the degree ofautomatic stabilisation ofmacroeconomic
shocks by federal transfers that is seen in more mature fiscal federations like the US. From
this perspective its implementation in an EMU that does not yet constitute an optimal currency
azea and a mature fiscal federation, deserves serious political consideration.
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Appendix A Initial jump in wages
The {p;(t),w,(t)} systems that describe the dynamics of the average and dífference system are linear dynamic
systems of the form,
l b~ fu`l
s~-A~x~(t)tb;tu;(t) x;-~w'I 6;-6Z u~-lu2l ielA,D}
'] ` J
(A.1)
The average and difference system display saddlepoint stability ifthe number of predetermined variables equals
the number of stable eigenvalues and the number of non-predetermined variables equals the number of unstable
eigenvalues (see e.g. Buiter (1984)). In both cases the price level p;(t) is a predetermined variable whereas the
wage rate w,{t) is forward looking. A necessary and sufficient condition for both systems to display saddlepoint
stability is that the determinant of A; is negative. Given the initial value x{0), the stable eigenvalue, h;, and
the steady state, x;(oo), the solution to (A.l) reads:
x;(t) -(xj(0) -x;(~)) e~'` t x;(~) -x;(0) e~'` t x;(~) (1- e"'`)
The steady-state of the system, x{oo), is found by solving:
x;(~) --A; 1(b~ t u;(0) e-c~~)
(A.2)
(A.3 )
If the dynamic systems are saddlepoint stable, the forward looking variables, i.e. w;(t), will take unique
initial values, w;(0), such that the system is placed on its unique converging dynamic trajectory, given the initial
price level p;(0). The initial value of the forward-looking variables, w;(0), is found by applying the method
proposed by Judd (1982):
- to find an analytical solution of the dynamic system, take the Laplace" transform L[(.),s] of the dynamic
system, .r-Ax(t)tb,tu;(t):
L[i;,s] - A;.L[x;,s] tL[br,s] ~L[u;,s]




- impose the condition that w;(0) adjusts in such a manner that saddlepoint stability of the dynamic system
is ensured, given the initial price level, p;(0). This implies that L[b;,z;]fL[u;,z;]}z,{0)-0, where s-z; with z; being
the unstable eigenvalue of A;. Imposing this convergence requirement gives the unique initial wage rate, w,{0),
consistent with long-run convergence ofthe dynamic system to its steady-state. lf we assume e.g. that the exogenous
shock decays exponentially, i.e. u~(t) - u;(0)e -P'`, x;(0) is found easily since the Laplace transform of the constant
b; is defined as b~z; and the Laplace transform of the exponentially dying impulse v,{t) as u;(0)I(ztp;).
" The Laplace transform of j(t), F(s) is defined as: F(s) -fJ(t)e -'t`"-`~dt.
b
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I The Average System
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A -i - 1
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M'AÍ vY(1 '8)
-8(1 - Q ) -8
A
(A.7)
with AA-1ty(xt5)l~,-vtrlX.The determinant of A", ~A,,~, which equals -SZVyl~.4,~, is equal to the product of the
eigenvalues. A necessary and sufficient condition for the average system to display saddlepoint stability, therefore,
is that 4,,~0. The eigenvalues of the average system equal:
z z z
h --1(vYó t ívYó )z'4(vYa ) )
"- Z AA ~A Á.DA
z z z
zA--2( v~ó - (vQg )zt4(~0 ) )
A A A
(A.8)









~(bA~) } L(~a uA(0)e
- v"S,s) t wA(0)
A
where bA- -~(~mAt( ~r trl X)yA t r1fA). Taking z" for s and using the Laplace transforms for a constant and
A
an exponentially decaying impulse, implying L(bA,zA) - bA , L(uA(0)e-v"`",zA) - uA(0) , the convergence condition
ZA ZA } PA
requires,
(2Ató )pA(0)-8(6A- v8 UA(0) tWA(O))-O
ZA ~A ZA}PA
Z,~ t 8 bA V S uA(0).. yVA(Q) - pA(Q) - - a-
E ZA ~A ZA } PA
(A.10)
for a solution to (A.6) to remain bounded.
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The inverse of the matrix AD equals:
1
t 0 0 j
fPD()lt -~a II
lWD(l)J








with O~ltvtrl(xt2~).The determinant of AD, ~AD~, which equals -SZV2a14D, is equal to the product of the
eigenvalues. The necessary and sufficient condition forthe difference system to display saddlepoint stability,
~.4D~ ~ 0, therefore, is satisfied in all cases. The eigenvalues of the difference system equal:
hD-- 1 ( vY82(2W-I) t (vY8Z(2p-1))2}4(v2aó2)
)2 ~D OD AD
(A.13)
z -- 1( vy82(2p-1) - ( vyBZ(2~-1))Zt4(v2ab2)
)
D- 2 ~D OD ~D





ó(1 - v(2a}Ya(2p-1))) s-8(1 - vYa(2p-1))
~D ~D
PD(0)




where bD -- Q8 [ T) (XyD tf~J. Taking z„ for sand using the Laplace transforms for a constant and an exponentially
D
decaying impulse, the convergence condition requires that,
(ZD ~ ó)Pp(0) - a( bD -~a uD(o) ' wD(0)) -0
ZD ~D ZD}pD
ZD}a bD VÓ Dp(0)..r yyD(0) - -PD(0) - - .-
Ó ZD ~D ZD}pD
(A.15)
for a solution to (A.11) to remain bounded.
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Chapter 6
Currency Substitution and Seigniorage in Eastern Europe'
Introduction
The initial stage of reform in the former Communist economies in Eastern Europe was
marked by a decline in economic activity and an increase in inflation. Bruno (1992) and
Solimano (1993) document and evaluate the reform efforts in Eastern Europe. Calvo and
Coricelli (1992), Lane (1992a) and Ebrill e.a. (1994) discuss extensively the set up and
results of the reform process in the case of Poland where reform is believed to have
been most drastic. Figure 1 shows the drop in (recorded) output and the increase of
inflation that accompanied the reform process started in 1990 in Poland, Hungary,
Romania and Bulgaria, the countries that are studied in this paper. As a measure of
output, the index of industrial output is used, whereas the rate of inflation is calculated
as the annual percentage increase of the consumer price index.
The economic and political instability that prevailed in most Eastern European
countries after the implementation of the reform programs from 1990 has induced a
strong increase in currency substitution or dollarisation. Currency substitution implies
that domestic money is replaced by foreign money in its traditional roles of ineans of
payment and store of value. Currency substitution was also fostered by the liberalisation
of fc'~ib`: Pxt',han~e rP~ui~UOnS tnat WaS par[ OI mu~í icl`'v,:: yr~6,..:::~. TharP ic cnm~
variation in the exchange rate arrangements the countries implemented: Poland was able
to maintain an exchange rate fixed to the U.S. dollar from January 1990 till October
1991 when it adopted a crawling peg; Hungary adopted a crawling peg system from
1989 onwards; Romania and Bulgaria followed a floating exchange rate system given
the lack of foreign exchange reserves and aimed at targeting the money supply.
' This chapter, which has been published in the Journal of Policy Reform, is based on joint research
with Nina Budina. An earlier, much different version, appeared as CentER Discussion Paper 9502 of
which parts were published in the Bulgarian National Bank Quarterly Review and a translation into Czech
in Politická Ekonomie. Comments by Harry Huizinga and seminar participants at the EEA annual confe-
rence held in September 1995 in Prague and the conference "Transition in Eastern Europe: Current Issues
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Dynamics of Inflation and Industrial Output
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This chapter analyses currency substitution in 4 Eastern European economies in
transition: Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgazia. Figure 2 plots the rate of exchange
rate depreciation against the U.S. dollaz (left scale) and the ratios of foreign currency de-
posits (FCD) -usually denominated in U.S. dollar- to currency (CL~, narrow money
(Ml ) and broad money (M2) (right scale). Such ratios of foreign money to domestic
money aze often used to measure currency substitution. Currency substitution increased
considerably in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria after the start of the reforms in 1990.
Currency substitution in Hungary increased much less and displayed less volatility than
in the other three countries. Hungary didn't experience such a dramatic inflationary
outburst like the other countries and started to implement its reform earlier and in a
more gradual form. In Poland, currency substitution decreased again with the successful
output and inflation stabilisation during 1991 and 1992. Currency substitution remained
at a high level in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria despite the recent decline of inflati-
on.
Such a form of "hysteresis" in the dollarisation ratio has also been noticed in
countries in Latin America during high inflation episodes, according to Clements and
Schwartz (1993) and Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992), and is attributed to a lack of credi-
bility of programs to control inflation and consequently a continuing widespread use of
the foreign money as a means of transaction and as a store of value.
An important policy implication of currency substitution, first noted by Girton
and Roper (1981), is the increased instability of monetary equilibrium. With higher
currency substitution, money demand is more sensitive to expected changes in the
opportunity costs of holding both domestic and foreign money. If the degree of currency
substitution increases, anticipated exchange rate movements induce larger shifts in
money demand which in turn require substantial shifts in exchange rates and interest
rates to restore equilibrium in foreign exchange and money markets. Currency substitu-
tion thus results in higher volatility of exchange rates and inflation and hampers monet-
ary policies directed at tazgeting a nominal anchor such as the money supply.
From a public finance perspective currency substitution causes the tax base of the
inflation tax, domestic base money, to become more elastic with respect to the tax rate,
the domestic rate of inflation, since currency substitution enables domestic agents to cir-
cumvent the inflation tax on domestic money by substituting foreign money for domes-
tic money. This results in a downwazd shift in the seigniorage Laffer curve and a lower
seigniorage maximising rate of inflation as compazed to a situation without currency
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The analysis proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical evidence we
obtain on currency substitution in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Section 3
discusses the relation between currency substitution and seigniorage revenues. A short
conclusion summarises our main results.
6.2 Empirical Evidence on Currency Substitution in Eastern Europe
Although widely believed to be substantial, empirical evidence on currency substitution
in Eastern Europe is currently rather limited. Lahiri (1991) analyses money demand and
currency substitution in the former republic of Yugoslavia. Lane (1992b) finds a signifi-
cant influence of currency substitution on money demand in Poland during the period
1979-1988. Chawluk and Cross (1994) analyse the influence of the pre-reform shortages
on Polish macro-economic money demand. Sahay and Vegh (1995a) discuss in detail
reform, the inflationazy process that developed itself and currency substitution in the
economies in transition. An important reason for the limited amount of empirical analy-
sis on money demand in transition economies is the relative scazcity of (accurate) data
on output, prices and monetary aggregates in most countries. While the result of a com-
prehensive data search, the current analysis is also hindered by this problem of relatively
short sample sizes and limited accuracy of the reported data.
There exists a vast empirical and theoretical literature on currency substitution.
Currency substitution has been studied for many countries. In particular, Latin America
(Ramirez-Rojas (1986), Fasano-Filho (1986), Rojas-Suarez (1992) and Clements and
Schwartz (1993) e.g.), Canada and the US (Miles (1977), Bordo and Choudry (1982),
Bergstrandt and Bundt (1990) and Ratti and Jeong (1994) e.g.) and the EU (Mizen and
Pentecost (1994), Angeloni, Cottazelli and Levy (1994) e.g.) have been subject to exten-
sive empirical research on currency substitution.
To test for the presence of currency substitution in Eastern Europe, we employ
the portfolio balance approach as developed by Cuddington (1983)Z. In this approach,
'A second approach towards currency substitution is the s.c. "money services" approach as introduced
by Miles (1978). This approach derives a relative demand for domestic and foreign money from a two-
stage individual optimization process in which indivuals first allocate their wealth between money and
other assets and then divide the money part into a domestic and a foreign component. This gives a
relative demand function for domestic and foreign money, AUeM', i.e. the inverse of the "dollarisation
ratio" of the economy, as a function of the relative opportunity costs of both monies. Empirical estimates
of such relative money demand functions of the "money services" approach are found e.g. in Ramirez-
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agents divide their financial wealth on domestic money, M, domestic bonds, B, foreign
money, M', and foreign bonds, B'. The returns on domestic bonds, foreign money and
foreign bonds are the domestic interest rate, i, the (expected) rate of depreciation,
é-de~dt, of the exchange rate, e, and the foreign interest rate plus depreciation, i'fé,
respectively. The nominal return on holding domestic money equals zero. Apart from a
scale variable, e.g. income or consumption, to capture the transaction motive, asset de-
mands are a positive function of their own return and a negative function of the returns
on the other assets.
The portfolio balance approach towards currency substitution tests whether there
is any significant impac"t from currency substitution on domestic money demand. It does
so by including the returns on the alternative assets to a standard loglinear money de-
mand function':
log(P)- a t log(y) - a2 i - a3é- a4 (i ` té) (1)
where P denotes the price level and y- Y~P real output. a, is the income elasticity of
money demand and proxies the demand for money resulting from the transactions
motive. aZ measures the interest elasticity of money demand.
a3 is the currency substitution elasticity of money demand as it measures the
impact of currency substitution on money demand: if the domestic currency is expected
to depreciate, foreign money becomes more attractive as a store of value than domestic
currency and real domestic money can decrease significantly if the currency substitution
elasticity is high. a4 measures the impact of international capital mobility on money de-
mand: if the foreign interest rate increases (or the expected rate of depreciation) foreign
bonds become more attractive to hold and domestic money balances are expected to de-
crease. Demand for real foreign money -in terms of domestic currency- by domestic
agents, m' - eM'~P, is also assumed to be of the form of ( 1). The (expected) rate of
Rojas (1986), Miles (1978), Bordo and Choudri (1982), Clements and Schwartz (1993), Guidotti and
Rodriguez (1992), Rogers (1992) and Agénor and Khan (1992) and Ratti and Jeong (1994).
' In particular the adding of the (expected) rate of depreciation is essential. This approach of adding
depreciation expectations to a traditional money demand function to estimate currency substitution is e.g.
found in Blejer ( 1978), Fasano-Filho ( 1986), Bergstrand and Bundt ( 1990), Angeloni e.a. ( 1994). See in
particular Cuddington ( 1983) on this approach to currency substitution. Brittain ( 1981) and Joines (1985)
test for the influence of currency substitution on velocity of money, v-Y~M, rather than money demand
itself.
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depreciation, however, is expected to exert a positive influence on the demand for real
foreign money, i.e. a3~0 in that case. aZ and a, aze expected to have a negative impact
on m'".
(1) was estimated for the four countries in our sample. Data were collected on
three monetary aggregates: currency in circulation (CC~, narrow money ( Ml) and broad
money (M2)5. Demand for foreign money was approximated by foreign currency
deposits (FCD) held at domestic banks and valued in domestic currency, a variable that
features in neazly all empirical studies on currency substitution given the lack of data on
foreign currency in circulation or demand deposits in foreign currency that domestic
agents hold at banks abroad. Foreign currency deposits, therefore, should be considered
as a conservative estimate of currency substitution in the domestic economy. As proxies
of the general price level and output we used consumer price indices and indices of
industrial production, respectively. The expected rate of depreciation was replaced by the
actual rate of depreciation to the U.S. dollarb. Thus, we assume that exchange rate
expectations are formed in a rational manner.
It was necessary to drop the ( long-term) capital mobility effect (a,) because of
the strong multicollinearity problem it causes with the currency substitution vaziable as
fluctuations in short-term ~ interest rates are in most cases negligible as compared to
fluctuations in the rate of exchange rate depreciation. Estimates of a3 then measures
both the impact of currency substitution and capital mobility on money demand, as
noted by Cuddington ( 1983), and we will tend to overestimate therefore the effect of
currency substitution. Casual observations suggest us that in the economies in transition
domestic and foreign money are probably better substitutes of each other than domestic
money and ( long-term) foreign bonds, i.e. the true a3 exceeds a4 considerably. In that
case omitting a4 seems defendable and our estimates of a3 will to a large extent reflect
the influence from currency substitution on money demand. This assumption seems
" The exchange rate coefficient is picking up two effects in case of the demand for foreign currency
deposits: a"demand" effect that we are interested in and a"supply" effect because an increase in the
exchange rate increases the value of foreign currency deposits in terms of domestic money. However, if
purchasing power parity holds (approximately) the second "supply" effect vanishes.
5 See the Appendix for definitions, sources and sample sizes of the variables.
6 Other measures that have been used to proxy the expected rate of depreciation are the forward
premium, (Bordo and Choudri (1982)), the rate of depreciation of the black market exchange rate (Blejer
(1979) and Fasano-Filho (1986)) and the inflation differential (Ramirez-Rojas (1985)).
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preferable to presenting rather meaningless estimates due to multicollinearity'.
A constant and a lineaz trend was added to (1), whenever they turned out to be
significant. Some empirical studies on money demand use a linear trend to measure the
effect of the process of financial liberalisation and innovation on money demand. Arrau
e.a. (1991) study financial innovation in developing countries, using time trends to
approximate the impact of financial innovation on money demand. The reform processes
in Eastern Europe have certainly stimulated financial reform and financial innovation
and one therefore might expect an independent effect from financial innovation on
money demand indeed to be present.
Table 1 presents unit root tests performed on the dependent and independent vari-
ables in (1), using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on stationazity ( a) with and (b)
without constant, using four lags in both cases. If the estimated ADF statistic is smaller
than the critical value, we reject the presence of a unit-root and conclude that the vazi-
able has been stationary. The critical values at three significance levels (l00~0, So~a and
1 oro) were considered. We find that in most cases the variables that appear in the regres-
sions are non-stationary in their level but become stationazy when differenced once.
' This assumption is potentially more harmful in industrial countries with highly developed and
integrated financíal markets as Cuddington (1983) rightly notes. We conjecture that the integration of Eas-
tern Europe with international long-term capital markets is currently limited. Mobility of short-term
capital is probably considerable. Short-term capital flows are, however, to some extent unrecorded as they
manifest themselves to a considerable extend in the form of illegal capital flight, Sahay and Vegh (1995b)
study net capital flows fromho Central and Eastern Europe and find that net capital flows to these
countries increased from -3.5 bin U.S. á in 1987 to 11.9 bin U.S. á in 1993.
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Table 1
Unit Root Tests
log(CU~P) log(MI~P) log(M2IP) log(FCD~P) log(y) i è
Poland
i) level
(a) -1.22 -1.13 -0.95 -1.93' -0.47 -0.13 -1.62
(b) -1.64 -1.66 - l .53 -2.42 -1.47 -1.75 -2.23
ii) first
difference
(a) -3.04"" -2.34'~ -1.87x -3.39"' -1.82' -3.90"' -4.12'~"
(b) -3.36" -2.64' -1.98 -3.14~" -1.62 -3.89"' -4.05"'
Hungary
i) level
(a) -1.33 -1.31 -1.01 1.07 -0.68 0.30 -0.92
(b) -0.49 -1.22 -1.59 1.41 -1.66 -1.31 -2.93'
ii) first
difference
(a) -2.59" -2.32" -1.73~ -0.72 -2.00"' -].98" -3.55'~`"
(b) -2.24 -2.73' -2.62' -2.09 -2.21 -2.27 -3.52~"
Romania
i) level
(a) 1.18 -0.45 0.60 1.26 0.23 -0.25 -0.90
(b) 1.16 -0.99 -0.98 -0.84 -1.62 -1.99 -1.49
ii) first
difference
(a) -1.63' - 1.81" -0.58 -1.68' -2.08" -1.72' -2.52"
(b) -0.94 -2.08 -0.13 -3.04~` -1.80 -1.57 -2.47'
Bulgaria
i) level
(a) -1.53 -1.62 -1.54 -0.40 -0.79 -0.46 -1.59
(b) -1.67 -1.71 -1.79 -1.07 -2.11 -1.90 -2.39
ii) first
difference
(a) -2.20" -1.95' -1.66' -2.60" -1.68' -1.94' -2.75""
(b) -2.72~` -2.07 -1.88 -2.98' -1.89 -1.97 -2.66'
Stationarity test of i) the level and ii) the first difference of variables. Test (a) Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test statistic using 4 lags of a variable, test (b) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic using 4 lags and a
constant. ~`," and "~` impty rejecting of HO that the variable contains a unit root at significance levels of
l00~0, 5"~o and lo~o respectively.
To avoid spurious regression results that may arise if dependent and independent
variables are non-stationary, it was decided to estimate (1) in the form of a two-stage
Error-Correction Model (ECM)8. In the first stage (1) is estimated using OLS. If the
residuals are found to be stationary, a cointegrating relation between the variables in the
regression exists and OLS produces (super) consistent estimates of the long-run money
demand elasticities. The column ADF gives the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic of the
residuals: if the ADF statistic is smaller than the critical value, the residuals are station-
B See Engle and Granger (1986) on the methodology of the error-correction method.
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ary and a cointegrating relationship between the variables is present. Again we use the
ADF test (a) with a constant and (b) without a constant. If stationarity of the residuals is
not rejected, the OLS estimation of (1) provide the long run money demand function.
Table 2 presents the estimation results from estimating (1).
Some caution in analysing the estimation results is necessary, however, because
the estimates are likely to be affected by the small sample sizes and possible endo-
geneity and omitted variables problems. CUSUM tests (not documented) on structural
stability of the estimated relations during the sample periods were performed: evidence
of structural stability of the estimated relations was found, except in the case of currency
demand in Poland during 1991 and demand for foreign currency deposits in Bulgaria
from 1993 onwards.
The stationarity test on the OLS residuals rejects in most cases the presence of a
unit-root in the residuals. In those cases, the estimated relations aze taken as representing
the long-term money demand function. The estimates of a3 that measure the presence of
currency substitution are in many cases with the expected negative sign. The evidence is
most convincing in the case of Bulgaria but also in the other countries we can identify
influence from currency substitution on money demand during the sample period. Also,
we find that financial innovation and reform, as approximated by the linear trend,
affected the demand for the different types of money. Table 2 gives in most cases
plausible estimates of long-run income and interest elasticities of money demand and
which we will use in the next section.
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Table 2
Estimation Results Static Money Demand Function
Poland
log(CUIP) 7.65' 0.69' -0.37' - 0.16' -0.01' 0.92 (a)-3.66"' 37



















(13.00) (5.53) (- 1.81) (-4.16) (-8.01) (b) -3.58"
7.33' 0.96' -0.26' -0.10 -0.02' 0.94 (a) -2.69" 37
(10.20) (6.34) (-1.79) (-1.39) (-10.75) (b) -2.64'
8.07' 0.91' -0.03 0.02 -0.01' 0.88 (a) -1.59 37
(12.84) (6.86) (-0.22) (0.61) (-3.96) (b) -1.58
7.51' 0.72' -0.12 0.21 0.80 (a) -2.61" 26
(5.35) (2.40) (- 0.41) (3.83) - (b) -2.51
1.18' -0.50 -0.17' -0.01' 0.66 (a) -2.37'" 37
- (141.2) (-1.36) (-1.77) (-4.40) (b) -2.26
6.62' 0.91' -0.75' -0.10' -0.01' 0.76 (a) -4.48"' 37
(11.99) (7.84) (-3.41) (-1.79) (2.93) (b) -4.41"'
7.71' 0.73' -0.87' -0.07 -0.01' 0.80 (a) -3.50"' 37
(18.82) (8.55) (-5.32) (-1.67) (3.06) (b) -3.45"
0.82' 0.81 0.30' 0.03' 0.70 (a) -2.21" 18
- (17.59) (1.05) (2.64) (6.74) (b) - 1.84
1.07' -0.44 -0.21 -0.03' 0.75 (a) -2.96"' 20
- (13.97) (-I.50) (-1.47) (-2.08) (b) -2.81'
1.29' -0.63 -0.12' -0.04' 0.65 (a) -2.27" 20
- (9.97) (-1.29) (-1.76) (2.00) (b) -2.17
1.44' -0.55 0.05 -0.03' 0.75 (a) -2.97"' 20
- (15.70) (-1.59) (0.93) (-1.73) (b)-2.81'
0.28' 0.44 0.01 0.06' 0.68 (a) -2.24" 20
- (2.53) (1.05) (0.14) (3.27) (b) -2.14
5.39' 0.76' - 0.71' -0.16' -0.04' 0.95 (a) -3.29"' 27
(5.18) (3.81) (-4.27) (-2.66) (-5.64) (b) -3.32"
5.48' 1.03' - 1.01" -0.08' - 0.06' 0.98 (a) -2.17" 27
(4.12) (4.10) (-7.56) (-2.88) (-6.79) (b) -2.10
6.05' 0.98' - 1.21' -0.06' -0.02' 0.98 (a) -3.70"' 27
(5.78) (4.91) (-7.22) (-3.03) (-3.23) (b) -3.59"
3.67' 0.89' -0.24 0.21' 0.28 (a) -2.34" 27
(1.93) (2.31) (-0.58) (4.11) - (b) -2.42
" means significant at a 900~o confidence level. t-statistics are given in brackets under the estimates.
ADF(4): stationarity test of the OLS residuals, test ( a) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic using 4 lags
of a variable, test ( b) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic using 4 lags and a constant. '," and
"'
imply rejecting HO that the variable contains a unit root at significance levels of ]0"~0, 5"~o and lolo
respectively.
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In the second stage of the ECM, (1) is estimated in differenced form with the
lagged OLS residual of step 1 included. In the presence of cointegration the lagged
residual should be negative and significant, indicating that there is adjustment of money
demand towards its long-run equilibrium (1). The differenced equation provides esti-
mates of the short-run elasticities of money demand. The parameter on the lagged
residual of step 1 estimates the adjustment speed of money demand towards its long run
equilibrium in (1). In particular, if the coefficient is low, the adjustment is long and vice
versa. Therefore, the estimated coefficient of the error-correction term gives us informa-
tion whether or not money demand adjust quickly to its long-term equilibrium level. The
estimations from the short-run money demand are given in Table 3.
The estimated short-term elasticities of money demand differ to some extent from
their long-term counterparts of Table 2 which could indicate quite complex adjustment
patterns of money demand over time. The error-correction term is sizable and significant
in most cases, indicating that there is indeed an adjustment mechanism forcing money
demand towards its long-term equilibrium. The estimated adjustment speed of short-term
money demand -as measured by 1 over the coefficient of the lagged OLS residual of
long-term money demand, denoted by EC, mostly lies between 0.25 and 0.75 indicating
that 250~o to 750~0 of the adjustment towards long-term equilibrium is achieved during the
first quarter.
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Table 3
Estimation Results Dynamic Money Demand Function
const 41og(y) 4 i 4 é EC R1 no.obs.
Poland
41og(CUIP) -0.01 0.80' -0.24' -0.14 -0.70' 0.65 36
(-1.24) (4.19) (- 3.38) (-0.86) (-5.37)
41og(MIIP) -0.02 0.96' - 0.15 -0.04' -0.67' 0.50 36
(-1.52) (3.79) (-1.64) (-2.12) ( -4.87)
41og(M2IP) -0.01 1.04' 0.14 0.03 -0.39' 0.64 36
(-0.43) (3.63) (1.27) (1.23) (-2.48)
41og(FCDIP) - 0.00 0.88' 0.35' 0.12' -0.50" 0.80 25
(-0.18) (1.93) (2.07) (2.87) ( -2.89)
Hungary
41og(CUIP) -0.01 0.31 -0.84' -0.07' -0.21' 0.22 36
(-0.57) (1.34) (-1.90) (-1.85) (-2.01)
41og(M1lP) -0.00 0.49' -0.68` -0.03 -0.18' 0.61 36
(-0.03) (2.52) (-1.80) (-0.78) (-6.83)
41og(M2~P) -0.02 0.29' -0.57' -0.01 -0.19' 0.62 36
(-0.30) (2.10) (-2.15) (-0.50) (2.17)
4log(FCD~P) 0.04' 0.24 0.06 0.21' -0.62' 0.64 17
(4.39) (0.52) (0.18) (2.47) ( - 5.54)
Romania
41og(CUIP) -0.03 0.62" -1.10' 0.02 -0.66' 0.46 19
(-0.91) (2.04) (-3.31) (0.98) (-3.08)
41og(M1~P) -0.04 0.41 -1.22' 0.07' -0.34' 0.58 l9
(-].09) (1.13) (-3.16) (3.14) (-2.38)
41og(M2~P) -0.03 0.30 -1.05' -0.04` -0.43' 0.46 19
(-1.03) (0.95) (-3.03) (-2.16) (-2.16)
41og(FCDIP) 0.06 0.22 0.28 0.02 -0.43' 0.25 19
(l.ll) (0.43) (0.52) (0.80) ( - 1.86)
Bulgaria
41og(CUIP) -0.04' 0.45' -0.49' -0.05' -0.63' 0.86
26
(-1.85) (2.78) (-2.72) (-3.42) (-3.23)
41og(MIIP) -0.08' 0.76` -0.49' -0.06' -0.92' 0.80 26
(-2.62) (3.04) (-2.04) (-3.19) (-3.93)
41og(M2~P) -0.04 0.74' -1.18' -0.05' -0.82' 0.74 26
(-1.51) (3.82) (-6.03) (-3.10) (-3.54)
41og(FCDIP) -0.00 0.40 0.11 0.23' -0.56' 0.27
26
(-0.07) (0.98) (0.23) (6.54) (-3.03)
' means significant at a 90"~o confidence level. t-statistics are given in brackets under the
estimates.
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6.3 Currency Substitution and Seigniorage Revenues
The empirical results of section 2 indicated that the influence of currency substitution on
money demand is likely to have been non-negligible in the transforming Eastern Europe-
an countries. This implies that the seigniorage revenues have been influenced by cur-
rency substitution: an increase in cturency substitution reduces the demand for domestic
money and by that seigniorage revenues9. The argument holds also the other way round:
Successful inflation stabilisation will reduce currency substitution and the leakage in
seigniorage revenues. To restore confidence in the purchasing power of the domestic
currency, fiscal discipline and more independent central banks are important prerequi-
sites. Both will contribute in achieving a lasting disinflation in the economies in transi-
tion where money creation was driven to a large extent by monetary financing of fiscal
deficits and the continued central bank lending to loss-making state-owned enterprises.
Steady-state seigniorage revenues as a fraction of GDP, s, equal It(mIy) where It
denotes the rate of money growth, It-M~M. If steady-state inflation equals the rate of
money growth, i.e. n-1t, and if money demand is given by (1), seigniorage revenues can
be written as:
-axi-a3é-ae(i'té) (2)s-nce
in which c equals ya'-t which equals one if the income elasticity is unity'o. Assume that
the Fisher hypothesis holds according to which the nominal interest equals the real
interest plus (expected) inflation, i.e. i-r~rt, where r denotes the real interest rate and n
the rate of inflation. Dropping again the effect from (long-run) capital mobility on
domestic money demand, that is a,-0, and replacing the rate of depreciation by the
' Note that also financial innovation, as measured by the deterministic trend in our empirical estima-
tion of ( 1), exerts an independent impact on money demand and seigniorage. The negative trend associa-
ted with financial innovation, implies that money demand and by that the seigniorage Laffer curve
uniformly shift down a little bit in every period as agents are able to economise on money. Financial
innovation dces however not affect the actual shape of the seigniorage Laffer curve and the seigniorage
maximising rate of inflation, merely its vertical position.
'" If a,xl, seigniorage as a fraction of GDP is also a function of GDP itself: If a,~l, seigniorage as a
fraction of GDP decreases if output increases and if a,~l, seigniorage increases if output increases. The
assumption that a,-1 features in most of the literature on the seigniorage Laffer curve as it enables to
concentrate entirely on the relation between inflation and seigniorage revenues.
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inflation differential plus the rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate, x, that is
é-n-n'tx, steady-state seigniorage revenues can be written as a function of domestic
inflation:
S-nde ~a2}a'~~ (3)
where d equals y a' -1 e -azr a~3i~ -X~ . The seigniorage Laffer curve (3) is a hump-shaped
function of inflation: if inflation is low, an increase in the rate of inflation will increase
seigniorage Laffer curve until the seigniorage maximising rate of inflation, n'", is rea-
ched. Any increase of inflation beyond nM decreases seigniorage revenues.
Governments that rely too heavily on money creation to finance fiscal deficits
risk to end up on the "wrong" side of the Laffer curve where attempts to raise seig-
niorage by increases in money creation azmihilate themselves in self-propelling hyper-
inflation and demonetization. It is cleaz that high fiscal deficits that were -in the absence
of broad markets in government debt- covered by money printing are important driving
forces of the inflationary accelerations that Eastern Europe witnessed, as have been the
price liberalisation combined with the initial monetary overhang and widespread wage
indexation. High fiscal deficits were caused by a drop in revenues due to the economic
stagnation, and high expenditures to cover subsidies and credit to loss making state
enterprises and unemployment and social security benefits.
The seigniorage maximising rate of inflation is found when differentiating (3)
w.r.t. n and putting the derivative equal to 0:




The "fiscal" effects of currency substitution can be illustrated with the aid of the seigni-
orage Laffer curve. In the absence of currency substitution, i.e. if a30, one gets the
well-known (closed-economy) result that seigniorage revenues are maximised when the
inflation is set equal to 1 over the interest semi-elasticity of money demand, a2". In the
presence of a significant impact from currency substitution on money demand, calcula-
tion of the seigniorage maximising rate of inflation as 1 over the interest semi-elasticity
of money demand leads to an overestimation as it ignores the effects of currency substi-
" See e.g. Easterly e.a. (1995) and the discussion therein on seigniorage maximisation.
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tution on money demand from changes in inflation1z.
Table 4 shows the seigniorage maximising rate of inflation using the estimates of
the long run elasticities of money demand, nM, and estimates of short run elasticities, ~rM.
The estimates of the elasticities aze found in Table 1 and Table 2. In addition, the actual
rate of inflation, rr, and seigniorage revenues as a fraction of GDP, s, are given.
Table 4
Inflation and Seigniorage
Poland Hungary Romania Bulgaria
~r"i 188.7oro 149.3oro 153.9oro 114.9oro
~' 263.2oro 109.9oro 92.6oro 185.2oro
1988 1t 52.9oro 13.9oro
s 4.09oro 0.74oro
1989 n I 87.7oro 16.7oro - 9.Ooro
s 6.22oro 0.95oro - 3.13oro
1990 1[ 136.2"ro 29.6oro - 50.7oro
s 4.98oro 1.40oro - 2.51 oro
1991 1t 44.2oro 27.Ooro 119.2oro 174.7oro
s 2.04oro 2.19oro 1.29oro 3.50"ro
1992 ~s 37.6oro 22. l oro 109.Ooro 58.4oro
s 1.90oro 2.22oro 2.17oro 3.19oro
1993 ~t 29.3oro 19.2oro 139.Soro 49.4oro
s 1.40oro 1.47oro 1.49oro 2.31 oro
1994 n 28.8oro 19.3oro 48.1 oro 75.2oro
s 1.72oro 0.93oro 1.99oro 2.45oro
12 Changes in the elasticities of the money demand function will change the shape of the seigniorage
Laffer curve over time. From (4) it follows that if money demand becomes more elastic w.r.t. currency
substitution, i.e. if a, increases, the seigniorage maximising rate of inflation declines as the tax base of
the inflation tax, domestic money in circulation, becomes more sensitive to a change in the tax rate, the
rate of inflation. The exact effect of a change of a, (and az) equals:
ds --nde-~`'"~A s0 b'az0
aa3
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It appeazs that seigniorage revenues constitute a non-negligible source of government
revenues in Eastern Europe. In estimating the seigniorage revenue maximising rate of
inflation we used the estimated elasticities of demand for currency in circulation as this
is considered to be the appropriate monetary aggregate from the perspective of sei-
gniorage ~ 3.
In the early stage of transition Poland, Romania and Bulgaria experienced short
periods of very high inflation. According to our estimates these countries have been at
the "wrong" side of the seigniorage Laffer curve during short periods in '90-'91. With
the inflation stabilisation throughout '93-'94 all countries are now again on the increas-
ing part of the seigniorage Laffer curve. Bulgaria appears to be closest to its seigniorage
maximising rate of inflation: according to our estimates Bulgaria has the lowest seignio-
rage maximising rate of inflation of the four countries and its rate of inflation during
1994 was higher than that of the other countries.
Conclusion
This chapter presented empirical evidence on currency substitution in Eastern Europe.
We used the portfolio balance approach of currency substitution to assess the impact of
currency substitution on money demand in four Eastern European countries Poland,
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Not withstanding the limited quality of our dataset, in
most cases a long term money demand relation can be identified in which currency
substitution is found to have an important influence. The empirical results also provide
estimates of income and interest elasticities and the impact of financial reform and inno-
vation. Estimation of the short-run money demand function provides a characterisation
of the adjustment process of money demand in the short-run.
Currency substitution has potentially important fiscal implications: seigniorage
revenues are affected by currency substitution as agents are able to circumvent the infla-
tion tax on domestic money when substituting into foreign money. The estimated money
demand functions were used to calculate the seigniorage maximising rates of inflation.
During short periods of 1989-1991, Poland and Bulgaria had rates of inflation that
exceeded the seigniorage maximising rates of inflation. Annual inflation in Hungary re-
mained in a band of 15oro-30o~u throughout the period 1988-1994 reflecting to a certain
" Alternatively, one could include cash reserves of the banking sector that monetary authorities
control with reserve requirements into the tax base of the inflation tax. van Aarle and Budina (1996)
analyse the relation between inflation, reserve requirements and seigniorage in the case of Poland.
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extent its more gradual reform path than the other countries where macroeconomic
reform was introduced more abruptly. Inflation stabilisation has not yet been achieved in
Bulgazia. Poland and more recently Romania succeeded in bringing down inflation
gradually well below the seigniorage maximising rate of inflation. The inflation stabilis-
ation achieved in Romania, however, still appeazs to be very vulnerable. While undoubt-
edly beneficial in many respects, this process of gradual disinflation has induced a loss
in seigniorage revenues to the government that has to be compensated by an increase in
other, distortionazy, taxes or a reduction in government spending.
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Appendix: Definitions of Variables and Data Sources
Poland
CU: currency in circulation (bin zloty), source: IFS, I86:III95
MI: nartow money (bin zloty), source: IFS, I86:III95
M2: broad money (bin zloty), source: IFS, I86:III95
FCD: foreign currency deposits (bin zloty), source: NBP, I89:III95
P: consumer price index (1985-100), source: IFS, 186:II[95
y: index of industrial output (1985-100), source: IFS, I86:11195
i: 3 montó deposit rate, source: NBP, 186:II195
é: depreciation Polish zloty against US á, source: IFS, [86:I[195
Hunt'arv
CU: curtency in circulation ( bin forint), source: IFS, I86:1195
Ml: narrow money ( bin forint), source: IFS, I86:1195
M2: broad money ( bin forint), source: IFS, I86:1195
FCD: foreign currency deposi[s of households and enterprises (bin forint), source: NBH, 191:II95
P: consumer price index ( 1985-100), source: IFS, 186:1I95
y: index of industrial output ( 1985-100), source: [FS, 186:II95
i: 3 month deposit rate, source: IFS, I86:[I95
é: depreciation Hungarian forint against US á , source (IFS), I86:II95
Romania
CU: currency in circulation (bin lei), source: [FS, IV89:III95
Ml: narrow money (bin lei), source: IFS, IV89:III95
M2: broad money (bin lei), source: IFS, IV89:[II95
FCD: foreign curtency deposits (bin lei), source: IFS, IV89:III95
P: consumer price index (1990-100), source: 1FS, III90:III95
y: index of industrial output (1985-100), source: IFS, IV89:III95
i: average deposit rate, source: NCS, IV90:III95
é: depreciation Romanian Lei against US S, source: IFS, I86:III95
Bulearia
CU: currency in circulation (bin leva), source: BNB, 186:[[95
Ml: nartow money ( bin leva), source: BNB, I86:II95
M2: broad money ( bin lei), source: BNB, 186:II95
FCD: foreign currency deposits ( bin lei), source: BNB, I86:II95
P: consumer price index ( 1989-100), source: BNB, IV88:H95
y: index of industrial output ( ]980-100), source: UN, 186aI95
i: deposit rate, source: BNB, IV88:II95
é: depreciation Bulgarian Leva against US á, source: BNB, III88:[I95
abbreviations: IFS-lnternational Financial Statistics [MF, NBH-National Bank of Hungary, NBP-
National Bank of Poland, NCS-Romanian National Commission for Statistics, BNB-Bulgarian National
Bank, UN-United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statitics
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Chapter 7
Currency Substitution, Financial Liberalisation and Seigniorage: the
Polish Reform of 1990'
Introduction
In January 1990 the Polish government launched the 'Balcerowicz'-plan that aimed at
restructuring the Polish economy into the direction of a modern market economy. From
a structural perspective, the Balcerowicz program contained guidelines regarding the
privatisation of the state sector, the liberalisation of prices, trade and the financial sector
and restoring of convertibility of the Zloty. Besides these structural features the plan
also proposed a set of ineasures to reduce the high inflation that existed. A combination
of fiscal consolidation, a unified fixed exchange rate, a reduction in wage indexation and
other restrictive incomes policies were expected to reduce inflation considerably. Exter-
nal aid from the IMF, Worldbank and the EU and a considerable debt relief within the
Brady plan, completed the Balcerowicz plan. The Balcerowicz program was carried out
under supervision of the International Monetary Fund and its structure and results are
already well documented, e.g. by Nuti (1990), Calvo and Coricelli (1992), Lane (1992a),
Sachs (1993), Lane (1994), Berg (1994), Blanchard (1994) and Ebrill e.a. (1994).
Poland experienced a strong increase in currency substitution in 1989 and 1990
as a consequence of high inflation and liberalisation of foreign exchange restrictions.
External convertibility of the Zloty and removal of the former strict currency controls
were important measures in the Balcerowicz plan. The removal of the currency controls
enabled a strong increase in currency substitution. In the first part of this chapter, a
small analytical model is constructed to analyse how a liberalisation of currency controls
affect money demand, inflation and seigniorage. The insights of the model are applied to
the case of Poland.
Another important element in the transformation process in Eastern Europe is the
' The first part of this chapter is a much revised version of a Tilburg University Research Memoran-
dum no.637, and forthcoming in Konjunkturpolitik. It has benefited much from a large number of sugge-
stions and comments from Harry Huizinga. The second part on financial repression is based on joint
research with Nina Budina. It was presented at the 1996 EEA conference that was held in August 1996 in
Istanbul and appeared as Working Paper no. 30 in the East European Series of the Institute for Advanced
Studies, Vienna.
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reform of the financial sector. An efficient financial sector promotes efficient financial
intermediation and the development of an efficient payments system. Cleazly, the func-
tioning and structure of the financial sector had to change drastically with the move
from a planned to a market-based economy. In the planned economy payment flows,
financial intermediation, credit allocation, currency issuance, foreign exchange and
banking regulation and supervision were all performed by the monopolistic State bank,
whereas in a market economy such different functions are typically decentralised with
different institutions. The main problems in the financial sector at the outset of the
reform were (i) lack of competition with the lazge state owned financial institutions
largely dominating the financial sector, (ii) an inefficient payments system, (ii) lack of
regulation and supervision by the standards of a modem market economy, (iii) a large
volume of non-performing loans at the balances of the financial sector, (iv) inexperi-
enced and ill-trained bankers. Therefore, reform in the financial sector typically com-
prised privatisation plans, a new framework of regulation and supervision and measures
to cope with the large amount of non-performing loans. The framework of regulation
and supervision has been largely modeled according to the standards of the countries in
the OECD. A detailed analysis of the financial sector reform in Eastern Europe is found
in Catte and Mastropasqua (1993), Bonin (1993) and Thorne (1993).
In the second part of this chapter, the theoretícal insights from the financial
repression literature aze applied to Poland that has undertaken a substantial liberalisation
of the financial sector. Government control of the financial sector has typically been
high in developing and transforming economies and the reliance on revenues from
repression of the domestic financial system is often considerable.
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 summarises
Poland's experience with economic reform, inflation, currency substitution and financial
repression. Section 3 introduces a macroeconomic model of a small open economy with
rational, maximising agents in which currency substitution is present. The effects of
currency substitution on public finance are derived. Next, the effects of introducing or
removing currency controls are considered. Section 4 applies the analytical results to the
case of Poland. Section 5 develops a small analytical model of financial repression,
seigniorage and financial sector reform. The seigniorage Laffer curve describes the rela-
tion between seigniorage, inflation and financial repression. The effect of a change in
financial repression on the seigniorage Laffer curve is examined. Our analytical model is
inspired by the important contribution of Brock (1989) on reserve requirements and
seigniorage. Section 6 studies the process of financial repression and liberalisation is
Poland. The Polish demand for currency and deposits is estimated and the parameter
Currency Substitution, Financial Liberalisation and Seigniorage 207
estimates are used to serve as inputs to derive the seigniorage Laffer curve. The con-
cluding section summarises the main insights that were offered in this chapter.
7.2 Poland's Experience with Inflation, Currency Substitution, Financial
Repression and Seigniorage
Economic Reform, Inflation and Currency Substitution in Poland
The Balcerowicz plan consisted of ineasures to foster both structural reform and
macroeconomic stabilisation of the Polish economy. By 1990 macroeconomic
stabilisation had become pressing as inflation had increased sharply due to the price
liberalisation and initial monetary overhang. Output had contracted sharply. Figure 1
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Figure 1 Inflation and Output Performance.
Poland 1987-1995. Data Source:
IMF and National Bank of Poland
(NBP)
Gradually macroeconomic imbalances reduced: a successful inflation stabilisation was
seen in the second half of 1990 and throughout 1991. A successful peg to the U.S.
dollar was kept during the first sixteen months of the program. At the end of 1991 the
output decline bottomed and a gradual recovery of the real side of the economy fol-
lowed. A growing private sector and increasing foreign direct investment were the main
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contributors to the improving output performance of the Polish economy.
Figure 2 shows the amount of real currency in circulation (CUIP), real narrow
money (MI~P) and real foreign currency deposits (FCD~P), all in logazithms. These
monetary aggregates display a structural break at the beginning of 1990 when real cur-
rency and narrow money balances jump down sharply and foreign currency deposits
increase sharply.
Real currency, narrow money and FCD
Poland 1986-1995
5 , .~.,86.I 87.1 86.1 89.1 9Ó.1 9Í.1 92.1 93.1 94.1 95.1
timc
-real ciarrncy --- rcat Ml - rcd FCD
Figure 2 Real Currency, Real Narrow Money
and Real FCD (in logs), Poland
1986-1995
Figure 3 displays the foreign currency deposits (FCD) to currency (CU) and to narrow
money (M1) ratio. This last ratio is often used as a proxy of the degree of cunency
substitution or dollarisation of the economyZ.
Z Strictly speakíng 'dollarisation' refers to currency substitution involving only U.S. ~. In practice,
however, currency substitution and dollarisation are used interchangebly, even if other currencies are
involved as well. In the current analysis these two terms are also used interchangebly.
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Figure 3 FCDICttrrency and FCDIMI ratios
Poland 1989-1995
The graph shows the drastic increase in cunency substitution at the end of 1989, when
high inflation, political and economic uncertainty prevailed and liberalisation of currency
controls was undertaken.
Financial Repression and Seigniorage in Poland
The revenues that accrue to the government from financial repression originate
from two sources: first, manipulation of interest rates enable governments to finance its
government debt at artificially low interest rates. Giovannini and de Melo (1993) esti-
mate the revenues from this sort of financial repression for 24 developing countries and
that revenues in some cases can be as high 30~0 of GDP. Molho (1992) considers the
case of Italy. Second, a system of reserve requirements on deposits increases the amount
of base money and by that seigniorage revenues'. In addition inefficient payments
systems may force the financial sector to hold more money balances than they optimally
would Like to. In Eastern Europe such 'float balances' have been substantial. In the
second part of this chapter, the theoretical insights from the financial repression litera-
' Theoretical models on the role of reserve requirements in public finance are found in Brock (1984)
and (1989), Freeman (1987), Mormouras and Russell (1992), Bachetta and Caminal (1992) and Espinosa-
Vega (1995). Roubini and Sala-I-Martin (1992) and Demetriades and Luintel (1994) analyse the relation
between financial repression and economic growth in developing countries.
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ture aze applied to Poland that has undertaken a substantial liberalisation of the financial
sector. We concentrate on the second instrument of financial repression, reserve require-
ments plus "float" balances, as (domestically owned) government debt has been small
until recently because of the small size of domestic capital mazkets.
Financial repression has been substantial in the case of Poland. Table 1 calculates
the Polish (annual) rate of base money growth, lt, the (annual) rate of inflation rate of
inflation, ~, the effective reserve requirement, T, total seigniorage revenues to GDP, sr1y,
which can be split up into seigniorage revenues from currency in circulation, s~~y, and
seigniorage revenues due to reserve requirements and float, s~y.
Table 1
Reserve Requirements, Inflation and Seigniorage in Poland
'89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94
~ 177oro 97"ro 22oro 31oro 7oro 20oro
n 201"ro 118"ro 47oro 35oro 29oro 28"ro
T 36"ro 31 oro 2óoro 21 oro l3"Io 11 "ro
s7Jy 6.80oIo 6.73oro 2.58oIo 3.41 oro 0.73oro 1.72oro
s~Jy 2.07oIo 3.66oro 2.04oro L90oro 1.40oro 1.09"ro
s~y 4.72oro 3.07oro 0.54oro 1.5 ] oro -0.68"ro 0.63oro
Data Source: IMFá~
Following Brock (1984) the effective reserve requirement, t, was calculated as
banking reserves over total bank deposits. Figure 4 plots the rate of inflation (left scale)
and the effective reserve requirement (right scale) during the period 1988-1995. In the
initial phase of the reform, inflation reached near hyperinflationary levels due to the
combination of the initial monetary overhang, shortages and price liberalisation. From
1991 onwards inflation stabilisation was achieved. The effects of the reform in the
financial sector result in a gradual reduction in the effective reserve requirement that we
interpret as a measure of financial repression by the monetary authorities. According to
the picture, financial repression has decreased considerably, even if we disregazd the
initial lazge drop in 1989 that can be largely attributed to the inflationary outburst
inflating broad money.
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Inflation and Financial Repression
Poland 1988-1995
- Inflation - Eff. Res.Req.
Figure 4 Inflation and Financial Repression
in Poland
In the second part of this chapter we analyse inflation and financial repression as two
sepazate instruments that enable governments to extract seigniorage revenues from base
money in circulation. An analytical model is introduced to derive the seigniorage Laffer
curve when governments can vary both the rate of inflation and the degree of financial
repression. From the analytical form of this seigniorage Laffer curve, the seigniorage
maximising combination of inflation and financial repression can be derived.
7.3 A Model on Currency Substitution, Currency Controls, Inflation and
Seigniorage
Currency substitution entails a shift from domestic to foreign money by domestic agents,
both for transaction purposes and as a store of value. Currency substitution azises from
currency viz. money demand that is sensitive to both domestic and foreign influences. In
pazticular, home and foreign interest rates influence currency substitution as they reflect
the opportunity costs of holding domestic and foreign money, respectively. If real
interest rates and foreign inflation aze assumed to be small and constant, the costs of
holding domestic and foreign money depends on the domestic and foreign rate of
inflation, respectively. Currency substitution in the domestic country, then, is likely to
increase with a higher domestic inflation rate and to decrease with a lower domestic rate
of inflation. This "inflation driven" currency substitution stands central in our analysis of
the Polish experience. The part of currency substitution that is driven by increases in
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foreign trade and other possible factors encounters less attention: it comes in as a con-
stant.
Currency substitution of a significant degree influences monetary equilibrium and
public finance in a small open economy considerably. Currency substitution implies that
velocity becomes less predictable. This on its turn, will make it more difficult for the
monetary authority to tazget monetary aggregates, exchange rates and interest rates. Cur-
rency substitution at the same time also affects public finance since it enables domestic
agents to circumvent the inflation tax imposed by the domestic government on holders
of domestic money. When domestic money is held by foreign agents, an additional
foreign source of seigniorage revenues is available. Because of their influence on seigni-
orage revenues, currency substitution and currency controls affect the whole public
finance.
Canzoneri and Diba (1992) compare the optimal rate of inflation if monetary
authorities in two countries play seigniorage maximisation games with the optimal rate
of inflation if both authorities seek to maximise social welfare in their country. Optimal
inflation rates in both monetary policy games critically depend on the degree of currency
substitution and in welfaze maximisation games the optimal inflation rate also depends
on the marginal distortion of ordinary taxation. A higher degree of currency substitution
lowers the optimal rate of inflation in both games, while a higher mazginal distortion
from ordinary taxation increases the optimal rate of inflation in the welfaze maximisation
game. It is interesting to extend the work of Canzoneri and Diba by considering the
possibility that monetary authorities introduce currency controls in an attempt to discour-
age currency substitution. Because of complexity the analysis is not cast in a two-coun-
try game as in Canzoneri and Diba but in a small country framework.
Consider a small open economy with agents that hold both domestic and foreign
money in transactions and as a store of value. If we want to model the currency substi-
tution that takes place we need to extend traditional money and allow domestic agents to
hold both domestic and foreign money. For simplicity money demand is modeled
according to the money-in-the-utility function approach which can be shown to be
functionally equivalent to a number of alternative money demand approaches such as
transaction costs models or shopping time models4. The representative domestic agent is
assumed to maximise a concave intertemporal utility function that has as its azgumentss
real consumption, c, domestic real money, m, and foreign real money, n:
" See, in particular, Feenstra ( 1986) and Croushore ( 1993), in this respect.
5 For the sake of brevity, we ommit the time index t that pertains to any variable.
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máX U(L~- J {u(C) tv(m,n;a)}e-ac`-`ddt u~,Vm,V~~O u~~,vmm,VnnSO (1)
~o
Utility is maximised subject to the dynamic budget constraint which relates real asset
accumulation, ti'v, to real interest income, rw, exogenously given real labour income, y, a
lump-sum transfer, i, tolfrom the government, real consumption and the inflation tax on
both the holdings of domestic money, (r~)m and foreign money, (r~rt~`)n:
r'v-rw}y-i-c-(rtn)m-(rtn`)n (2)
Real financial wealth of the individual consists of net foreign assets, f, which yield a
fixed real return r, real domestic money and real foreign money:
W M eN eFw----t-t--mtn}.f
P P P P
(3)
in which e denotes the exchange rate of domestic money against foreign money. We
exclude ever growing foreign debt or asset accumulation and negative amounts of
money:
lim f e-~`-0 m,n ? 0
~~m
(4)
Solving the maximisation problems of the representative agent, yields implicit demand









where 7,, denotes the co-state variable associated with real wealth a time t. (Sa) and (Sd)
are the standard static and dynamic optimality conditions concerning real consumption
allocation. (Sb) and (Sc) reveal that demand for domestic and foreign money are deter-
mined by the utility derived from liquidity services, v(m,n;6), and the opportunity costs
of both monies. Opportunity costs of both monies differ if there is any inflation differen-
tial between the domestic economy and the rest of the world.
Assume that instant utility u(c)tv(m,n;6) has the following shape:
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u(c) t v(m,n;a) - c - 0.5 (y -m tw -n)2 - O.Sa [(y -m)2 t (w -n)2] (6)
in which y and o~ are constants that reflect optimal holdings of domestic and foreign
money respectively. a is defined in such a manner that - ll6 measures the change in the
relative amount of real domestic money balances of domestic agents, if the inflation
differential is increased by lo~o. -l~v is therefore referred to as the elasticity of currency
substitution in the remainder. - U6-0 and w-0 represents the case when no currency
substitution occurs (n-0).
How much currency substitution is induced by an inflation differential depends
critically on the value of a which parametrises currency substitution: it measures the
degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign money. A high 6 implies that
domestic and foreign money are poor substitutes, a low a that they are good substitutes.
When positive, both monies are substitutes of each other, when negative both monies are
complements. 6 summarises in a way the structural and institutional characteristics of
the monetary system of the small open country, under study. Guidotti (1993) analyses
the consequences of financial innovations that facilitate currency substitution in the
domestic country, inducing a decrease of 6. Financial innovations enable the representa-
tive agent to economise on real money balances, which make him better off. However a
'secondary' effect is present, as indicated by de Grégorio (1991) if ordinary taxes, i, are
distortionary or carry collection costs: a decrease in a induces a decrease in holdings of
real domestic money and therefore a decrease in real seigniorage revenues that has to be
compensated by a rise in distortionary ordinary taxes and which will make society worse
off. The magnitudes of both effects determine whether the economy is better off from a
financial innovation or not.
Given the functional form of v(m,n;a) in (6), the first-order-conditions (3a),(3b)
and (3c) can be combined to give m and n as a function of domestic and foreign infla-
tion rates:
r (atl) 1m- y-(a }2) Q(a }2) n} a(o }2) n'




A rise of the domestic inflation rate induces a decrease in the demand for domestic
money and an increase in the demand for foreign money, while a rise in the foreign
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inflation rate has the opposite effects.b Holdings of both monies are nonnegative as long
as inflation rates remain within a certain range:





If the domestic inflation rate exceeds the upper limit of (8a) a hyperinflation results:
domestic agents seek to reduce their holdings of domestic real money to zero.' If infla-
tion is lower than the lower limit of (b), domestic agents actually would prefer to have a
negative amount of foreign currency which is not possible.
Foreign demand for domestic money is assumed to be constant:
m'-a az0 (9)
This assumption makes it possible to restrict computational complexity in the remainder
of the analysis considerably. This simplifying assumption can also be interpreted to
represent a situation in which foreign demand for domestic money is constant and not
sensitive to relative interest rates: such a situation is present when the á in the foreign
equivalent of (1) goes to infinity.
The parameters {a,y,w,a} of the money demand system represent all factors that
are not modelled but do affect demand for money: these parameters possibly change
over time. An increase in t~ could represent an increase in currency substitution arising
from an increase in foreign trade and all other factors: an increase in Poland's w is likely
to have taken place in the period 1988-1991. The demand function for domestic money
(7a) has the important property that an increase in currency substitution possibilities, i.e.
a decrease in 6, raises the sensitivity of domestic money demand w.r.t. the domestic rate
of inflation.
The government conducts monetary and fiscal policy subject to the dynamic
6 One could assume at this stage that domestic and foreign inflation rate are linked by relative purcha-
sing power parity, implying that the (expected) rate of depreciation, é, is equal to the inflation differential,
n-n'. As we are not convinced that PPP is a good approximation to the case of Poland that we consider
in the empirical part, we stick to (7a) and (7b).
' Unstable hyperinflationary processes, in general, can only be ruled out when money is essential to
agents, i.e. when v,~(m-0) --oo. Money is essential if lim m~, o{m vm} ~ 0, (Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1983)). Essentiality of money is however not an attractive properry. Money in the present model is
inessential, as can be seen by inspecting v,~(O,n;a) and v„(m,0;a).
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government budget constraint that relates the fiscal deficit, g-i, and real seigniorage
revenues, s:
g-t-s-ritStnms-mstn(mtm') (10)
where g denotes real government expenditures. s Real seigniorage revenues accrue to the
monetary authorities because of their monopoly in creating domestic (base) money. Sei-
gniorage revenues in (10) result from so-called 'passive' seigniorage, m', accruing from
trend growth of real money balances in a growing economy and so-called 'active'
seigniorage, ~tms, from the inflation tax. The total supply of money rrr` is equal to the
amount of real domestic money held by domestic residents plus the amount held by
foreign agents, m'-mfm'.
Currency substitution, via its influence on the inflation tax, introduces a source of
extemalities: seigniorage revenues that domestic agents transfer to the foreign monetary
authorities through currency substitution aze rebated to foreign agents by the foreign
monetary authorities, whereas the inflation tax on foreign holders of domestic money is
rebated to domestic agents9, together with the inflation tax levied on domestic holders of
domestic money. Because of the fact that part of the inflation tax on domestic money
can be shifted upon the shoulders of foreign agents, a rate of inflation larger than zero is
optimal, even when ordinary taxes are non distortionary.'o
Seigniorage maximisation
Seigniorage revenues display the Laffer-curve characteristic: if the inflation rate
exceeds the rate that maximises steady-state seigniorage revenues, seigniorage revenues
decline if inflation is increased further. Steady-state real seigniorage revenues can be
written as a quadratic function of the domestic inflation rate:
e Lane (1992a) provides details on the different categories of taxes and expenditures and their relative
importance in Poland's public finance at the outset of the reform.
9 Assume that government spending is fixed.
'o This is the 'taxing the foreigner' problem of Canzoneri (1989) and Canzoneri and Diba (1991) who
show in a two-country game how non-cooperative seigniorage maximisation games in the presence of a
seigniorage extemality induces sub-optimal policies from a welfare point of view.
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s-nms-n[yta- r -(a}1) nt 1 n'] (11)
(Qt2) o(at2) o(atl)




Figure 5 The Seigniorage Laffer Curve
Currency substitution affects both the constant part, yfa-r~(6f2), and the slope of the
seigniorage Laffer curve. An increase of a, y or n or a decrease in r imply a broaden-
ing of the base of the inflation tax. A decrease of a implies that domestic and foreign
money become better substitutes, i.e. -1~6 increases in absolute value. The tax base of
the inflation tax, therefore, becomes more elastic with respect to changes in the domestic
rate of inflation. Together with the decrease in the constant of the seigniorage Laffer
curve, this índuces a flatter seigniorage Laffer curve that is rotated towards the origin, as
by drawn in Figure 5 by the arrow. The inflation rate that maximises real seigniorage
revenues is found by differentiating (I1) w.r.t. n and putting the derivative equal to 0:
~ -0 -~ n- 1 [Q(at2)(Yta)-art~`l
an 2(atl)
(12)
If both monies are better substitutes, i.e. if a is low, the optimal inflation rate must be
lower -provided that r and n' are small- as agents easily substitute between domestic and
foreign money. In other words, currency substitution imposes inflationary discipline on
218 Chapter 7
the domestic monetary authorities. In Figure 4 we have indicated the inward rotation
from the seigniorage Laffer curve caused by a decrease in 6 with an arrow.
E~cient Taxation
In Appendix A we consider efficient taxation as an alternative to seigniorage
maximisation by the govermnent. The public finance view of inflation defines the
optimal inflation rate by considering the inflation tax as part of the entire tax system.
Mankiw (1987) clearly states the problem of efficient taxation with ordinary taxes and
the inflation tax. Efficient taxation entails the minimisation of the discounted social costs
of financing a given amount of public expenditures. Efficient taxation requires (a) the
equalisation of the marginal excess burden of all forms of taxation in one period (the
static optimality condition), (b) the equalisation of marginal costs of taxation over
different periods, (the dynamic optimality condition). (a) and (b) are also known as
Barro's "tax smoothing" principles.
The inflation tax is distortionary in that a higher rate of domestic inflation induc-
es agents to hold fewer domestic balances and to substitute away into foreign balances:
according to (7a), only if domestic rate of inflation is equal to zero, households' demand
for domestic money will be satiated. In the presence of tax collection costs or any other
distortion from ordinary taxes, the Friedman rule of a zero inflation rate is not longer
optimal: efficient taxation requires positive inflation (tax) rates. In the current open
economy framework, the Friedman rule is not optimal even if ordinary taxes aze lump-
sum because the inflation tax partly falls on foreigners -as long as a is positive-, and the
this part of the inflation tax can be redistributed to domestic agents. The inflation tax
gives the domestic government the possibility "to tax the foreigner", a possibility put
forward by Canzoneri (1989).
Currency Controls
Until now it has been assumed that the monetary authorities did not impose any
restriction on currency substitution. In this section we consider the consequences of
imposing currency controls by the monetary authorities to discourage currency substitu-
tion. Since the use of foreign exchange restrictions is widespread in reality,' ~ it seems
" More institutional details on the use of foreign exchange restrictions can be found in the [MF's
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (1994).
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interesting to incorporate this possibility. Consider the following definition of a perfect
currency control in the home country1z:
n-0 d t (13)
Assume that the use of domestic money by foreign agents is not restricted by either
domestic or foreign monetary authorities: restricting the use of domestic money by
foreign agents is not efficient, since it implies giving up the source of foreign
seigniorage revenues. With a currency control, demand for domestic money by domestic
agents changes since their money demand is the result of a different, more restricted,
optimisation program from which results:
mR-Y t W 1 1a}1 - a}lr- Q}lrr (14)
Real domestic money balances held by domestic agents are nonnegative as long as the
domestic nominal interest does not exceed a level of yl(6f1)tW-r. If we compare (14),
the 'restricted' demand for domestic money by domestic agents, with the 'unrestricted'
demand for domestic agents by domestic agents, m~, , in (7a), one finds:
1 r 1 1mo-mR- - (o } 1)[W } Q}2~ -
Q(o }2)(a } 1) ~} o(o
t2) n. (15)
An (unanticipated) abolition of a currency control at time to induces a structural
break in demand for domestic money by domestic agents: the constant falls while the
sensitivity w.r.t the domestic and foreign inflation rate increases. In the next section we
test whether such a structural break has been present in Polish money demand at the
removal of foreign exchange restrictions in January 1990.
Seigniorage revenues in the presence of currency controls amount to:
sR-nmR-n(ytatW -r-~) (16)
atl ofl atl
The rate of inflation that maximises steady-state seigniorage revenues if currency con-
trols are imposed, is again found by differentiating real seigniorage revenues w.r.t. the
inflation rate and putting this derivative equal to zero:
12 In realiry, one would not expect monetary policymakers to be that effective in imposing currency
controls. A'leaky' currency control n- v with v~ 0, could be introduced instead of (13).
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an -0
b n- a21(Yta)t2(w-r) (17)
The removal of currency controls implies that the inflation rate that maximises
steady-state real seigniorage revenues becomes lower, since
~~-~R - - 2(otl) ~Y }a
t4(a }1)w-(3a t4)r-n `l (18)
is negative, in case the real interest rate and the foreign rate of inflation remain small.
~„ denotes the seigniorage maximising rate of inflation if no currency control is im-
posed, according to (13), and n,t denotes the seigniorage maximising rate of inflation if a
currency control was imposed, according to (17).
A removal of currency controls induces a decrease in the constant of the money
demand function, a decrease in the seigniorage maximising rate of inflation and an in-
crease in the sensitivity w.r.t. the domestic inflation rate. The seigniorage Laffer curve,
consequently, rotates towards the origin in Figure 5, as we noted before. This rotation
implies a lower rate of inflation that maximises steady state seigniorage revenues and
lower seigniorage revenues for any rate of inflation. The change in the seigniorage
Laffer curve caused by a removal of currency controls is equal to:
sU-sR-n(m~-mR)-n(- W t r - n t n~ ) (19)
atl (atl)(at2) a(atl)(at2) a(at2)
7.4 Empirical Testing of the Model: the Case of Poland
In this section we test for a structural break in Polish money demand as a consequence
of the reform program launched in January 1990. This comprehensive reform and disin-
flation program entailed amongst others a fixing of the Zloty against the dollar, a reduc-
tion in the fiscal deficit, a restrictive income policy and the removal of currency con-
trols. Evidence of the structural break of money demand is then used to assess the
impact of the reform on the seigniorage Laffer curve.
Two interesting empirical studies on Polish money demand already exist. Lane
(1992b) looks at money demand before the reform of 1990 when Poland was basically a
planned economy. A theoretical model is constructed in which Polish agents face cash-
in-advance constraint on domestic currency when buying in official markets and a cash-
in-advance constraint on foreign money when buying in black markets. The money
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demand functions from the model then are tested empirically. Using an Error-Correction
Model a stable long-run money demand is found. Short-run adjustment of money de-
mand is found to be fairly rapid, contradicting the notion that money in a communist
economy is passive. Chawluk and Cross (1994) find evidence that shortages had a
significant influence on money demand of Polish agents. Higher shortages necessitated
the Polish agents to hold lazger precautionary cash-balances than they would otherwise.
Fluctuations in shortages therefore exerted a separate influence on money demand. A
number of proxies of the degree of shortages is used to correct real money demand.
An interesting empirical implication from the theoretical part was the structural
change in the demand for real Polish money: a decline in the intercept and an increase
in the elasticity of money demand with respect to the domestic and foreign rate of
inflation. Figure 2 indeed suggested that a structural break in demand for real currency
and the demand for narrow money occurred in Poland at the end of 1989. We can test
this theoretical implication by splitting the entire sample into two parts: the period
before January 1990 when currency controls were in force and the period after January
1990 when currency controls were not active, and test whether intercept and slopes of
the money demand function changed azound January 1990.
In order to test for a structural break in the demand for money, we estimate a




The dummy coefficients So, S~ and SZ measure the 'regime switching' effects of a
removal of currency controls on money demand as derived in (15). The 'reform' dummy
D takes a value 0 for the first subsample and a value 1 for the second subsample. If So
is negative, support for a drop in the constant of the money demand function is found. A
negative value for 8~ and a positive SZ indicate increased sensitiveness of domestic real
money demand w.r.t. the domestic and foreign rate of inflation after the 1990 reforms.
Our dataset contains quarterly data on Polish currency in circulation, C, narrow
money, Ml, in circulation, the Polish consumer price index, P, and the US consumer
price index, Pi. Data were available from the IMF International Financial Statistics and
the National Bank of Poland; an unbroken time series for all variables from the first
quarter of 1987 until the third quarter of 1995 could be derived.
Estimating (20) by OLS, may produce spurious results if the dependent and
independent variables aze non-stationazy and no cointegrating relationship is found
between them. To check whether such spurious results may be produced we, therefore,
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first employ unit-root tests on the dependent and independent variables. Table 1 gives
the results from the unit root tests. Two unit-root tests where considered (i) the Dickey-
Fuller test (DF), and (ii) the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test using a constant and a
deterministic trend; in both cases two lags were used in the specification.
Table 1
Unit Root Tests
CU~P MI~P n n~
(a) levels
DF -1.23 -1.30 -1.13 -0.76
ADF -2.12 -1.41 -2.21 -2.20
(b) first dif-
ferences
DF -4.54' -3.30' - 3.80' -3.35'
ADF -4.85' -3.73' - 3.86' -3.41'
Unit Root tests t at a vana e contams a unit root. I
the DF and ADF test statistics are significant one
rejects HO that the variable contains a unit root. ~
denotes significant at a So~o significance level
The unit root tests indicate that the variables in the regression are indeed non-stationarity
and integrated of order one.
Next, we proceed by estimating the money demand functions in the form of a
two-stage Error-Correction Model (ECM) whose principles were first formulated by
Engle and Granger (1986). In the first stage the long-run or static money demand func-
tion (20) is estimated in levels using OLS. It is tested whether the OLS residuals are
stationary or not: if the residuals are found to be stationary, a cointegrating relation
between the variables exists and OLS does produce consistent estimates of the long-run
money demand functions. The results from estimating the long-run demand for real cur-
rency and real narrow money are given in Table 2.
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Table 2
Estimation Results of the Long Run Money Demand Functions
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const D n Drt n' Da" RZ s.e. F(3,35) DF DW
GP 5.75' -0.74~` -0.54' -0.26~` 0.47 0.35 0.93 0.26 6.72' -4.61' 1.73
(5.30) (-5.91) (-8.37) (-5.15) (0.85) (1.26)
MIIP 6.88' -1.32' -0.69' -0.42' 0.82 -0.13' 0.97 0.37 4.9]' -3.26' 1.91
(6.97) (-10.05) (-11.38) (-7.93) (0.59) (-3.04)
t-statisUCS are oun m parent eses. m icates t at a vana e ~s s~gni icant at a 95"~o eve o sigm i-
cance. s.e.: standard error of the regression. F(.): F-test on the restriction SoS,-SZ0. DF: Dickey-Fuller
test on stationarity of the OLS residuals. Stationarity of the residuals occurs if the DF test statistic is
significant and implies that a cointegrating relation exists. DW: Durbin-Watson statistic on autocorrelation
of the residuals
The estimates for the dummy coefficients support the hypothesis of a structural
change in the money demand function: the estimates of So,S~ are significant and with the
correct sign. SZ is not significant in case of real currency and with a wrong sign in case
of narrow money. A substantial (in the order of 150~o to 250~0) and statistically significant
drop in the constant is predicted. In the DF column a Dickey-Fuller test on the
stationarity of the OLS residuals is performed to test whether or not there is a
cointegrating relation between the non-stationary variables.
The hypothesis of cointegration is confirmed in both cases. The absence of
autocorrelation according to the Durbin Watson (DW) statistic in the next column
implies further support for the case of cointegration and non-degenerate OLS estimates.
In the F(.) column of Table 2, we test the restriction that all three reform dummies are
equal to 0, i.e. that no structural change in the demand for real money occurred around
January 1990. In both case we can reject the zero hypothesis of no change.
In the second stage of the ECM, the money demand functions are estimated in
first differences rather than in levels and the lagged OLS residual of the long-run or
static money demand function is added as an explanatory variable. This gives estimates
of the short-run or dynamic money demand function,
DIn(p)-ytOn tS1D0~t~3z0~'}S2DO~n'tpEC-tte (21)
in which 4 denotes the difference operator and EC.~ the lagged OLS residual from the
estimations the static money demand function (20). The estimation results from estimat-
ing the short run money demand function are found in Table 3.
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Table 3
Estimation Results Short Run Money Demand Functions
On DOa rt' D~a' EC-, RZ s.e. F(2,34) DW
4CIP -0.29' -0.08' 0.12' -0.03 -0.47' 0.59 0.10 1.19 1.62
(-5.13) (-1.90) (2.31) (-1.54) ( -4.16)
~YIIIP -0.38' -0.15' 0.17 0.07 -0.52' 0.60 0.11 2.76' 1.56
(-6.37) (-2.30) ( 1.50) (1.78) (-4.26)
t-statistics are oun m parentheses. m icates t at a vana e ~s sigm icant at a 5"~0
level of significance. s.e.: standard error of the regression. F(.): F-test on the restriction
y,-y2 0. DW: Durbin-Watson statistic on autocorrelation of the residuals.
The estimated elasticities of the short-run money demand functions aze smaller
than their long-run equivalents. The lagged OLS residual is the error-correction term
which measures the speed of adjustment of money demand towazds the long-run money
demand function: if the coefficient of the error-correction term is low, money demand
adjust only slowly to its long-run equilibrium level and vice versa. The estimated para-
meter of the error-correction term implies that money demand adjusts fairly quickly to
its long-run value: a value of p of -0.5 implies that SOo~o of the distance between actual
and long-run money balances is removed in a quarter.
From the estimates of real money demand, (20), we can draw the (steady-state)
seigniorage Laffer curves that were present in Poland before and after the removal of the
currency controls in Januazy 1990, since the change of seigniorage revenues according
to (19) can be estimated as:
sU -sR - n [So t S in t S2~ `] (22)
Figure 6 graphs the downward jump of the seigniorage Laffer curve Poland experienced
with the removal of currency controls, according to our estimates of (20).
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Figure 6 'Reform' Shift of the Polish
Seigniorage Laffer Curve '89-'90
Seigniorage revenues from currency in circulation were related to 1989 output. Inflation
during 1989 rose from 770~o in the first quarter to 3600~o in the last quarter when the
Polish economy was in a hyperinflation. Inflation at that time was well beyond the rate
of inflation that would maximize steady-state seigniorage which according to our esti-
mates was around 1850~0. The removal of the currency controls induced the downwazd
shift in the seigniorage Laffer curve that is indicated by an azrow. In the new regime the
inflation rate that maximizes steady-state seigniorage is considerably lower, azound
1250~0. During 1990 inflation declined steadily and the Polish economy moved leftwazd
along the new seigniorage Laffer curve.
7.5 A Model on Financial Repression, Liberalisation and Seigniorage
Apart from reserve requirements, inefficiencies and delays in the payments system force
the banking and financial sector to hold a larger amount of reserve money than it other-
wise would. In our analysis such involuntarily held excess reserves because of ineffic-
ient payment systems, are considered to be part of the financíal repression by the monet-
ary authorities, as their consequences on seigniorage are similaz to those of reserve
requirements. "Float" balances held at the central bank because of inefficiencies in the
payments systems have amounted up to 150~0 of reserve money in Eastern Europe.
Folkerts-Landau e.a. (1993) and Balino e.a. (1994) analyse the inefficiencies in the
payments systems in Eastern Europe and consider the scope for reforming payments
systems.
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During the 1980's Poland implemented some small but steady reforms in its
financial sector in an attempt to reduce the most obvious distortions. In particular,
bureaucracy and the lack of financial discipline of state enterprises resulting in `soft
budget constraints' were attacked. In 1989 the State bank was dissolved into 9 com-
mercial banks that were each operating in a particular region. The major reform of the
financial sector followed with the jump on the path of transition towards a market
economy with the Polish `Big Bang' of 1990. As concerning reform of the financial
sector, this structural reform and macroeconomic stabilisation program, established a
free banking system, privatisation of the state-owned enterprises in the financial sector,
internal and external convertibility of the Zloty and a strong reduction of direct interven-
tion by the State in the financial sector.
As in the other Eastern European countries, reform of the Polish financial sector
has been hindered initially by (a) a low degree of competition, (b) an inadequate and
inefficient payments system -resulting in float-, ( c) a large amount of non or ill-perform-
ing loans that were made to (former) state-owned companies, ( d) inadequate regulation
and supervision by the monetary authorities, ( e) a lack of experienced and trained
workers in the financial sector. During 1991 and 1992 a new body of regulatory and
supervisory legislation was introduced to strengthen further the institutional framework
of the financial markets. Included were amendments to establish a more independent
Central Bank, a system of minimum capital requirements, capital adequacy ratios,
restrictions on exposure and bankruptcy procedures. Deposit insurance is, however, still
prevented because of the large amount of non-performing loans that still exist in the
financial sector. Measures to reform the payments system, to stimulate money market
development and recapitalisation of banks using fiscal resources are other important
elements of the financial sector reform. Privatisation of state owned bank branches and
the rapid growth of new domestic and foreign banks have led to a sharp increase in
competition.
In this section we analyse the consequences of a system of reserve requirements
that authorities impose on the domestic financial sector. Reserve requirements viz. finan-
cial repression here are defined as the effective reserve requirement rather than statutory
reserve requirements sínce we want to include the "float" balances that the banking
sector is forced to hold with the monetary authorities because of inefficient payment
systems. In this manner we are able to concentrate on the actual fiscal revenues that
financial repression provides. Reserve requirements imply that the amount of base
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money, H, is held artificially high, thus enlarging seigniorage revenues13. Base money
equals currency in circulation, M, plus reserve money, which equals the reserve require-
ments, T~, times the different types of deposits, D~:
H-Mf~ ti~D (23)
i
Real seigniorage revenues are defined as the change in real base money. According to
(22), seigniorage revenues come from two sources, from the increase in currency in
circulation and from an increase in banking reserves, either due to an increase in reserve
requirements or an increase in deposits. Real seigniorage revenues, s, are equal to the
product of the rate of base money growth, ~t-(1~H)(dHldt), times the stock of real base
money, h-HIP, where P denotes the price level and t time'". p is controlled by the
monetary authorities.
Assume that economic agents have two alternatives to perform transactions and
to store wealth: currency or deposits in domestic currency15 that yield a nominal return
of i`t. Deposits are subject to a uniform reserve requirement, i. With competitive banking
the deposit rate will equal one minus the reserve requirement times the nominal (bor-
rowing) rate of interest i, implying that i~-(1-T)i16. ii acts as an implicit tax on financial
intermediation by the banking industry. The nominal deposit rate equals the real deposit
rate, rv, minus the rate of inflation, i.e. i`t-~t~r. The real deposit rate can be rewritten as
a function of reserve requirements, the real interest rate in the economy, r, and the rate
" This argument stresses the revenue motive underlying reserve requirements. Other motives that are
sometimes distinguished are (i) its use as a monetary policy instrument, (ii) reserve money is a primary
source of liquidity for the domestic money market, (iii) the seigniorage from reserve requirements could
be considered as a renumeration of the services of the Central Bank provided to the banking sector.
" This follows since: s -
dH 1- dH 1 H- p h
dt P dt H P
15 In van Aarle and Budina ( 1995) we investigate the demand for foreign currency deposits in Eastern
Europe. We found a significant impact from such currency substitution on Polish money demand and by
that on seigniorage during the transition period.
16 Banking profits, B, equal the average rate of return on its loans minus the average rate of return on
its deposits, i.e. 8-[(1 -T)i-io]D. The zero profit condition thus implies ( 1 -T)i-i~. The assumption of a
competitive financial sector is clearly rather odd in the case of Poland before 1990. However, as Siegel
(1981) shows, the outcomes under perfect competition are replicated by a financial monoply whose profits
are taxed at a rate of 100"~0. Fry ( 1981) discusses government monopoly in the financial sector.
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of inflation: ~-(1-T)r-in. For simplicity we assume that the real interest rate is constant
and equal to the rate of time preference. In steady-state the rate of inflation equals the
rate of base money growth minus real output growth, g-~lYldt, i.e. rz-p -g.
It is a useful exercise to derive the macroeconomic demand for currency and
deposits by solving the underlying optimisation problem of the representative agent.
Agents will use the different characteristics of both monies to determine the optimal
demand for both monies as a function of the transactions motive and the store of value
motive. Such a derivation of demand for currency and deposits from microeconomic
principles is implied by the 'shopping time' approach, as found e.g. in Brock ( 1989),
and the 'liquidity costs' approach of money demand that is based on cash-in-advance
constraints, as found e.g. in Bachetta and Caminal (1992). It can been shown that both
the 'shopping time' and the 'liquidity costs' approaches aze functionally equivalent to
the 'money-in-the-utility-function' approach that we want to employ here".
In the money-in-the-utility-function approach, a representative consumer derives
utility from real consumption, c, and liquidity. Assume that utility is separable into
utility derived from consumption, u(c), and utility derived from liquidity, v(.). Money
can be held in the form of real currency balances, which aze denoted as, m-iYUP, and
real deposits, d-D~P, which yield a nominal return i~, therefore, v(.)-v(m,d). Utility is
assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in its arguments, therefore, u~~0, v,,,~0,
v,,~0 and u~.~~0, v,,,,,,~0, v,,~~0. For simplicity, it is assumed that currency and deposits are
substitutes nor complements in the utility function, implying that V,,,~V~,,,-0. The con-
sumer seeks to maximise his intertemporal utility function subject to the dynamic budget
constraint that relates real wealth accumulation, net, after-tax, income, consumption and
opportunity costs of holding currency and deposits. This dynamic optimisation problem
can be written as follows,







in which w denotes real wealth, y, denotes real income that is derived from supplying
" See Croushore (1993) and Feenstra (1986).
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one unit of labour in the labour mazket and which is taxed at a rate iy. Real wealth
consists of real bonds, b, real currency and real deposits. Bonds yield the nominal
interest rate, i. The no-Ponzi game condition precludes unbounded growth of indebted-
ness. The present value Hamiltonian that is associated with this dynamic optimisation
problem equals,
H- u(c) } v(m,d) t~, (rw ty(1-i) - c- i m-(i -i d) d) (25)
where ~, denotes the co-state vaziable corresponding to the dynamic constraint ti'v. The













Total differentiation of (25b) and (25c) implies that -given our assumptions about the
signs of the first and second order derivatives of u(.) and v(.)- the demand for real
currency and the demand for real deposits are a positive function of consumption and a







Fairly standard log-lineaz macroeconomic demand functions for currency and deposits,
1e The partial derivatives that result, equal:
am u~~t dm u~
ac - v~ ai - v~
~ u~~(i-i~ ~j u~
dc - v~ a(i - i~- vee
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ln(m) - amin(y) - ~im i
ln(d) - adln(y) - (3d(i -i ~
(28a)
(28b)
will satisfy (27) and will be used in the remainder of the analysis. Empirical estimation
of (28) yields estimates income elasticities and the interest semi-elasticities of both
demand functions and will be important in the empirical part of the analysis.
Combining (22) and (28) -and using the implication of a competitive banking
sector that sets i-i~ equal to ii- we can write steady-state seigniorage revenues, s-ph, as
the following exponential function of the rate of base money growth and financial
repression:
a~ln(c)-Pc(r'V-8) aaln(c)'9et(~'v-8)s-ph-~(e tte ) (29)
Seigniorage revenues display the well-known Laffer curve property: if inflation increases
seigniorage revenues first increase. If inflation is increased beyond the seigniorage maxi-
mising rate of inflation, a further increase in inflation reduces seigniorage revenues. The
rate of base money growth that maximises steady-state seigniorage is found when
differentiating (24) w.r.t. p:
~ -0 a (1-(i~4~)c}t(lt(3d4~)d-0
id
" il- ~ct ~ C ~ád-tiil~
c F'
(30)
The effective reserve requirement that maximises steady-state seigniorage in turn
is found when differentiating (24) w.r.t. z:




If both the rate of base money growth and the effective reserve requirement aze tazgeted
such as to maximise seigniorage revenues and if we assume for simplicity in the remain-
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der that the real rate of interest and the growth rate of real output are equal to zero19, i.e.
r-g-0, we find lt~`-1IR~ and t~`-R~Re. In the next section, we derive empirical estimates
for the interest elasticities in case of Poland and use to estimates to calculate such a
seigniorage maximising combination {p~`,T~`} for Poland.
Note that in case of unitary income elasticities, i.e. a,,,-a~1, seigniorage rev-
enues as a fraction of output, s~y, are independent of the level of output. If a~ and ad are
larger than one, seigniorage revenues increase more than proportional to output.
7.6 Empirical Testing of the Model: the Case of Poland
Figure 7 plots real currency in circulation and real deposits in Poland during the period
1988-1995 (both in logs). Deposits are the sum of demand, time, saving and foreign cur-
rency deposits held in domestic banks. The sum of time, saving and foreign currency
deposits is often referred to as the stock of quasi-money (QM). Together with narrow
money (M1) which consists of currency and demand deposits, quasi-money forms the
stock of broad money (M2) in the economy.
19 Without this assumption, the pair {p', t'} has to be found from solving the following
combination of non-linear optimality conditions:
I (r-g)d








88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
- Giirrenry - - Deposits
Figure 7 Real Currency and Real Deposits.
Poland 1988-1995
To estimate the interest elasticities of the demand for currency and deposits, we
estimated the following log-lineaz money demand functions:
Mln(P)- a~ln(y) t pm i t trend } e~
ln(P) - adln(y) t ad(i - id) t trend t Ed
(32a)
(32b)
a; and (i; measure the income and interest elasticities of the demand for currency and
deposits. The average borrowing and lending interest rates on 3 months Zloty deposits
were used as the nominal borrowing rate, i, and the nominal lending rate, i~, in (32).
Output was approximated by using the index of industrial production. A trend was
added to account for the impact of long-term factors, if any, that may impact on money
demand. In particular, the impact of financial innovations, e.g. credit cazds, cash
machines etc., on money demand is sometimes introduced in the form of a trend, see
e.g. Arrau e.a. (1995).
Table 3 gives the results from estimating (32),
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Table 3
Estimation Results Money Demand and Deposit Demand Functions
a (i trend RZ adj. s.e. ADF(4) no.obs.
c 0.84' -0.46` -0.003 0.80 0.30 -3.61' 37
(9.58) (-2.92) (-1.65) [-3.56] (86I:95I)
d 0.86' -1.18' 0.002 0.85 0.28 -3.59' 37
(15.73) (-2.89) (1.33) [-3.56j (861:951)
enotes sigm icant at a So~o eve o con i ence. s.e.: stan ar error o t e regress~on.
ADF(4): Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on stationarity of the regression residuals, using a
constant, deterministic trend and four lags in the specification.
t-statistics are given in brackets below the parameter estimates. The ADF column con-
tains the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test (including both constant and trend and
4 lags in its specification) on stationarity of the OLS residuals. If the residuals are
stationary, a cointegrating relation between the regression variables exist and OLS
produces consistent estimates of the true parameters, despite the non-stationarity of the
dependent and independent variables, as shown by Engle and Granger (1987). In both
cases we indeed do not reject the hypothesis that the OLS residuals of our estimated
regressions are stationary at a 950~o significance level.
The small trends that we find in both cases imply that the demand for currency
shifts down a little bit autonomously each year whereas deposits increase a little bit.
Assuming that this is indeed due to financial innovation, the estimated trends imply a
steady increase in sophistication of money services. The estimated parameters in Table 3
of the different money demand functions enable us to draw the seigniorage Laffer curve




Figure 9 Inflation, Financial Repression and Seig-
niorage in Poland
The parameter estimates now allow us to calculate the combination {p~`,T~} that maxi-
mises steady-state seigniorage. Using the results derived in Section 2 we find
p~`-1~(3~:2170~o and t~`-(3~l(3,,-390~0. Accordingly, we conclude that Poland gradually
moved away from its seigniorage maximising combination of inflation and financial
repression during the period 1989-1995.
Conclusion
In the context of a small open economy model, a closer look at the public finance
consequences of currency substitution, currency controls and financial repression was
undertaken. Currency substitution of a significant degree was seen to have potentially
strong influence on public finance. Currency substitution imposes inflationary discipline
to monetary policymakers, because a higher degree of currency substitution makes
demand for domestic money, and by that real seigniorage revenues, more sensitive to
inflation differentials between the small economy and the rest-of-the-world.
The public finance effects of imposing or removing currency controls were
derived. Currency controls are a widespread phenomenon in developing countries and in
the model they enter as devices with which monetary authorities are able to avoid
currency substitution and by that prevent the seigniorage outflow due to currency substi-
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tution in the domestic economy. The removal of a currency control was seen to induce a
structural break in money demand.
An empirical illustration of the analysis was carried with respect to U.S. dollar
currency substitution in Poland, where the removal of a currency control on Januazy, lth
1990 was part of a larger reform package and an active disinflation policy. Evidence for
a significant structural break in money demand was found. Polish currency substitution
displayed a form of hysteresis: after the hyperinflation a structurally higher degree of
dollarisation was seen, which only gradually declined after the hyperinflation. The break
in Polish money demand that was found, enabled us to determine the reform-effect on
the shape of the Polish seigniorage Laffer curve.
Financial reform is a crucial aspect in the transition economies in Eastern Europe.
In the former communist system financial intermediation, foreign exchange and pay-
ments systems were all controlled by the monopolistic State Bank acting as a direct gov-
ernment agent in the planning process. In a decentralised market-led economy such a
structure of the financial sector is clearly inappropriate.
Poland has pursued a deliberate policy of financial sector reform since 1989. This
policy has led to a strong drop in direct government intervention in financial markets.
Gradually, a new institutional body of regulation and supervision is created that is better
suited to establish an efficient financial sector in a mazket-led economy. Financial sector
reform itself is likely to foster economic growth in Poland.
The second part of this chapter applied a theoretical model on financial
repression to the process of financial sector reform in Poland. In particulaz, we con-
sidered the relation between financial repression, inflation and seigniorage revenues. We
discussed the effect of financial sector reform on seigniorage. After estimating demand
for currency and deposits for Poland, we were able to draw the seigniorage Laffer curve.
The inflation stabilisation and decrease in financial repression during the period '89-'94,
while beneficial in many respects, have led to a substantial reduction in seigniorage
revenues accruing to the Polish government.
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Appendix A Optimal Taxation with Currency Substitution and Currency Controls
Consider the problem of choosing the optimal mix of ordinary taxes and the inflation tax
in an economy with currency substitution. Assume that ordinary taxes cazry collection
costs, K(T), which aze increasing and convex in t, i.e. x'(2p0 and x"(r)~0. The dynamic
government budget constraint (] 0) then becomes:
g-T tx(i)-s-mstrrm5-mstn(m}m') (A.1)
The tax collection costs imply that even lump-sum taxes, while not distortionary at the
individual level, are costly from a macroeconomic perspective: collecting them can only
at the sacrifice of real resources.
Optimal taxation requires the government to choose that pazticular mix of ordi-
nazy taxes and the inflation tax that maximises social welfare, which is defined by (1).
The optimal mix of taxation is found when maximising (1) subject to the dynamic
government budget constraint (10), using (2), (6), (7a), (7b). The optimal taxation prob-
lem yields the following static efficiency condition regarding inflation and ordinary
taxes:
n- 1 [2an' f o(Q }2)Z (a tK'(ti))l (A.2)
a2t2o t2
According to (A.2), the government should rely more on the inflation tax if the foreign
rate of inflation is high, if foreigners hold a high amount of domestic money or if
ordinary taxes bear high marginal collection costs. Currency substitution as measured by
a and a influences the optimal rate of inflation: a higher a increases the optimal rate of
inflation whereas a lower 6 drives down the optimal rate of inflationZO.
Maximisation of social welfare in the presence of cunency controls is achieved
when the ordinary taxes and the inflation tax are set such that:
20 The partial derivatives of r~ w.r.t. a and a are resp.
c3n - a"t4o3t10a2f812on'ta(at2)Z(a tx'(s))]
aa a2t2o;2
t I [2n't(3oZ;8at4)(a'K'(t))] ~ 0
aZt2ot2
an - o(o t2)2 ~ 0
aa oZt2at2
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n -(atl)(a tx'(ti)) t w (A.3)
If a currency control is imposed, the optimal inflation rate is higher than without a con-
trol if 6 is not too large, i.e. if both monies aze good substitutes, and foreign inflation is
low, as is clear when subtracting (A.3) from (A.2):
2
no-~R- o -2 (a tx(,r))-w t 2a n. (A.4)
azt2a }2 aZt2a t2
in which ~ni~ refers to the optimal interest rate when no currency control is imposed and
~R to the optimal rate of inflation if a currency control is imposed.
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Chapter 8
Tax Smoothing and the Time-Inconsistency Problem: Evidence for
Developed and Developing Countries'
Introduction
Government debt increased considerably throughout the 1980s in most developed and
developing countries. A high stock of government debt may create adverse incentive
problems as the government is tempted to (partially) default on its obligations. The
anticipation that the government will force a(partial) explicit default or a confiscatory
interest rate tax, induces financial markets to require a'default' premium on government
debt. If the probability of explicit repudiation rises with the amount of outstanding real
government debt, the real interest rate on government debt rises with the stock of
government debt itselfz.
Besides such an explicit default on its obligations, nominal government debt
carries the possibility to default implicitly by generating inflation and erode the real
value of outstanding government debt in that way. Rational agents will be aware of this
time-inconsistency problem associated with non-indexed government debt and will set
inflationary expectations accordingly. Therefore, with a high stock of non-indexed
govemment debt, inflation tends to be higher than the socially optimal level as predicted
by the framework of dynamic optimal taxation since agents will find it increasingly
likely that the government will seek to reduce the real value of its debt by creating a
surprise inflation.
The theory of dynamic optimal taxation determines optimal inflation -which acts
as a tax on holders of money balances- and ordinary taxation from the excess burdens
associated with different forms of taxation and the respective elasticities of the tax bases
w.r.t. their tax rates. As shown by Mankiw (1987), equalisation of the marginal excess
burden both across different tax instruments and over time gives the optimal tax rates. In
addition, Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) compare inflation and ordinary taxation in the
optimal but time-inconsistent case with inflation and taxation in the suboptimal but time-
' This chapter is based on joint research with Gert-Jan Thomassen. We benefited from many insightful
suggestions of Harry Huizinga.
Z Alesina e.a. (1992) find some empirical evidence of small risk-premia on govemment debt in some
highly indebted OECD countries.
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consistent case.
This paper provides empirical evidence on the implications of the dynamic
optimal taxation or "tax-smoothing" model for a broad set of developing and developed
countries. First, government solvency is tested as this is one of the underlying
assumptions for the tax-smoothing hypothesis. Next we explore the static and dynamic
efficiency conditions of the dynamic optimal taxation problem. Finally we consider the
implications of the time-inconsistency problem associated with a high stock of nominal
government debt.
The time-inconsistency problems a highly-indebted government faces, can be
alleviated by a commitment device. Such a commitment device makes a commitment to
honour government debt obligations more credible in the eyes of the holders of
government debt. Commitment devices that have been analysed in the literature are
indexation of government debt (e.g. Bohn (1988), Calvo (1988b) and Huber (1992)), and
the choice of the term structure of government debt (Persson, Persson and Svensson
(1987), Missale and Blanchard (1991), Persson and Svensson (1986)).
In the current analysis, we distinguish between government debt issued in
domestic currency and government debt issued in foreign currency. If purchasing parity
holds (approximately at least), the real value of outstanding government debt in foreign
currency is not a source of time-inconsistency problems, as its real value is not eroded
by unanticipated inflation, as it is the case if government debt is issued in domestic
currency. A government with a large stock of public debt, therefore, could reduce in
principle its time-inconsistency problems by issuing foreign currency debt instead of
domestic currency debt. Such a policy would actually be quite similar to indexing of
government debt. The paper is set up as follows: section 2 considers the framework of
dynamic optimal taxation and the problem of time-inconsistency of high government
debt. Section 3 presents empirical evidence on government solvency, dynamic optimal
taxation and the time-inconsistency problem of high government debt for a sample of
fourty developed and twenty developing countries. A short conclusions summarises the
main results from this paper.
8.2 Dynamic Optimal Taxation: the Theoretical Framework
The theory of dynamic optimal taxation, whose principles have been formulated by
Barro (1979) and Mankiw (1987), determines the optimal mix of taxation and the
spreading of tax burdens over time. An essential feature of the dynamic optimal taxation
framework is the notion that all forms of taxation imply distortions. Given the "excess
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burdens" associated with different types of taxation, the dynamic optimal taxation model
derives the optimal structure of taxation and its optimal dynamic adjustment. Dynamic
optimal taxation requires the intertemporal minimisation of the excess burden from
financing a given government spending requirement by the available set of government
revenue sources. Minimisation of the excess burden is achieved if the marginal excess
burdens are set to an equal level, both across different instruments and over time. The
optimal dynamic path of taxation and government debt results from the tax-smoothing
requirement, that requires a constant marginal excess burden over time. Tax smoothing
implies that temporary changes in government spending (e.g. due to a waz) aze covered
by government debt accumulation, whereas permanent changes in government spending
are met by permanent changes in taxation.
In order to formalise this argument, we follow the dynamic optimal taxation
framework of Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) and extent it to an open economy setting
where government debt can be issued in domestic and foreign currency. Two revenue
sources aze distinguished: the inflation tax that is imposed on holders of domestic (base)
money if inflation is positive and ordinazy taxes which aze modeled as an income viz.
output tax. The excess burden from income taxation result from its distortionazy impact
on production and the deadweight losses associated with its collection. Distortions
induced by inflation aze the reduction in desired cash holdings, the "menu-costs" that aze
induced by price changes and the unintended redistributive effects inflation causes'.
Define the total excess burden, L„ as the expected present value of deadweight losses




where p denotes the discount factor. It is assumed that h(.) and -v(.) are increasing and
convex functions of their arguments.
The dynamic government budget constraint relates government spending,
ordinary taxes, the inflation tax and government debt accumulation. We distinguish
between government debt denominated in domestic currency, Do, and government debt
denominated in foreign currency, D;. Total outstanding governtnent debt at time t equals
' An early contribution on the social costs of inflation is Bailey (1956). Lucas ( 1994) extends the
work of Bailey and applies it to the case of the U.S.
" Trehan and Walsh (1990) consider the possibility of stochastic shocks to the "excess burden"
functions h(.) and -v(.).
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D~Dote,D;~ in which e, denotes the exchange rate at time t. Government debt issued in
domestic currency pays the domestic nominal interest rate, i„ whereas government debt
in foreign currency pays the foreign nominal interest rate, i;. Denote by 6 the fraction of
total government debt that is denominated in domestic currency, i.e. 6-Do~D,.
Real debt is found when deflating nominal debt by the price level at time t, p,.
Denoting real variables by lowercase characters, we can write the dynamic government
budget constraint in real terms as follows,
d-do 1 t{ pr-t tdF I ti. Pr-ter-t t -T -s~ ~-t( ~ t)(-) ~-t( ~ t)( ) g~ ~y~ ~
P~ P~e~
(2)
in which g, denotes real government expenditures, i„ the rate of income taxations, y„
real output and, s„ seigniorage revenues. A higher rate of inflation reduces the real value
of (non-indexed) government debt at time t, as long as it is denominated in domestic
currency. The real value of government debt denominated in foreign currency is not
eroded by inflation if purchasing power parity holds (approximately). In that case, a
higher rate of inflation implies a higher rate of depreciation of the exchange rate. In that
case the real value of the fraction (1-6) of total goven~unent debt that is denominated in
foreign currency is not eroded by domestic inflationb. This feature will turn out to be
important in the remainder of the analysis.
Seigniorage revenues are the real proceeds from money creation and are defined
as the increase in real money balances in circulation,
Mi-M~-t - 1~r-ts~- -m~-m~-t( )
pr Pr
(3)
Seigniorage results from two sources: the inflation tax on outstanding money balances
and the seigniorage revenues induced by real economic growth that necessitates agents
to hold more money to carry out their transactions.
5 For simplicity, we assume that tax revenues can be collected instantaneously, i.e. that there are no
collection lags. In the presence of tax collections lags, real tax revenues -if not indexed- will be eroded by
inflation. Such a"Tanzi-effect" implies that real tax revenues are a negative function of the rate of
inflation, i.e. T, Y, -Ty,(~rt,) with Ty,'~0.
6 This follows immediately since purchasing power parity implies that P`-le`-~ -p`--1 , in which p;
Piet Pr~
denotes the foreign price level.
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To rule out the case where a government accumulates unsustainable levels of
government debt, we need to impose the no-Ponzi game condition which prevents
government debt from accumulating at a rate faster than the real interest rate on
government debt, implying that,
lim d~ e frJ ~ - 0 (4)
r-m
Note that the government solvency constraint is also violated if the government runs an
unsustainable series of primary surpluses.
Dynamic optimal taxation requires the minimisation of (1) subject to the dynamic
government budget constraint (2) -inserting the definition of seigniorage ( 3)- and the
condition that the government remains solvent (4). Assume that the excess burdens of
income taxation and inflation can be represented by the following CES functions:
h(T,)-ti,a"~(afl) and v(p,., ~p,)-(p,.l Ip,)`-PI(1-(3). a and (3 aze positive coefficients that
summarise all institutional characteristics that influence the excess burdens of both taxes.
The first-order conditions from minimising (1) subject to the dynamic government
budget constraint (2) and the no-Ponzi game condition (4) are,
pr-ia (-)-P
Tr pr




( P~ )-v (p~-~)-a
E ( p~. i





where ~ and rl are defined as the elasticity of real income w.r.t. the tax rate and the
interest elasticity of real money demand, respectively. E,(.) denotes the expectations
operator. Expectations determined at time t are based on the information set which
includes all past observations of the money supply, inflation, income tax rates and past
and current government debt.
(Sa) is the intra-temporal or static optimality condition that equates in any period
the marginal excess burdens of both tax instruments, thus "smoothing" of the excess
burdens from taxation over the different tax instnunents. This implies that the rate of
inflation and the rate of ordinary taxation display comovement over time. (Sb) and (Sc)
aze intertemporal or dynamic efficiency conditions that require "tax-smoothing" over
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time: taxes are set optimal if the expected marginal excess burden is smoothed over
time. Government debt plays an important role in ensuring optimal taxation because it
enables to smooth taxation over time: temporary changes in government spending, e.g.
due to a waz, can be covered by increases in government debt. Permanent changes in
government spending, however, are optimally absorbed by permanent changes in
taxation. Taking logazithms, assuming rational expectations and that the expected growth








where n-1n(p,Ip,.~) denotes the rate of inflation. yo-1l[i.ln[(lti;)I(lfrl)], y,-a~p and
yZ-1~R are positive constants.
Monetary policy, if set according to the principles of dynamic optimal taxation, is
subject to a time-inconsistency problem' if government debt is issued in domestic
currency and non-indexed: governments will have an incentive to reduce the real value
of these nominal government liabilities by a high rate of inflation. As soon as the public
realises that monetary policy is subject to such a time-inconsistency problem, it will
revíse its inflationary expectations accordingly. Therefore, n-~rz`([m,.ffd,"]ly,)8, rather
than n-~r(m,.,~y,) as in the time-inconsistent case. The time-consistent equilibrium, as a
result, is mazked by a higher rate of inflation than the optimal rate of inflation that
results in the time-inconsistent case. This follows directly from recalculating the
efficiency conditions of the dynamic optimal taxation problem but now taking into
account that non-indexed government debt denominated in domestic currency induces
such a time-inconsistency problem, implying that the first-order conditions become,
' It is assumed that fiscaf policy does not face a similar time-inconsistency problem when
implementing the tax rate T,. The long implementation lag of changes in tax rates and brackets usually
prevents a rapid adjustment. See Jensen (1992) for a framework where both monetary and fiscal policy is
subject to time-inconsistency problems.
e Note that we use do-(1 ti,.,-n,)d,.,o.
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The fraction of government debt that is denominated in foreign currency, 1-a, does not
give rise to time-inconsistency problems: provided, as before, that purchasing power
parity holds (approximately), inflation implies an equal depreciation of the exchange rate
and the real value of government debt that is denominated in foreign currency remains
unaffected.
8.3 Dynamic Optimal Taxation: Empirical Evidence
In this section we want to test whether there are countries that appear to have followed
the optimal taxation principles and if time-inconsistency problems associated with high
government debt have surfaced. In order to do so a dataset for fouriy developing and
twenty developed countries was considered. Data were taken from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics. Table 1 gives the rate of inflation, income taxation,
fiscal deficit, and total government debt. For a considerable number of developing
countries it was possible to calculate the share, a, of total government debt that is
denominated in domestic currency. Inflation, n, is measured as the annual rate of change
in the consumer price index. The rate of ordinary taxes, i, is defined as the ratio of total
government tax revenues to GDP. f denotes the ratio of the (interest-inclusive) fiscal
deficit to GDP, while d is the government debt to GDP ratio. Columns 2-6 give
averages for the period '64-'79 and the stock of government debt and a at the end of
1979 whereas columns 7-11 give the same variables for the period '80-'94 and the end
of 1984, respectively. In many cases the numbers calculated cover only a smaller period
of the 2 sub-periods because of lack of data.
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Table 1 a
Summary Statistics: Developing Countries
country '64-'79 avg '79 '79 '80-'94 avg '94 '94a t j d a a t j d a
Argentina 91.6"ro 13.8"Io 5.3ora 7.5"Io 0.77 584.2"Io 9.9"~0 2.8"ro 21.5"~0` 0.51
Bolivia 12.4"Io 9.2"ro 3.8"ro n.a. n.a. 992.2"ro 9.8oro 10.8"ro 45.6"ro` 0
Brazil 36.2"ro I5.5"ro 0.9"ro n.a. n.a. 695.2"ro 26.2"ro 7.5"ro 17.1"r" 0.99
Chile 119.9oro 28.1"~0 3.3"~o n.a. n.a. 20.7"ro 26.3"ro -0.5"~o n.a. n.a.
Columbia 16.1"ro 9.8oro 0.4"ro 8.4"ro 0.23 24.5"ro 12"ro 1.4"ro n.a. n.a.
Ecuador 9.1"~0 10.6"~0 2.2"~o n.a. n.a. 38.3"~0 13.9"~o O.SoIo n.a. n.a.
Guyana 6.5"ro 28.0"ro 8.4"ro 142.7"ro 0.54 I5.5"~0 39.7"ro 31.2oro 295.5"ró 0.16
Paraguay 7.7oro 11.1"~0 0.1"ro 7.2"ro 0.19 21.5"~0 ll.l"ro 0.2"ro 11.3"Ior 0.09
Peru 21.0"~0 15.3"Io 3.6"Io n.a. n.a. 916.2"Io 11.8"~0 3.7"~o n.a. n.a.
Suriname 7.5"ro 26.4"ro 1.3"ro 18.7"ro. 0.85 26"ro 28.4oro 12.1"Io 160.0"Iob 0.93
Uruguay 62.5"ro 17.5"ro 2.2"~0 16.1"ro 0.34 65.2"~0 23.1"ro 2.1"Io 27.5"ro 0.36
Venezuela 4.7oro 23.5"ro O.Soro 15.3"ro 0.13 26.8"ro 22.7"ro 0.2"ro 22.Ooró 0.39
Costa Rica 6.8oro 13.6"Io 3.4"ro 39.7"ro 0.74 25oro 14.9"ro 0.9"ro 46.4"ro' 0.65
EI Salvador 6.2"ro 12.5"ro 0.5"ro 18.3"ro 0.37 I8.1"ro 11.80~0 2.6"ro 37.0"ro 0.36
Guatemala 5.8"~0 9.3"ro l.l"~0 10.8"~0 0.64 I5.5"~0 8.9"ro 2.3'ro 17.1"rog 0.77
Honduras 5.1"ro 12.1"ro 1.2"~0 26.7"ro 0.29 10.8"ro IS.loro 4.1"Io 119.9"ro 0.11
Mexico 10.4"ro 8.0"~0 2.8"ro 19.7"ro 0.83 54.6'~0 8.0"~0 8.1"Io 22.6"ro` 0.92
Dominican Rp 5.9"~0 15.3"~0 1.4"~0 9.1"~0 0 24.30~0 12.8"~0 0.7"~o n.a. n.a.
Barbados 12.0"ro 28.9"Io 2.7"ro 30.9oro 0.72 6.1"~0 29.7"~0 3.6"ro 41.9"ro` 0.43
Jamaica 12.2"ro 22.8"ro 10.8"ro 76.4"ro 0.58 23.5"ro 27.0"ro 15.3"ro 59.1or" 0.73
Haiti 7.Ooro 12.7"Io 1.2oIo n.a. n.a. 10.4"~0 11.9oro 4.3"~o n.a. n.a.
Trinidad 8.5"ro 25.2"ro 0.8"Io 13.9"ro 0.42 10.7"~0 35.0"ro 4.9"Io 47.6"ro` 0.44
Israël 22.0"ro 38.4"ro 22.3"ro 220.0"ro 0.53 96.8"Io 47.7"ro 10.0"ro 137.3"~ó 0.75'
Bangladesh 14.3"ro 9.4"ro 0.2"ro n.a. n.a. 9.4"ro 10.9"ro -0.5"ro n.a. n.a.
Indonesia 123.2"ro 17.9"ro 2.8"ro 23.9"Io 0.03 9.6"Io 20.7"ro 1.2'ro 37.5"Ió 0.04
India 7.9"ro 9.5"ro 4.(1"~0 43.9"~0 0.80 9.5"ro 18.9"ro 1.2"ro 56.7"ró 0.88
Korea 14.3"ro 18.9"~0 1.2"~0 12.0"Io 0.34 8.l"ro 19.0"ro 0.9"~0 7.9"ro 0.77
Malaysia 3.7"ro 20.4"Io 6.3'ro 44.9"ro 0.78 3.7oro 24.3"ro 0.9"~0 50.2"ro 0.84
Pakistan 9.1"~0 14.0"~0 6.8"~0 60.2"Io 0.42 7.7"ro 17.2"ra 6.9"ro 77.4"Io` 0.53
Philippines 10.8"ro 12.9"ro 0.9"ro 17.0"ro 0.44 14.3"Io 15.3"ro 2.6"ro 67.9"ró 0.65
Singapore 4.6"ro 21.6"~0 0.2"Io 66.4"ro 0.93 2.8"ro 31.5"ro 4.7"ro 71.7"ro I
Sri Lanka 5.5"~0 21.5"Io 7.7"ro 60.2"ro 0.50 13.2"Io 22.0"Io I1.9"Io 97.3"~ó 0.44
Thailand 5.7"ro 13.4"ro 2.3"~0 23.3"ro 0.82 S.5"ro 16.2"ro 0.4"ro 8.4"ró 0.61
Egypt 6.8"ro 39.1"Io 17.2"~o n.a. n.a. 16.8"ro 36.2"ro 7.6"ro n.a. n.a.
Zaire 34.1"ro 24.6"Io 5.2"ro 47.7"ro 0.46 639.1"ro 8.9"ro 7.6"ro 128.7"Io" 0.10
Zambia 9.3"Io 27.7"Io 7.8"ro 92.8"ro 0.70 70.7"ro 21.3"ro 13.2oro 139.1"Io~ 0.26
Zimbabwe 5.5"ro 23.7"Io 7.7"~0 52.4"ro 0.76 17.(WIo 30.0"ro 8.5"ro 68.6"~" 0.61
South Africa 7.SoIo 19.9"ro 4.2"Io 39.7"~0 0.90 14.2"~0 23.5"ro 4.6"~0 49.6"ro' 0.97
'1993, "1992, `1991,'1990, `1989, ~1988,'1987, "1986,'1985. Source: IMF Intemational Financial Statistics.
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Table 16
Summary Statistics: Developed Countries
country '64-'79 avg '79 '80-'94 avg '94
a t f d a i j d
U.S.A. 5.6oIo 30.3"ro 1.5"~0 26.4"ro 5.1"ro 33.6"~0 4.lol0 52.6"ro
Germany 3.9"ro 40.7"ro 0.8"ro 29.7"ro 3.1"ro 45.2"Io 1.8oro 50.1"ro
Japan 7.6"Io 18.3"ro 1.7"ro 35.6"ro 2.5"ro 31.9oIo 0.7oro 56.Sor"
Canada 5.9"ro 18.0"ro 1.9oro 26.9"Io 5.60~0 17.loro 4.0"ro 45.Sora`
France 6.9"ro 40.2"ro 0.6"ro 21.6"ro 6.0"Io 48.7"ro 2.6"ro 48.5"ro
I[aly 8.9"Io 30.1"ro 6.8oro 60.3oIo 9.7"~0 39.4"~0 11.7"ro 125.4"ro
U.K. 9.4"Io 37.1"ro 2.7"ro 54.9"~0 6.8"ro 39.6oro 2.7"ro 51.5"~0
Austria 5.1"ro 26.7"ro 2.3"ro 36.0"ro 3.8oro 35.2"ro 4.óoro 64.Soro
Belg'tum 5.8oro 39.6oro 3.7"ro 72.Soro 4.4"ro 50.4"~0 9.Oo~o 136.1"Io
Denmark 8.0"ro 41.7"ro -0.9"ro 31.OoIo S.Soro 55.3"ro 2.5"ro 75.6or
Finland 8.8oro 25. I oro 0.4"ro I 1.7"ro 6.3oro 28.7"ro 3.1 "ro 62. Soro
Greece 8.5"ro 18.6"ro 2. Soro 29.0"ro 18.9"ro 25.4"ro 9.9oro 114. l oIo
Ireland 9.9"ro 32.2"ro 8.0"ro 69.8"ro 7.5"ro 39.5'~0 8.1"ro 89.8"ro
the Netherlands 6.40~0 44.1"ro 1.9"ro 44.7"ro 2.9"~0 54.9"ro 4.9"ro 78.lol0
Norway 6.8"~0 29.0"Io 3.0"Io 42.1"~0 6.8oIo 34.8"ro -l.l"ro 22.2or"
Portugal 12.6oro 25.5"ro 3.3"ro 41.0"~o I5.5"ro 36.7"ro 9.1"ro 69.7"~0
Spain 11.5"ro 23.5"ro 1.8"ro I5.5"ro 9.0"~0 36.4"ro 5.2"ro 82.9"ro
Sweden 6.8"ro 31.9"ra 1.4"ro 39.6"Io 7.6"ra 40.4"ro 4.9"Io 76.7"ro
Switzerland 4.4"ro 8.Soro 0.5"ro l4.loro 3.7"ro 9.3"Io 0.2"ro 21.8"ra
Australia 7.60~0 22.1"ro 1.9"ro n.a. 7.Oo~o 25.5"ro 0.9"ro 13.lora
'1993, ~1992. `199L'1990, `1989, r1988, 8 1987, "1986,'1985
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
An important assumption of the dynamic efficient taxation framework is that the
government solvency constraint (4) is not violated. The empirical methodology that has
been developed to test empirically whether govermnent solvency is present, is to test for
a unit root in the fiscal deficit9. Trehan and Walsh (1991) show that if the (interest
' A related solvency test that has been used in the literature is to test for cointegration between
government revenues and government expenditures, see e.g. Kremers (1988). In case cointegration
between revenues and expenditure is found, the intertemporal govemment solvency constraint is not
violated. Trehan and Walsh (1991) show that such inference about government solvency is based on the
assumption that the expected real interest rate on govemment debt is constant. It is furthermore shown
that this assumption is not necessary with the solvency test based on testing stationarity of the (interest-
inclusive) fiscal deficit.
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inclusive) fiscal deficit is found to be stationary, the intertemporal government budget
constraint is not violated and we may conclude that government solvency constraint is
not violated by current policies. A considerable number of empirical studies have tested
government solvency in this way, e.g. Trehan and Walsh (1991) in case of the U.S,
Baglioni and Cherubini (1993) in case of Italy, Grilli (1988) in case of the EU countries
and Tanner (1995) for Brazil. The second column of Table 2 present the outcomes of a
unit root test on the fiscal deficit.
To test for a unit root Dickey-Fuller test statistics were calculated and compazed
with the IOo~o, So~o and la~o critical values. If the Dickey-Fuller statistic is smaller than its
critical value we reject the presence of a unit root and conclude that the variable has
been stationary. Rejection of a unit root at l00~0 level of significance is indicated with
one asterisk, at a So~o level of significance with two asterisks and at a lo~o level of
significance with three asterisks.~o The unit root tests on the fiscal deficit cast doubt
about government solvency in a considerable number of developing countries and in
case of Italy, Belgium, Greece and Portugal in the group of developed countries. Among
the group of developing countries, some countries in South Asia appear to be insolvent
in the sense that they incurred a sequence of increasing fiscal surpluses rather than
deficits. Such a sequence of increasing fiscal surpluses is just as unsustainable in the
long run as high fiscal deficits.
'a One lag was used in the specification of the Dickey-Fuller tests. In addition Augmented Dickey-
Fuller unit roots tests with drift and with deterministic time trend were carried out which are, however,
not tabulated to save space. In most cases the outcomes of these additional unit root tests confirm the unit
root tests presented in Table 2.
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Table 2a
Unit Root Tests: Developing Countries
country F~Y ic 4a t 4t !n(m,.~~y,) ~In(m,-~~y,) In l1(n
(m~-~}d~o~y~) (rn,.~td,~~~yr)
Argentina -1.54 -2.68" " -5.03'"r -0.95 -6.14"'r -1.24 -4.60r"" -1.43 -1.81"
Bolivia -1.79" -4.54""' -8.17"r" 0.31 -3.03"rs -0.72 -5.28rrs -0.51 -3.06"""
Brazil -1.23 -0.84 -6.75""' 0.09 -8.80r"" -1.29 -6.22'"" 0.87 -0.90
Chile -2.12"" -I.46 -2.98"rr -0.40 -7.06""" -0.43 -3.15""r - -
Columbia -2.17"' -0.43 -9.42rss 0.98 -7.17""" 0.04 -6.12"' -1.32 -3.38r""
Ecuador -2.08"r -0.84 -5.28""" 0.41 -6.24""" -0.59 -4.55'"' 1.14 -1.68"
Guyana -t15 -1.76r -6.16"r" 0.32 -7.30"" -0.91 -4.23"rr -0.56 -2.79""
Paraguay -4.15""r -0.90 -5.58""" 0.69 -5.89""" 0.24 -6.25"'r -0.25 -1.65"
Peru -1.45 -3.25""" -6.26s"' -0.09 -4.SOrr' -0.76 -8.88"r' - -
Suriname 1.27 1.41 -2.57"" -0.06 -6.03"r' 0.44 -1.72r 6.40 -4.00""s
Uruguay -2.46"" -1.16 -5.38r" -0.04 -6.Olrrr -172 -7.96""" -0.83 -4.76"rr
Venezuela -4.03""" -0.64 -6.94'"" -0.54 -5.45""" -0.27 -4.23r"" 1.32 -3.26r"'
Cos[a Rica -1.79' -1.98"" -5.60"" 0.14 -5.28'"" 0.28 -8.35"" 0.37 -4.95'""
EI Salvador -1.92" -0.90 -S.SSr'" -0.47 -6.41""' 0.34 -5.11"" 0.15 -4.79r""
Guatemala -1.50 -1.81 -5.56"rr -0.29 -4.55""r -0.44 -6.23""" 0.12 -2.41""
Honduras -1.05 -1.18 -5.49""' 1.48 -4.62""" 0.77 -6.80"" 0.45 -3.44'""
Mexico -1.16 -1.39 -4.81""" -0.49 -3.42"r" -0.59 -S.OOr"" 0.03 -5.48"""
Dominican Rp -2.70""" -1.66' -5.26"" 0.09 -4.67""" -0.57 -9.43'r' 0.08 -3.05'"
Barbados -1.69r -1.60 -4.97""' 0.11 -5.37'"" -0.35 -11.35"'" 0.10 -3.04rr"
Jamaica -0.37 -1.43 -5.95r"" 0.80 -4.90""" 1.22 -4.05" " 0.10 -0.88
Haïti -0.56 -0.55 -6.67""" -0.43 -S.I7"r" 1.71 -6.79""r - -
Trinidad -2.34'" -0.82 -5.46"'" -0.91 -3.35'"r -0.06 -5.69""r 1.52 -3.43""
Israël -2.Slr' -1.77r -4.57""' 0.07 -5.30" " -0.70 -3.95'"r -0.58 -4.09"""
Bangladesh -2.68r" -1.71' -4.30r" 0.24 -2.45"" 0.56 -4.69'r' - -
Indonesia -1.98"" -3.84'r" -12.96"r" 0.06 -4.63'"' -0.90 -3.88"'r -0.67 -5.49"""
India 0.11 -2.00'" -5.83"' 0.84 -5.02"'" 1.09 -4.14""r 1.30 -4.44'""
Korea -2.38"r -1.36 -4.86""r 0.40 -5.35""r -0.14 -5.12""" 0.09 -5.34""s
Malaysia -0.99 -1.84" -5.45'"" -0.49 -8.87r"r 0.96 -3.86'"' 0.66 -3.58'""
Pakistan -0.61 -1.28 -5.01"" 0.71 -6.10""r -0.66 -5.20rr" 0.64 -3.83'""
Philippines -0.68 -2.24r' -6.SSr'r 0.50 -7.06""" 0.81 -6.09"rr 2.49 -2.10""
Singapore -0.25 -2.53"r - 4.88"'r 0.59 -5.45r"' -0.79 -5.53"r 1.07 -3.72""
Sri Lanka -0.81 -1.43 -7.10""" -0.49 -S.SSr" -0.91 -5.55"'r -0.09 -5.41"""
Thailand -1.30 -1.79r -S.18r"r 0.82 -6.12"'" -1.28 -4.84r" -0.73 -2.92"'
EBYPt -2.00" -1.21 -7.65"" -1.06 -3.Ol,s" -0.03 -3.22" : - -
Zaire -1.26 0.33 -4.88"r' 2.25 -1.35 -0.18 -4.60r'r - -
Zambia -2.42"r 1.92 -4.78r" -2.06" -5.21"" -0.61 -4.33rr' -0.42 -2.24"r
Zimbabwe -1.86' 1.14 -5.94"'" -0.85 -4.46"r -0.02 -6.70"r -5.20r" 0.13
South Africa -0.49 -0.87 -7.13r"" 1.05 -3.03"' 0.73 -4.43r" 0.57 -3.62"'
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Table 26
Unit Root Tests: Developed Countries
country FIY n 4n r Oz In(m,-~Iy,) ~In(m,.~Iy,) !n 0!n
(m~-itdDlY~) (m~.itdr~IY~)
U.S.A. -1.81s -0.86 -3.89ss" 1.97 -5.22"s -2.ISss -3.93'"s 1.33 -2.99""s
Germany -2.48ss -0.79 -3.53ss' 2.23 -4.93ss' -0.24 -4.63sss 4.51 -2.64"'
Japan -2.69s"' -1.61 -5.62sss 1.62 -5.12sss 0.69 -3.30ss' 2.80 -1.37
Canada -3.37"s -0.78 -4.05'"s -0.89 -5.28"s' -2.33'" -4.64s"s 0.52 -3.69MS'
France -4.38"s -0.66 -4.15's' 2.42 -3.04"' -2.62sss -3.04s"k 0.78 -4.90
I[aly -1.12 -0.72 -4.34sss 3.39 -3.37"' -1.61 -0.19 4.54 -2.93"s
U.K. -2.45ss -1.08 -S.ISsss 0.34 -3.37"' -2.36's -4.65sss -2.43"' -2.30s'
Austria -1.96' -0.99 -5.54's' 1.42 -1.37 -2.12s" -5.92"ss 3.47 -2.50"
Belgium -L02 -0.90 -3.56"s 2.56 -3.80'ss -7.OIs's -4.20's' 1.44 -4.Ols"
Denmark -1.98ss -0.92 -6.06sss 2.56 -3.65's' -0.80 -5.84ss" 1.62 -2.24ss
Finland -2.20"' -0.94 -4.42"' -0.29 -7.54"' 1.35 -6.16"' 3.59 -2.28"
Greece -1.32 -0.70 -4.91s's 1.83 -0.25 -0.33 -2.21'i 3.74 -2.37s'
Ireland -3.00'ss -0.83 -3.39'ss 0.89 -6.37"' -1.21 -4.28s's 1.00 -3.32s"
the Netherlands -1.96s -1.12 -5.88sss 1.38 -5.37"' -1.06 -4.40s" 3.01 -1.22
Norway -2.36's -0.99 -6.10'ss -0.80 -5.32a" -3.88sss -3.50"' -0.62 -2.35s'
Portugal -0.64 -0.84 -5.87's' 1.65 -5.44s'" -0.58 -S.Olsss 1.34 -4.38""
Spain -2.52ss -0.95 -4.85""s 5.20 -3.64ss' -0.41 -6.42ss' 2.23 -3.40s"
Sweden -2.SSs' -I.00 -5.90'ss -0.74 0.03 0.64 -4.71sss 1.77 -3.61s.s
Switzerland -3.47ss' -1.20 -3.78sss 0.08 -2.S8ss' -1.72s -4.72s" -0.23 -4.43'ss
Australia -1.94' -0.76 -4.43'ss 0.40 -4.79's' -1.48 -6.58s" -1.05 -0.48
Next, we want to test whether countries obey the principles of dynamic optimal
taxation when deciding upon monetary and fiscal policies and whether there is evidence
that time-inconsistency problems become important if government debt is high. As
mentioned in section 2 the static and dynamic efficiency conditions have directly
testable empirical implications. From the static efficiency condition, it follows that
inflation and ordinazy taxation should display comovement over time, implying that
inflation and ordinary taxation should be cointegrated. The dynamic efficiency
conditions imply that inflation and income taxation should be set in such a manner that
their data generating process follows a random walk. These two empirical implications
of the dynamic optimal taxation framework have been tested empirically by e.g. Grilli
(1987) in case of the EU, Trehan and Walsh (1990) in case of the U.S., and Edwards
and Tabellini (1991) and Roubini (1991) for a broad set of developing countries.
We first test the dynamic efficiency condition that implies that ordinazy taxes and
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the rate of inflation should be set in such a manner that their dynamics behave as a
random walk. The results from the unit root tests performed on the rate of ordinary
taxes and the rate of inflation are found in columns 3-6 of Table 2. In the majority of
the cases unit roots in inflation and income taxation cannot be rejected.
The static efficiency condition (6a) of the optimal taxation problem requires
cointegration between inflation, the inverse of velocity and the rate of ordinary taxation.
We test the static efficiency condition estimating (6a), after adding a time trend and a
regression residual:
n~ -ao t at In(T~) ta2ln( mr-t ) t trend t e~ (8)
y~
A trend was added to account for long-run effects affecting inflation and ordinary
taxation that remain outside the scope of the theoretical model, but might have
significantly affected the design of monetazy and fiscal policy. The estimation results
from estimating (8) aze found in Table 3.
If the estimates of a~ and aZ are found to be (significantly) positive and a
cointegrating relation between the variables in (8) exists, we conclude that the static
efficiency concerning comovement of inflation and the ordinary tax rate has not been
violated. We test for the presence of a cointegrating relation in (8) by considering the
order of integration of the OLS residuals of (8). If the residuals aze found to be
stationary, a cointegrating vector is necessarily present, as shown by Engle and Granger
(1987). If not, a cointegrating vector is absent and we need to reject the dynamic
optimal taxation framework ~~. The Dickey-Fuller test which uses neither constant nor
deterministic trend is the appropríate test for this cointegration test and is found in the
DF column of Table 3. Observations with inflation rates of higher 250a~o which
occasionally featured in some Latin American countries were excluded because such
outlying observations necessarily bias the estimation results and are likely to produce
meaningless estimation results if not disregarded.
" This is also the approach adopted by Grilli (1987), Roubini (]991) and Trehan and Walsh (1991).
Evans and Amey (1996) apply the more recent Johansen method in their tests on cointegration between
inflation and ordinary taxation in case of twelve OECD countries.
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Table 3a
Static Efticiency Tests in the Commitment Case: Developing Countries
country a~ ai aZ rrend RZ F-stat DF-stat sample
Argentina 2.31" O.S6 0.45 O.OS' 0.25 1.80 -2.12t4 1968-1994
(2.52) (1.02) (1.57) (1.88)
Bolivia -2.19"' -1.09""" 0.25"" 0.03""" 0.78 26.06"" -3.88"' 1965-1994
(-4.98) (-8.18) (1.97) (6.54)
Brazil -2.04 -I.OS" 0.38 0.16""" 0.72 15.97""-3.18'"' 1965-1994(-1.23) (-1.90) (O.SI) (3.08)
Chile 1.38 0.87" -OA8 -0.001 0.18 1.69 -3.39""" 1965-1994
(1.69) (1.72) (-O.S1) (-0.06)
Columbia 0.73"" 0.17 0.09 0.003 0.59 11.82"'" -4.06""" 1965-1993
(2.44) (1.61) (0.95) (1.66)
Ecuador 0.39 0.28 -0.10 0.01"' 0.69 19.63""" -3.43""' 1965-1994(0.67) (1.36) (-0.73) (2.SS)
Guyana 0.69""" 0.29"; 0.08'" -0.008 O.SS 9.87'"' -5.14"" 1965-1992
(4.67) (3.41) (2.50) (-2.41)
Paraguay -0.26 -0.24" 0.12 0.009""" 0.64 14.75'"" -3.79""" 1965-1993(-0.66) (-1.85) (I.OS) (S.6S)
Peru 1.40 -0.32 0.86"t" 0.03"i 0.64 12.75""" -3.11""" 1965-1994
(1.44) (-0.74) (3.SS) (4.20)
Suriname 0.06 -0.11 0.06 -0.001 0.18 0.88 -2.35"' 1971-1986
(0.15) (-O.SS) (0.92) (-0.12)
Uruguay 2.41""" 0.27 0.69"'" O.OIS 0.30 3.72"" -3.19""" 1965-1994
(3.76) (LOS) (3.08) (1.57)
Venezuela -I.II"'s 0.004 -0.41""" 0.02'"" 0.79 31.93"" -5.80""" 1965-1994
(5.19) (0.04) (4.50) (9.29)
Costa Rica 1.72' -0.38 0.91""' -0.03""" O.S4 7.68""" -3.12""" 1970-1993
(1.77) (-1.02) (4.43) (-2.89)
EI Salvador 0.27 0.13 -0.000 0.007""" O.S8 11.84""" -2.70""" 1965-1994
(1.39) (1.63) (-0.01) (3.40)
Guatemala O.SS -0.27' O.S2""" 0.008""' O.S8 11.49'"' -3.50""" 1965-1993
(1.54) (-1.93) (3.56) (4.61)
Honduras 1.21"" -0.03 0.47""" 0.002 0.59 12.28""' -4.01""" 1965-1994
(2.76) (-0.14) (3.51) (O.S2)
Mexico -0.74" -0.63""" 0.28"" 0.01""" 0.87 52.10""" -4.54""" 1966-1992
(-3.40) (-8.38) (4.91) (3.47)
Dominican Rp 0.32 -0.36" 0.48'"' 0.01""" O.S6 10.69""" -4.20'"" 1965-1993
(0.88) (2.31) (2.85) (3.78)
Barbados -0.88" -O.S9"" -0.12 -0.002 0.42 4.04"" -3.25"'" 1969-1989
(-1.99) (-2.64) (-0.97) (-0.68)
Jamaica -0.21 -0.16 -0.04 0.005 0.03 0.10 -2.48"" 1972-1987
(-0.27) (-O.S4) (-0.22) (0.40)
Haïti 0.88"' -O.1S"" O.4I""" -0.02" O.S9 10.19'"" -3.17""" 1967-1990
(2.10) (-2.49) (3.19) (-2.SS)
Trinidad 0.20' 0.13""' -0.02 0.001 0.74 17.65'"" -4.22"'" 1965-1989
(1.78) (3.90) (-0.38) (0.51)
tsraël 1.75"' 0.47 O.S4'"" -0.007 0.69 18.02""" -1.39 1965-1994(7.30) (1.48) (3.29) (-L27)
Bangladesh 1.75' 0.002 0.48'"" -0.016" 0.74 7.40""" -2.62"" 1974-1985
(2.17) (0.009) (3.44) (-I.SS)
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Korea 0.80" 0.10 0.29"'
(2.59) (0.53) (3.34)


























Zimbabwe 0.07"' 0.11 -0.07
(0.08) (0.45) (-0.27)
South Africa -0.05 0.12 -0.1 I"
(-0.24) (1.27) (-2.63)
-0.01"' 0.68 11.84s"" -4.67"' 1973-1993
(-3.39)
-0.003 0.17 1.66 -3.81"' 1965-1993
(-0.63)
-0.002 0.55 7.86"' -4.16'"' 1972-1994
(-0.88)
-0.001 0.10 0.95 -3.50"' 1965-1994
(-0.99)
-0.003 0.76 18.94"' -4.25" " 1973-1994
(-0.97)
0.007'"' 0.54 10.05"" -3.95"' 1965-1994
(3.25)
0.001 0.04 0.37 -3.13" ' 1965-1994
(0.41)
0.005'" 0.31 3.81" -3.74'sr 1965-1993
(2.82)
0.006 0.10 0.89 -3.23'"" 1965-1993
(1.42)
0.003 0.63 7.32"" -5.97'"' 1975-1992
(1.49)
0.06'"' 0.83 28.46"s -5.72""' I969-I992
(5.55)
0.004 0.74 18.65"' -2.61'" 1966-1989
(0.44)
0.000 0.07 0.28 -4.37"" 1976-1990
(0.03)
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0.42 O.SOss -0.11 -0.006"ss 0.27 3.ISss -2.22ss 1965-1994(I.11) (2.17) (-1.47) (-3.06)
O.Slsss 0.18ss 0.13s's -0.002ss 0.42 6.33ss' -2.47ss 1965-1994(4.48) (2.66) (3.13) (-2.82)
1.38s"" 0.05ss 0.47sss -0.01'ss 0.80 31.77sss -5.03s's 1965-1991(8.55) (2.18) (6.75) (-7.30)
1.02sss 0.05 0.34'ss 0.007sss 0.69 16.95's" -3.82sss 1965-1994(7.13) (1.19) (6.80) (5.92)
0.17 0.25 -0.09 -0.007sss 0.21 2.37s -2.06ss 1965-1994(0.71) (1.38) (-1.44) (-2.58)
-1.53'ss -0.96sss -0.24s O.Olss' 0.65 15.91s's -2.75'ss I965-1994(4.39) (-6.13) (-1.99) (5.80)
l.I8s's 0.51':s 0.27ssw 0.009sss 0.52 9.53sss -2.63s' 1965-1994(5.60) (3.80) (4.33) (3.34)
-0.02 O.OSsss -0.11 -O.OOSsss 0.47 7.46ss' -3.12'ss 1965-1993(-0.12) (3.10) (-1.36) (-3.17)
0.30 0.23'ss -0.01 -0.005 0.42 6.07sss -2.26s' 1965-1993(1.58) (3.96) (-0.08) (-0.96)
-0.03 0.07 -0.07sss -0.005'ss 0.60 9.16s's -3.22s's 1965-1994
(-0.21) (0.89) (-3.22) (-3.44)
-0.10 0.05 -0.08'"s 0.000 0.43 6.62sss -3.27sss 1965-1994(-0.87) (1.23) (-3.48) (0.10)
-0.82ss -0.58sss 0.12 0.018ss' 0.64 14.74sRS -3.45sss 1965-1993(-2.14) (-3.43) (l.ll) (4.79)
0.99'ss 0.24ss 0.35'ss O.OOSss 0.70 20.06s's -3.02"' 1965-1994(6.09) (2.10) (6.96) (2.27)
the Netherlands -0.41sss -0.22s's -0.12sss -0.000 0.63 14.48s's -3.68ss' 1965-1994
(3.21) (-2.94) (-4.28) (-0.36)
Norway 0.38" 0.11'ss 0.07 -0.001 0.35 3.99ss -3.70sss 1965-1994(1.91) (3.05) (0.69) (-0.26)
Portugal 0.53 0.20 0.09 -0.001 0.11 1.02 -2.02ss 1965-1993(0.90) (0.52) (0.95) (-0.14)
Spain -0.76s -0.53s 0.06 0.013s 0.20 2.20' -1.26 1965-1994
(-1.99) (-2.14) (0.10) (2.01)
Sweden 0.46ss 0.03 0.14ss 0.001 0.18 1.76s -2.36's 1965-1994
(2.10) (0.40) (2.21) (0.65)
Switzerland -0.40ss -0.18ss 0.01 0.001 0.26 3.03's -2.77s" 1965-1994
(-2.31) (-2.55) (0.29) (0.59)
Australia -0.21 -0.16 -0.01 0.001 0.03 0.23 -1.42 1965-1992(-0.42) (-0.76) (-0.12) (0.43
In the case of developing countries (cf. Table 3a), the estimation results generally
suggest that inflation and income taxation were not determined along the lines of the
optimal taxation framework in the presence of commitment: for only 16 out of 40
countries the estimate of a~ are positive, as predicted by theory. In case of 9 countries
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out of these 16, also a2 is positive. From the 9 countries whose estimates indicate correct
signs of a, and a,, only in case of Guyana and Israël both coefficients are significant.
The case of Guyana, however, is quite exceptional as this country is by faz the most
indebted country of our sample and it is likely to be insolvent.
The commitment case seems more applicable to the case of the developed
countries (cf. Table 3b). In fourteen out of the twenty countries a positive association
between inflation and income taxation is found. In case of the southern European
countries, except Portugal, and the Netherlands and Switzerland negative values of a,
aze found indicating at inefficiencies in the tax system. In case of Germany, Japan,
Canada, U.K., Ireland and to some extent France and Sweden the evidence for the
commitment case of optimal taxation is strongest.
As shown in section 2, the dynamic optimal taxation problem potentially suffers
from a time-inconsistency problem if government debt is issued in the form of non-
indexed long-term government debt which is denominated in domestic currency. In that
case, inflation and ordinazy taxation will be set according to (7c). In order to test the
importance of such a time-inconsistency problem, a deterministic trend and regression
residual was added to (7c):
D
t
n~ - bo } bl In(i~) t bZ ln( mr-y` `) t trend t e~ (9)
For the subsample of developed countries no information was available about 6, the
share of total government debt that is denominated in domestic currency. Although in
some cases governments in these countries have issued ( smaller) amounts of government
debt denominated in foreign currency ( Italy, Greece and Belgium e.g.) we have assumed
that 6 equalled one for all developed countries and throughout the sample period,
because of this lack of information. Table 4 gives the estimation results from estimating
(9) and the outcomes for the cointegration tests.
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Table 4a
Static Efficiency Tests in the No-Commitment Case: Developing Countries
country bo bi 62 rrend R' F-stat DF-stat sample
Argentina 2.59 0.17 0.54' 0.004 0.65 3.83' -1.68' 1976-1990
(1.84) (0.27) (1.91) (0.08)
Bolivia 0.12 -0.02 0.05 0.005 0.21 0.87 -1.38 1966-1978
(0.15) (-0.06) (0.24) (0.64)
Brazil -0.11 -1.95 0.24 0.19' 0.70 3.29' -1.78' 1980-1986
(-0.02) (-0.76) (1.23) (2.13)
Chile
Columbia -0.10 0.08 -0.21 0.007 0.66 9.09" ' -5.59" ' 1965-1983
(-0.17) (0.48) (-1.02) (1.09)
Ecuador 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.71 3.38" 1965-1973
(0.52) (0.29) (0.44) (0.69)
Guyana 0.37" 0.15 0.07" -0.005" 0.54 9.23"' -5.11"' 1965-1992
(2.36) (1.33) (2.28) (-1.77)
Paraguay 0.14 -0.46 0.56" 0.008 0.55 3.99" -3.78"' 1975-1989
(0.20) (-1.51) (2.24) (1.59)
Peru
Suriname -0.52 -0.31 -0.03 0.01 0.29 0.84 -1.47 1971-1986
(-0.75) (-1.12) (-0.28) (0.60)
Uruguay 1.88" 0.722 0.08 -0.000 0.28 2.35' -2.64"" 1973-1994
(2.56) (L64) (0.43) (-0.04)
Venezuela - 0.80' 0.01 0.28" O.O2Ri4 0.66 7.86"' - 2.51"" 1971-1986
(2.13) (0.16) (2.48) (3.24)
Costa Rica 1.72' -0.38 0.03 0.01 0.18 1.21 -2.68" 1973-1993
(1.77) (1.02) (0.08) (0.46)
EI Salvador 0.37" 0.13 0.04 0.005 0.59 12.41"' -2.97'"' 1965-1994
(1.86) (1.65) (0.85) (1.63)
Guatemala -0.54 -0.02 -0.24 0.02 0.17 0.80 -3.26"' 1973-1988
(-0.61) (-0.10) (-1.03) (-1.43)
Honduras 0.41 0.26 0.08 0.004 0.41 6.22"' -3.76"' 1965-1994
(0.67) (1.12) (1.12) (0.69)
Mexico -0.33 -0.63"' 0.28"' 0.001 0.87 44.98"' -4.16"' 1966-1990
(-0.92) (-6.42) (2.95) (0.10)
Dominican Rp 0.81' 0.39 0.17 0.03' 0.48 6.90" -4.56"' 1976-1985
(2.03) (1.71) (0.83) (2.30)
Barbados -0.38 -0.53" 0.06 -0.005 0.45 4.30"s -3.16" ' 1971-1989(-I.IS) (-2.36) (0.64) (-1.66)
lamaica 0.02 -0.11 0.28 0.002 0.23 1.48 -2.36" 1973-1986
(0.03) (-0.37) (1.70) (0.12)
Haïti
Trinidad 0.22 0.12"' -0.001 0.001 0.75 17.49'"' -4.11"' 1966-1989
(1.67) (3.09) (-O.IS) (0.32)
Israël 0.37 0.12 1.39" ' -0.02" 0.87 36.12'"' -3.02" ' 1973-1994
(1.35) (0.40) (6.72) (-2.71)
Bangladesh -
[ndonesia -0.16 -0.33"' 0.01 -0.01" ' 0.67 11.51 "' -4.58" ' 1973-1993
(-0.48) (-3.03) (0.12) (-4.39)
India -0.12 -0.09 0.02 0.002 0.03 0.25 -4.01"' 1965-1993
(-0.35) (-0.70) (0.17) (0.54)
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Korea 0.92'" -0.06 0.44" -0.003 0.42 4.57"' -3.43""' 1972-1994
(2.34) (-0.27) (2.04.) (-1.29)
Malaysia -0.05 0.004 -0.10 0.002 0.10 0.93 -4.25""' 1965-1994
(-0.71) (0.27) (-1.58) (1.43)
Pakistan 0.36 -0.09 0.25'" -0.01" 0.57 6.69'"" -3.23'"' 1973-1992
(0.62) (-0.37) (2.79) (-1.86)
Philippines -0.83""" -0.43""" 0.03 0.007"" 0.43 6.20"" -4.17'"" 1965-1994
(-3.71) (-3.30) (0.37) (2.43)
Singapore -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 0.003 0.05 0.48 -3.26""' 1965-1994
(-0.44) (-0.30) (-0.66) (0.76)
Sri Lanka 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.002 0.09 0.60 -3.28"' 1973-1993
(0.72) (0.52) (0.05) (I.00)
Thailand -0.49 -0.24 -0.03 0.003 0.07 0.58 -3.32"'" 1965-1993
(-1.03) (-1.24) (-0.42) (1.08)
EgYPt -
Zaire 0.24 0.14 0.41""" 0.07"'" 0.78 13.21""" -4.53'"" 1972-1992
(1.22) (0.85) (3.36) (5.12)
Zambia 1.06 1.21 0.21"' 0.05"' 0.79 7.44""" -1.75" 1971-1988
(0.81) (1.12) (2.32) (2.98)
Zimbabwe -0.29 -0.06 -0.25 0.01 0.19 0.86 -4.53""' 1977-1940
(-0.49) (-0.23) (-1.30) (0.75)
South Africa O.13 0.12"' -0.17" 0.001" 0.89 65.47"'" -3.52""" 1966-1993
(1.20) (2.10) (-1.88) (1.84)
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Table 3b
Static Efficiency Tests in the No-Commitment Case: Developed Countries
country b~ bi bZ trend R~ F-stat DF-stat sample
U.S.A. -0.23 -0.07 -0.17"' 0.003s 0.68 18.16"' -2.98"' 1965-1994
(-0.93) (-0.41) (-6.16) (1.72)
Germany 0.06 0.16" -0.07" 0.001 0.29 3.40"' -1.74" 1965-1994
(0.55) (2.13) (-1.76) (0.46)
Japan 0.29"" 0.13"' -0.03 -0.006' 0.49 7.10"' -3.42"' 1976-1991
(2.64) (3.32) (-1.41) (-1.70)
Canada -0.25" -0.05 -0.17'"' 0.004"' 0.75 20.57""' -3.33sss 1965-1990(-2.70) (-1.24) (-7.39) (5.15)
France 0.05 0.22" -0.16"'-0.002 0.72 22.23i"-2.35" 1965-1994(0.48) (2.11) (-7.25) (-1.12)
Italy -1.06"' - 0.61'"" -0.46"' 0.03"' 0.74 24.36"' -2.58" 1965-1994
(-7.78) (-5.92) (-3.78) (6.73)
U.K. 0.29 0.12 -0.18' -0.01"as 0.43 5.25'"" -2.56" 1971-1994
(1.62) (0.65) (-1.73) (-2.95)
Austria 0.15' 0.25" ' -0.17" ' 0.003 " 0.76 21.20"'-3.43 "' 1971-1993
(1.75) (3.18) (-5.34) (2.37)
Belgium 0.22""' 0.18"' -0.08" -0.002 0.52 9.08'"' -2.44'" 1965-1993
(3.20) (3.23) (-2.29) (-0.89)
Denmark 0.08 -0.11 O.ol -0.004 0.58 9.16"' -3.70" ' 1972-1994
(0.51) (-0.56) (0.45) (-1.66)
Finland -0.03 0.04 -0.07'"' 0.001 0.66 16.64""-2.78"' 1965-1994
(-0.51) (1.03) (-6.09) (1.52)
Greece -0.92'". -0.35 0.21 0.03"' 0.40 4.41"" -3.12"' 1971-1993(-2.25) (-1.46) (1.38) (2.92)
Ireland 0.61" 0.48" -0.18' -0.003 0.23 2.53' -1.95' 1965-1994
(2.47) (2.15) (-1.73) (-1.24)
the Netherlands -0.06 -0.16 -0.05 -0.001 0.70 12.23" ' -2.28"' 1975-1994(-0.94) (-1.48) (-0.69) (-0.31)
Norway 0.25" ' 0.11'" 0.02 -0.003" 0.34 3.83" -3.72"' 1965-1991(4.13) (2.67) (0.39) (-1.83)
Portugal 0.39 -0.05 0.29"' -0.01 0.33 4.06" -3.09"' 1965-1993
(0.76) (-0.14) (3.06) (-1.13)
Spain 0.03 0.16 -0.22"' 0.004 0.54 10.19"' -2.22's 1965-1994
(0.07) (0.68) (-4.37) (0.72)
Sweden -0.10 -0.06 -0.08' 0.004" 0.14 1.40 -2.33" 1965-1994
(-0.80) (-0.70) (-1.95) (1.73)
Switzerland -0.38s" -0.16" -0.02 0.000 0.27 3.16i" -2.54's 1965-1994(-2.22) (-2.31) (-0.61) (0.37)
Aus[ralia 1.22" 0.74"' - 0.08" -0.01" 0.74 4.78' -3.61ssr 1983-1991
(3.74) (3.41) (-2.23) (-3.62)
The estimates of the no-commitment case confirm and extent our result on the
commitment case before. In particular, we find that commitment problems seem to be
more relevant for a majority of developing countries: in no less than twenty-four of the
thirty-two developing countries a positive value of à, is found. Commitment problems
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seem to be more relevant for the Latin American and Caribbean countries than for the
South-East Asian countries. The impressive economic growth and rapidly developing
capital markets in this last region are likely to alleviate the commitment problems for
the governments in these countries. The no-commitment case does not seem to be
relevant to the set of developed countries: only in case of Greece and Portugal there is
some indication that time-inconsistency problems might have been present.
Conclusion
In the absence of a commitment technology, the optimal policies set according to the
principles of the dynamic optimal taxation framework are subject to a time-inconsistency
problem if government debt is issued in nominal long-term bonds in domestic currency.
In that case the government is tempted to erode the real value of its debt by a surprise
inflation. A rational public will anticipate this time-inconsistency problem if the
government cannot commit its policies and determine its inflationary expectations in
such a manner that expected and actual inflation coincide and the real value of
government debt is not eroded. The time-consistent solution, consequently, is
characterised by too high inflation rates and, due to the higher seigniorage revenues, too
low ordinary tax rates compared to the optimal but time-inconsistent dynamic optimal
taxation solution.
This paper argued that only government debt denominated in domestic currency
might generate such a time-inconsistency problem. Government debt in foreign currency
does not generate the same time-inconsistency problems because the government cannot
inflate away its real value, provided purchasing power parity holds (approximately). In
that case debt denominated in foreign currency serves as a commitment technology
having similar commitment effects as indexation and maturity structure. Empirical
testing of the tax smoothing framework for a set of fourty developing and twenty
developed countries, indicated that the case of commitment seems more relevant for the
group of developed countries, whereas time-inconsistency problems were found in case
of most developing countries.
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Concluding Remarks
As we indicated in the introduction, the interactions between monetary and fiscal
policies are numerous and highly complex. This thesis has only touched upon a small
fraction of thinkable subjects, models and empirically testable implications. Similarly,
we have studied only a tiny fraction of the numerous aspects that play a role in EMU
and the economics of transition.
From the subjects that we did address in a more than superficial way, we gained
some interesting insights. From Chapters 2-4 we leazned more on the dynamic aspects of
the (strategic) interaction of monetary and fiscal policy both in a setting with national
monetary policy and a setting with a monetary union. Chapter 5 extended the vast
literature on output stabilisation from monetary and fiscal policies in economies that
feature nominal rigidities. It was shown how fiscal transfers in EMU can alleviate the
adjustment burden from asymmetric shocks in EMU. Although strategic issues were
discarded, it became clear that also in this azea the interaction of monetary and fiscal
policy is highly ínteresting: in the context of EMU a lot of interesting questions were
raised and partially answered.
In Chapters 6-8 we considered the quasi-fiscal effects of many monetary policy
instruments and actions. Monetary policy enables the monetary authority to generate
different types of revenues that are usually collected under the header of 'seigniorage
revenues'. In the 'public finance view of inflation' monetary policy is considered as
being part of a larger tax system which is operated by the government. Monetary policy
can be used in a short-sighted rent-seeking way if aimed e.g. at maximising seigniorage.
Not surprisingly, political instability is a most fertile soil for such monetary policies to
earthen as the experience in many developing countries seems to prove.
Chapter 6 and 7 studied some monetary aspects of transition in Eastern Europe.
The combination of price liberalisation, a lazge monetary overhang, expansionary
monetary and fiscal policy and institutional and political instability created an inflatio-
nary environment in almost all economies in transition in the initial phase of reform
from communism to capitalism. Chapter 6 studied the increase in currency substitution
that took place in such an unstable macroeconomic environment and aimed at a better
understanding of causes and implications for the economies in transition. Chapter 7
studied monetary reform in Poland. Two small theoretical models were constructed to
provide more insight on the relation between seigniorage and currency substitution and
seigniorage and financial repression. The insights from the models were applied to the
case of Poland that undertook a radical liberalisation in 1990 of its system of currency
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controls and of its financial sector.
Of course, also more efficient monetary policy is thinkable from the perspective
of the 'public finance view of inflation'. The 'dynamic optimal taxation' framework that
we considered in Chapter 8 desígns efficient tax systems that minimize the societal
excess burden of taxation. It derives the properties of efficient monetary and fiscal
policy as summarised in the "tax smoothing" principle. Empirical analysis of the static
and dynamic efficiency conditions for monetary and fiscal policy, revealed that in
particular developing countries in many cases experienced commitment problems w.r.t.
monetary policy, implying that the principles of efficient taxation can not be fully
respected.
Needless to say that our study remains incomplete, if not unsatisfactory, in many
respects. As a consequence, a considerable number of interesting reseazch plans can be
imagined that extend and complement this study. In the context of EMU a promising
research track is the interaction in the EMU of monetazy policy, fiscal policy and wage
policies of trade unions that control national wage setting. The first sketches for such a
model have recently been undertaken with some more or less promising results. Next,
and also highly interesting, is a closer look at the decision making problem that has to
be resolved inside the ECB and the issues concerning its independence and
accountability. As mentioned earlier, this decision making involves an intricate process
of bargaining and coalition formation. ECB Governors are likely to have to trade-off
common and national interests. Possibly, the final outcomes of such bargaining process
could be markedly inefficient and preferred by none of the ECB Governors.
The external implications and dimensions of EMU have been basically discarded
-as in much of the literature on EMU-. Needless to say that also there a number of
interesting questions may remain to be answered in future research. In particulaz, the
interaction with the economies of transition should be in the forefront of our interests. It
is likely that the coming decade(s) will see a rapid integration of trade and capital flows
between the EU and Eastern Europe with considerable consequences for the functioning
of the EMU and the transition process in Eastern Europe. Eventually, the Vysegrad
countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) may become
part of the EU themselves, thus completing a circle that nobody would have imagined a
decade ago.
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift bevat zeven hoofdstukken die de interactie van monetair en fiscaal
beleid als gemeenschappelijke probleemstelling hebben. Zowel theoretische als empiri-
sche methoden worden gebruikt om meer inzicht te verschaffen in het complexe karakter
van deze interactie van monetair en fiscaal beleid. Met uitzondering van hoofdstuk 2 en
8 zijn de artikelen te plaatsen in de context van de vorming van de Economische en
Monetaire Unie (EMU) in de Europese Unie (EU) (hoofdstuk 3,4 en 5), en de econo-
mische hervormingsprocessen in Oost Europa (hoofdstuk 6 en 7). Zowel de vorming van
de EMU als de hervormingsprocessen in Oost Europa betreffen diepgaande veranderin-
gen in de economische, sociale en politieke structuren van de betrokken landen. De
artikelen focussen elk op een afzonderlijk element van de complexe structuur en
gevolgen van deze hervomingsprocessen in het hedendaagse Europa.
Interactie van monetaire en fiscaal beleid en de vorming van EMU
EMU impliceert in de eerste plaats de vervanging van nationale monetaire beleidsauto-
nomie door een gemeenschappelijke monetair beleid, geconcipieë rd en geïmplementeerd
door de Europese Centrale Bank (ECB). In de studie 'One Market, One Money' heeft de
Europese Commissie de statische en dynamische efficiencyvoordelen van een monetaire
unie met een gemeenschappelijke valuta geanalyseerd.
De vorming van de EMU heeft ook een aantal belangrijke effecten voor de
vorming van nationaal fiscaal beleid. In de eerste plaats vormen de budgetaire stringen-
tiecriteria van het Maastricht verdrag voor de vorming van de EMU, een belangrijke
randvoorwaarde voor het nationaal fiscaal beleid. Voor een groot aantal landen betekent
het respecteren van de fiscale criteria een zeer zware aanpassingslast. Het belang van en
beroep op actieve fiscale stabilisatiepolitiek is in een monetaire unie echter duidelijk
groter omdat het wisselkoersinstrument als actieve stabilisator van asymmetrische
schokken te vervallen komt. Dominantie van asymmetrische schokken, Keynesiaanse
rigiditeiten op de goederen- en arbeidsmarkten, lage arbeidsmobiliteit tussen landen en
geringe automatische stabilisatie door federale, i.e. EU, overheidsuitgaven en belastingen
impliceren dat de EMU minder efficiënte uitkomsten genereert. Critici van de EMU
gebruiken dikwijls dit 'optimal currency area' argument ter motivatie van hun wan-
trouwen jegens de EMU.
Hoofdstuk 2 analyseert de dynamische interactie van monetair en fiscaal beleid
vanwege de dynamische budgetrestrictie van de overheidsfinancië n. Dit hoofdstuk
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analyseert in detail het model van Tabellini (1986) waarin de monetaire en fiscale
autoriteiten in een dynamisch conflict met betrekking tot de stabilisatie van overheids-
schuld geplaatst worden. De fiscale autoriteit controleert het primaire financieringstekort
en de monetaire autoriteit de monetisatie. In eerste instantie worden de uitkomsten m.b.t.
de staatsschuldstabilisatie, het financieringstekort en de inflatie vergeleken tussen het
cooperatieve evenwicht en het noncooperatieve Nash evenwicht. Een herinterpretatie van
de bekende 'Unpleasant Monetaristic Arithmetic' van Sargent en Wallace wordt voorge-
steld in de context van het Tabellini model. Voorts worden de consequenties van een
conservatieve en een onafhankelijke Centrale Bank bestudeerd. Aan de hand van een
numeriek voorbeeld worden de belangrijkste inzichten die het theoretische model
opleverde nog eens geillustreerd.
Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 breiden het model van hoofdstuk 2 uit naar een monetaire unie
van twee landen om zodoende meer inzicht te krijgen in de interactie tussen fiscale
autoriteiten en de ECB in de EMU. Een vergelijking wordt steeds gemaakt van de
uitkomsten van het dynamische conflict met betrekking tot de stabilisatie van de staats-
schuld wanneer een land een eigen nationaal monetair beleid (zoals in hoofdstuk 2) en
wanneer een land deelneemt aan de monetaire unie. Op die manier ontstaat inzicht in de
effecten van participatie aan de EMU vanuit het perspectief van staatsschuldstabilisatie
Hoofdstuk 3 concentreert zich op situaties waarin de ECB geheel onafhankelijk
dan wel geheel afhankelijk van de fiscale autoriteit opereert. (On)afhankelijkheid van de
ECB ontstaat bij Stackelberg leiderschap van de ECB (fiscale autoriteiten) in het
dynamische staatsschuldstabilisatieconflict tussen de ECB en de fiscale autoriteiten.
Aangegeven wordt hoe zowel een zeer onafhankelijke als een zeer afhankelijke ECB
aanleiding geeft tot inefficiënte uitkomsten.
Hoofdstuk 4 vergelijkt de uitkomsten van het dynamische staatsschuldstabilisa-
tieconflict tussen de ECB en de fiscale autoriteiten wanneer beide autoriteiten 'commit-
ment technologies' hebben in het dynamische spel, zoals in hoofdstuk 2 en 3, met het
evenwicht waarin de beide spelers niet over een dergelijk instrument beschikken. In
termen van de theorie van differentiaalspelen: een vergelijking tussen de uitkomsten met
'open-loop Nash' strategieën en 'feedback Nash' strategieën wordt ondernomen.
Tabellini (1986) laat zien hoe in de context van nationaal monetair beleid, feedback
strategieën nog inefficiëntere uitkomsten produceren dan open-loop strategieën omdat de
ene speler nog minder bijdrage levert aan het gemeenschappelijke belang van stabilisatie
van de staatsschuld als de andere speler zijn bijdrage opvoert. Er onstaat met andere
woorden een dynamische vorm van het prisoner's dilemma.
Uitbreiding van de analyse van Tabellini naar een monetaire unie van twee
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identieke landen met een gemeenschappelijke monetaire autoriteit blijkt een aantal
interessante gevolgen te impliceren die worden verklaard. Aangetoond wordt dat vervan-
ging van nationaal monetair beleid door participatie in een monetaire unie geen effecten
oplevert bij open-loop strategies, mits landen een seigniorage aandeel ontvangen dat
evenredig is aan hun economische grootte. Een meer verrassend resultaat is dat met
closed-loop strategieën, financieringstekorten en inflatie lager zijn en staatsschuld
stabilisatie sneller bereikt wordt in de monetaire unie dan met nationaal monetair beleid.
De oorzaak is dat de monetaire autoriteit in de monetaire unie minder reageareert op het
fiscale beleid van de afzonderlijke fiscale autoriteiten dan in de situatie met nationaal
monetair beleid.
Vervolgens worden consequenties van codperatie tussen de fiscale autoriteiten in
de monetaire unie onderzocht. Dergelijke codperatie heeft geen verdere consequenties in
het geval van open-loop strategies. In het geval van closed-loop strategies, echter, zijn
de fiscale spelers weer in staat om dezelfde machtspositie t.o.v. de ECB te bereiken
welke zij voorheen hadden ten opzichte van de nationale monetaire autoriteit. Met
behulp van numerieke simulatie wordt vervolgens onderzocht wat de consequenties zijn
van de vorming van een monetaire unie tussen twee landen die verschillen in de hoogte
van de initiële staatsschuld en van een montaire unie die verschillen in hun fiscale
preferenties.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt onderzocht in hoeverre het 'optimal currency area'
probleem in de EMU beperkt kan worden door een Europees Federaal Transfer Systeem
(EFTS), zoals voorgesteld door van der Ploeg (1991), dat automatische transfers
impliceert van landen die positieve asymmetrische output schokken ondervinden naar
landen die negative asymmetrische output schokken ondervinden. Gedemonstreerd wordt
hoe zo'n EFTS bijdraagt tot de stabilisatie van business cycle fluctuaties die gegeneerd
worden door de asymmetrische schokken. Voorts laat de analyse zien hoe het fiscaal
beleid van de nationale fiscale autoriteiten en monetair beleid van ECB kan bijdragen
aan outputstabilisatie in the EU.
Interactie van monetair en fiscaal beleid en het transitieproces in Oost-Europa
Het geheel empirische hoofdstuk 6 bestudeerd het verschijnsel van 'currency
substitution' (valutasubstitutie) in de Oost-Europese economie ën in transitie en analy-
seert de fiscale consequenties van valutasubstitutie. Valutasubstitutie impliceert de
gedeeltelijk verdringing van de nationale valuta door vreemde valuta (veelal U.S. dollar)
in haar traditionele rol als transactie en als vermogensbewaarmiddel. De binnenlandse
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valuta wordt steeds minder aantrekkelijk -en de buitenlandse valuta steeds aantrekkelijk-
voor die functies bij een stijgende inflatie. De economieën is transitie werden vrijwel
zonder uitzondering getroffen door een sterke recessie en sterke prijsstijgingen, die
gevoed werden door de combinatie van prijsliberalisatie, een initiële monetaire overhang
en expansief monetair en fiscaal beleid.
Het effect van valutasubstitutie wordt onderzocht voor Hongarije, Polen,
Roemenië en Bulgarije. Er wordt getoetst of de (verwachte) wisselkoersdepreciatie een
negatief effect heeft op de vraag naaz binnenlandse valuta en een positief effect op de
vraag naar buitenlandse valuta. De vraag naar buitenlandse valuta wordt benaderd door
de buitenlandse valuta deposito's die de economisce subjecten aanhoden omdat er geen
gegevens zijn over de circulatie van buitenlandse bankbiljetten in deze landen. Een
onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen de korte - en lange termijn vraag naaz geld. De
geschatte parameters van de geldvraagfuncties worden vervolgens gebruikt om de
siegniorage maximaliserende inflatiegraad te berekenen voor de vier landen.
Hoofdstuk 7 toetst twee theoretische modellen in het geval van Polen, dat van de
voormalige planeconomie ën het meest radicale hervormingspad introduceerde. Het eerste
model analyseert opnieuw de relatie tussen valutasubstitutie en seigniorage en analyseert
het effect van valutacontroles die currency substitutie verhinderen. Geïnspireerd door de
analyse van Canzoneri en Diba (1991), wordt een representatieve agent model geïntrodu-
ceerd. Economische subjecten kunnen zowel binnenlandse als buitenlandse valuta
aanhouden. Er wordt geanalyseerd hoe de inflatie de verhouding tussen binnenlandse en
buitenlandse valuta in circulatie beïnvloedt en daardoor de seigniorage die de overheid
ontvangt. De overheid kan besluiten valutasubstitutie te ontmoedigen. De welvaartseffec-
ten van een dergelijke maatregel worden bepaald. Op basis van de theoretische analyse
wordt in de empirische applicatie, Polen bestudeerd. Polen introduceerde in Januazi 1990
een omvangrijk hervormingsprogramma. Een belangrijk onderdeel van het programma
was de afschaffing van het bestaande systeem van valutacontroles. De hoge inflatie die
heerste, stimuleerde een sterke toename van valutasubstitutie. Geanalyseerd wordt hoe de
afschaffing van de valutarestricties en de sterke toename van valutasubstitutie in een
inflatoire omgeving, tot een sterke daling van seigniorage leidden.
In het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 7 wordt het theoretische model van Brock
(1979) over financiële repressie, inflatie en seigniorage toegepast op Polen dat een
omvangrijke liberalisatie van de financiële sector doorvoerde in 1990. Voorheen werden
alle activiteiten in de monetaire en financiële sector uitgevoerd door het staatsmonopolie.
De repressie van de financiële sector vormt een belangrijke bron van seigniorage voor
de overheid. In het representatieve agent model van Brock bepalen de economische
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subjecten de hoeveelheid contanten en de hoeveelheid deposito's. De overheid bepaalt
de vereiste reserves die de financiële sector moet aanhouden. Door een hogere vereiste
reserve, dwingen de monetaire autoriteiten de financiële sector om meer reserves aan te
houden. Hierdoor wordt de basisgeldhoeveelheid uitgebreidt en stijgt de seigniorage.
Hoofdstuk 8, tenslotte, onderzoekt de empirische implicaties van het model van
de 'dynamisch optimale belastingen' (dynamic optimal taxation) voor een groep van
veertig ontwikkelingslanden en twintig geïndustrialiseerde landen. Het model van de
dynamisch optimale belastingen bepaalt de optimale structuur van het belastingsysteem,
zowel t.a.v. de hoogte van de verschillende tarieven voor iedere periode als de aanpas-
sing van de tarieven tussen verschillende perioden. Een onderscheid wordt gemaakt
tussen het zg. 'tijdsinconsistente' en het 'tijdsconsistente' evencwicht. In het laatste
geval veroorzaakt een hoge staatsschuld een 'commitment' probleem m.b.t. monetair
beleid: een rationaal publiek is er zich van bewust dat de hoge staatsschuld de overheid
een prikkel verschaft om m.b.v. inflatoir monetair beleid de rëele waarde van de
staatsschuld te reduceren. In het tijdsconsistente evenwicht is de inflatie dientengevolge
hoger dan in het tijdsinconsistente evenwicht waarin de overheid wel een commitment-
technologie bezit om de optimale monetaire politiek te implementeren, en inflatiever-
wachtingen onafhankelijk van de hoogte van de staatsschuld worden bepaald. In het
empirische gedeelte wordt onderzocht in welke gevallen de tijdsinconsistente en in
welke gevallen de tijdsconsistente evenwicten meer relevant lijken te zijn.
Een korte conclusie vat de belangrijkste inzichten nog eens samen en overweegt
enkele onderwerpen voor mogelijk toekomstig onderzoek.
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